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1 Introduction 
For 10 years, I led a program to support local organizations that focused on 
overcoming ethnic divides in the former Yugoslavia. Eschewing government grants 
and the short-term project mindset, we sought out a few, mostly grassroots, 
organizations to support with a long-term partnership that included modest funds 
and spaces for reflection,1 as sought by the organizations. This research emerged 
from that experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia or BiH), particularly from two 
practical questions with which we struggled. The first question was, how do 
organizations become change agents, or as we often thought of it, develop that ‘spark’ 
that motivates and drives them? The longer that the post-Dayton era continues, the 
more the current political institutions seem devoted to exploiting the state for 
personal gain and stuck in the ethnic politics of mutual recrimination, condemning 
citizens to economic stagnation and a lack of hope for positive change. If change 
must include bottom-up political struggle, as I came to believe, then the question is, 
how do organizations become change agents towards the state, rejecting the 
common understanding in BiH (i.e., anti-politics) that politics is a dirty and immoral 
affair that is best avoided all together?  
The second question was, how do such organizations develop legitimacy 
among those in their surroundings? One of the organizations aimed to open up 
societal dialogue to discuss the events of the wars of the 1990s and their aftermath 
and approached this goal by working with veterans. That group’s strategy was based 
on the legitimacy of veterans, due to the way that veterans hold weight in social 
discussions because of their sacrifice and moral authority. However, to implement 
this approach, the organization first had to establish its own organizational 
legitimacy with veterans. That process took many years of building trust to be able 
to invite veterans to safe spaces where former enemies could openly dialogue together 
and trust each other. They felt that their organizational legitimacy with the veterans 
                                                          
1 Grants were up to US$10,000/year, and spaces for reflection included a yearly meeting of partners with 
changing theoretical input and access to training opportunities. 
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made it possible to organize public visits by mixed groups of veterans to sites of 
atrocities committed by the various armed forces. Although marginalized, those 
events still had symbolic power and influenced public discourse about the past. This 
potential contrasted to the limited social and political impact of many donor-funded 
organizations. Many such organizations were visibly separate from the everyday 
reality of life in BiH and their lofty goals of peacebuilding and democratization were 
commonly dismissed in everyday interactions. Bringing these two questions 
together, I hypothesized that those organizations with local legitimacy might be 
more likely to have a broader sense of agency and a stronger ability to influence 
policies. This hypothesis was guided by the assumptions that the organizations with 
local legitimacy would be more accepted by domestic political actors and better able 
to mobilize citizens and to have a stronger sense of ownership of the government. 
 The following paragraphs will briefly describe an academic approach to 
addressing this hypothesis. Understanding and explaining political agency is 
furthered by a conceptual framework that focuses on the political effects of civil 
society2 (CS) from the actors’ perspective. This dissertation has adopted the concept 
of civic agency for this very reason. Civic agency is the primary focus of concern 
within the theory of civic-driven change (CDC), which was proposed as a way to 
‘bring the politics back in,’ given the limited and de-politicized way that CS has been 
applied in donor3 policies (Fowler & Biekart, 2008). This dissertation applies civic 
agency to conceptualize the ‘spark’ that motivates and shapes civil society’s struggle 
towards the state in divided societies. The dissertation provides in-depth research on 
the civic agency of both formal and non-formal CS actors (CSOs and non-formal 
activists, respectively), focusing on the types of actions that are undertaken and the 
outcomes of engagement with the state.  
                                                          
2 Civil society theories and the definition of CS used in this dissertation are discussed in section 1.2.1, 
page 14. 
3 In BiH, donors include bilateral and multilateral agencies from Western countries, which provided funds 
for CS. Based on publicly-available information, non-Western donor support for CS is minimal (Ministry 
of Finance and Treasury, 2016). 
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Subsequently, empirical findings related to civic agency were used to 
investigate the causal links between legitimacy and civic agency. These links were 
explored by selecting and comparing similar CSOs with different kinds of 
legitimacy. In addition, the civic agency of activists was also compared to that of 
CSOs in a similar context. Local legitimacy was treated first from the perspective of 
citizens, because the political mobilization of citizens is often considered important 
for understanding how CS actors influence government policies  (Diamond, 1994; 
Tilly, Tarrow, & McAdam, 2004; White, 2004). The perspectives of political actors 
on CS legitimacy were also researched because legitimacy in the eyes of political 
actors may be connected to CSOs’ ability to achieve outcomes. Finally, legitimacy in 
the eyes of donors was also considered because of the important role of international 
donors in BiH in general, and their emphasis on fostering CS in particular. 
International policies following ethnic conflict since 1989 have frequently been based 
on what has been called the ‘liberal peace,’ anchored in the holy trinity of democratic 
governance, CS, and a free market (Richmond, 2008). The central role played by CS 
discourse within liberal peace policies has been the foundation of ‘CS strengthening’ 
as an international policy aim, seen as a means to promote democratization and 
peacebuilding. CS strengthening policies were conceived as a method of reforming 
state-society relations and fostering responsive and legitimate institutions that can 
effectively deal with conflict (Cousens, Kumar, & Wermester, 2001; Woodward, 
2007). 
This dissertation will analyze the links between legitimacy and civic agency 
in relation to two academic debates. The first debate focuses on CS strengthening 
programs and how they reduce local support for CSOs and activists, while the second 
debate focuses on the difficulties of mobilizing cross-cutting identities in divided 
societies. The first debate is what can be termed the ‘legitimacy critique’ regarding 
the political effects of CS strengthening programs. This critique claims that donor 
programs foster weak advocates because supported CSOs have low local legitimacy 
(Fagan, 2005; Howell & Pearce, 2001b; Kostovicova, 2010; Pouligny, 2005). The 
literature related to the ‘legitimacy critique,’ which is elaborated in the theoretical 
framework that follows, has highlighted the ways that donor practices select 
Chapter 1 
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recipient CSOs with low local legitimacy and also actively reduce CSOs’ local 
legitimacy by isolating them from constituencies. The degree to which the 
‘legitimacy critique’ is correct matters for understanding political developments 
because this critique means that the civic agency of donor-supported CSOs is limited 
as they lack the means to influence policies due to low legitimacy among local 
populations.  
The second debate concerns the potential and limitations of CS vis-à-vis 
ethnic division in a divided society.4 CS legitimacy can tell us about the potential 
and challenges associated with mobilizing cross-cutting identities to reach across 
ethnic lines, as veterans’ common experiences and identities were able to do in the 
example mentioned earlier. Politically salient cross-cutting identities can have an 
integrating and moderating effect on ethnic politics (Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, 
1995; Horowitz, 1985; Selway, 2011). According to this perspective, civic agency in 
divided societies can influence long-term political developments by mobilizing or 
strengthening such cross-cutting identities. However, this process is difficult because 
cross-cutting identities are inhibited by the nature of ethnic politics that is prevalent 
in divided societies. The literature on divided societies often places greater emphasis 
on those within CS that advocate for division, because CS is as divided as political 
society and there are strong interests to maintain the divided status quo (e.g., Belloni, 
2008; Bojicic-dzelilovic, 2006; S. Fisher, 2003; Orjuela, 2010). This research 
examines the potential and limitations of civic agency in terms of influencing cross-
cutting identities by investigating the advocacy of selected women’s, youth, and 
social welfare CSOs, as well as activism framed around a ‘citizen’ identity.  
This dissertation uses Bosnia as a case study for how civic agency develops in 
the context of CS strengthening programs in ethnically divided societies. Its 
scientific relevance is strengthened because it refers to both the debates regarding 
the political effects of CS strengthening programs and also CS in divided societies. 
CS strengthening programs have existed in Bosnia for over 20 years and have the 
                                                          
4 ‘[A] society which is both ethnically diverse and where ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around 
which interests are organised for political purposes, such as elections’ (B. Reilly, 2001, p. 4). 
  Introduction 
 
5 
second highest per-capita financial investment of any divided society in the world.5 
These characteristics mean that Bosnia is an extreme case of CS strengthening 
programs. Extreme cases are instructive for drawing more general conclusions 
because the more general possibilities and limitations of civic agency are magnified 
by this intensity and duration (Yin, 2003). This leads to the expectation that the 
findings will also be relevant for other divided societies with CS strengthening 
programs. The conclusion will consider the evidence for this broader relevance of 
the findings. 
The intensity of the wars from 1992-1995 and political significance of the 
intervention in the immediate aftermath of the cold war contributed to Bosnia’s role 
as a ‘pilot project for international governance’ (Ehrke 2003 in Fischer, 2006). 
However, since 2006, the political and military aspects of intervention have been 
reduced,6 leaving Bosnia as a case of state-building and CS strengthening efforts that 
have been ongoing for more than two decades. Governance since 2006 as thus been 
characterized by electoral democracy based on both ethnic group rights and citizens’ 
rights as inscribed into the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) (Belloni, 2007; Toal & 
Dahlman, 2011). This research was conducted from 2012-2014 and covers this 
period after 2006. 
The focus on civic agency follows a shift in the peace literature away from 
interventions and their (lack of) results and toward the ‘local turn,’  meaning a shift 
in epistemology from interventionism to the ideational constructions of local actors 
and the processes, practices, and interrelationships that shape those constructions 
(Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). From the perspective of the ‘local turn,’ the 
relevance of civic agency will be examined by placing attention on those CSOs and 
non-formal activists who do articulate political goals. Given the characteristics of 
democratic governance in a divided society, what can be learned regarding the 
experiences of engagement in governance processes? Ultimately, this exploration 
                                                          
5 See Table 6.1 Divided societies with donor programs, page 185. 
6 The earlier period (1995-2005) was characterized by the ‘Bonn powers,’ based on which the 
internationally-appointed High Representative passed laws and removed elected officials. Outside powers 
retain a role in the Peace Implementation Council, including the naming of a High Representative. 
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contributes to our understanding of the utility of civic agency as a theory of change 
in divided societies.  
This dissertation adds empirical detail to the ‘local turn’ literature because 
existing research tells us little about the civic agency of CSOs that are not supported 
by donors. Although the ‘legitimacy critique’ discusses low local legitimacy, there has 
been little research about what characteristics of CSOs and processes contribute to 
high local legitimacy. Much of the literature on the impacts of CS strengthening 
programs in divided societies has limited its analysis to the relatively few donor-
supported CSOs. However, national and local government funding in Bosnia is 
about seven times higher than funding from external donors.7 Further, beyond the 
idea that legitimacy with donors leads to low legitimacy with local populations, what 
is the nature of the interaction between local and donor legitimacy?  
The approach following the ‘local turn’ will be informed by the literature on 
CS strengthening programs and CS in divided societies, which are helpful ways to 
conceptualize the challenges and opportunities faced by both non-formal activists 
and CSOs. The dissertation contributes due to its focus on these elements’ joint 
effects on legitimacy and civic agency. Given that the inquiry brings together 
separate literatures on CS strengthening programs, divided societies, and civic 
agency, it focuses on theory-building rather than theory-testing. The comparison of 
CSOs with different kinds of legitimacy and CSOs and non-formal activists in the 
same context strengthen the potential for such a theory-building exercise to identify 
important variables, concepts, and arguments that can later be extended to other 
cases. In addition, this approach adds to and nuances the literature on CS in divided 
societies (e.g., Belloni, 2008; Putnam, 2000; Varshney, 2002), which does not 
address these joint effects with CS strengthening programs.  
This dissertation thus aims to answer the following research question: How 
do the local and donor legitimacy of civil society actors influence their civic agency and their 
outcomes in the presence of donor CS strengthening programs in a divided society?   
                                                          
7 Grants for civil society and human rights in 2012 of 7.5 million euros (Donor Coordination Forum, 
2012) and grants to CSOs from all levels of government of 51.3 million euros (SIF in BiH & CSPC, 
2011).  
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This introduction will first establish the context of CS and governance in the 
Bosnian case. Next, the introduction offers a theoretical framework for the research, 
presenting each of the key concepts (CS, civic agency, participatory and transactional 
capacities, and legitimacy) and explaining how those concepts are used in relation to 
theory and empirical research. The theoretical framework begins by describing two 
previously introduced frameworks for understanding this context, based on the 
literature on CS strengthening programs and CS in divided societies. This is 
followed by a definition of civic agency, including the potential relevance of 
participatory and transactional capacities. Finally, legitimacy is discussed, including 
a multi-dimensional framework for analyzing the varied understandings of 
legitimacy with different actors.  
The discussion of the theoretical framework will highlight the scientific 
relevance of this dissertation. This will focus on how the research contributes to 
several ongoing debates about the relationship between CS and identity politics 
dominant in divided societies, and the ‘legitimacy critique’ of CS strengthening 
programs. The remainder of the introduction will focus on laying out the research. 
First, the research question will be broken down into four sub-questions in order to 
tease out the causal links between legitimacy and civic agency. The theoretical 
framework of the research question is represented graphically in a conceptual model, 
which will be used throughout the dissertation. Then, a section on methodology will 
present the design of the research and describe how the data was collected and 
analyzed to answer the research question. Finally, the societal relevance of the 
dissertation is discussed in light of current donor policies and discourse among CS 
actors in Bosnia. 
1.1 Exploring civil society and governance in the Bosnian case 
This section aims to review the literature on the relationship between CS and 
governance in Bosnia. It is helpful to begin with a discussion of the context of pre-
war CS and the political system that was instituted in the Dayton Agreement. Next, 
three analytical approaches that are used in the literature on CS and post-war 
Chapter 1 
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political developments in Bosnia will be introduced. The first approach focuses on 
faulty models and incorrect assumptions regarding the potential of CS that are made 
in donor CS strengthening programs. This perspective is critical of the potential of 
CS to develop civic agency and to influence governance at all in the present Bosnian 
institutional framework, let alone in a positive fashion that is conducive to 
democratization or peacebuilding. The second approach identifies the challenges to 
developing civic agency in the persistence of patrimonial power relations within 
formally democratic institutions. From this perspective, a divided society obstructs 
civic agency based on cross-cutting identities. The third approach concerns the 
stance of anti-politics, of distancing oneself from political actors and institutions, 
which CS actors adopt. Throughout the section, the contribution of the literature 
towards the research question will be identified. 
Before the 1992-1995 war, Bosnia-Herzegovina possessed many mostly 
amateur community organizations (often sports and cultural organizations), which 
were largely controlled by the Communist Party. In addition, elected neighborhood 
organizations (mjesne zajednice) were a prime channel for local planning and 
community participation (Sterland, 2006). During and after the war, most of these 
associations were either dismantled or reformed with new leadership and 
membership as populations shifted. The pre-war urban population had been heavily 
mixed, with more homogeneous rural settlements often close to similar settlements 
of different ethnicity. The pre-war population was composed of 43.5% Bosniaks, 
31.2% Serbs, 17.4% Croats, and 7.9% Yugoslavs and other identifications.8 Ethnic 
cleansing and the pressures of war led to the division of the formerly mixed 
population into territories with clear ethnic majorities. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement formalized these divisions, with the Republika 
Srpska (RS) as a centralized entity with a large Serb majority (achieved through 
ethnic cleansing), the Federation of BiH (FBiH) as a federal entity consisting of ten 
rather autonomous cantons populated mostly by ethnic Bosniaks and Croats, and 
                                                          
8 The figures are based on self-identification in the 1991 census using the post-war term Bosniak in place 
of the term Muslim, which was used at the time as an ethnic and religious identifier (Toal & Dahlman, 
2011). 
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Brčko as a small autonomous district under international control (Toal & Dahlman, 
2011). New joint state-level institutions were designed around consociationalism, or 
power sharing between rather autonomous ethnic elites, which was inscribed into 
the state by the division of state institutions along ethnic lines, with extensive veto 
rights for each ethnic group (Belloni, 2004; Touquet & Vermeersch, 2008). This 
institutionalization of ethnicity as the guiding rationale for politics led to 
characterizations of post-Dayton BiH as an ethnocracy (L. M. Howard, 2012) and 
a ‘democracy of ethnic oligarchies’ (Mujkic, 2007, p. 113) with limited democratic 
substance. This logic benefits ethnonationalist parties by constructing ethnic groups 
as homogeneous blocks that are led by their respective elites, thereby undermining 
the potential for the politicization of non-ethnic issues and cross-cutting identities. 
The post-war period witnessed simultaneous and ongoing initiatives toward 
statebuilding and CS strengthening by international actors.9 This initial period 
involved the influx of international NGOs and international support for new NGOs 
as service providers, focused on rebuilding and resettlement. Intervenors made two 
assumptions based on the decontextualized application of a model of CS that 
developed in Western societies. First, the intervenors assumed that support for ‘civil 
society’ would function as a check on nationalist (divisive) politics and promote 
ethnic reconciliation (Belloni, 2007, p. 96; Fagan, 2005). This tendency to expect a 
lot from CS gained strength as democratic institutions and external interventions 
failed to achieve reconciliation (Belloni, 2001).10 The short-term goal of reshaping 
institutions thus shifted to a long-term focus on ‘social engineering’ to diminish the 
harmful influence of nationalism and to build a ‘vibrant’ CS according to Western 
ideals. The second assumption underlying CS strengthening programs was the idea 
that a democratic Bosnian state would be ‘open to and under the control of civil 
society, [and] responsive to the advocacy campaigns of the local civic groups’ 
(Belloni, 2001, p. 170). The international discourse of CS strengthening has thus 
                                                          
9 See (Belloni, 2007; Chandler, 2000; Donais, 2005). 
10 See (Šavija-Valha, 2012, p. 243), who critiques ‘reconciliation interventionism’ based on the centrality 
of ethnicity and ‘the techno-managerial approach which disregards the specificities of the socio-cultural 
context to which it is applied.’ 
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become laden with the multiple goals of sidestepping 'uncooperative' local elites, 
solving ethnic tensions, promoting reintegration and enabling the post-war 
democratic transition – in short, solving the Bosnian puzzle.  
The literature on the failures of CS strengthening programs to lead to more 
inclusive politics and long-term conflict resolution coexists and often interrelates 
with the second analytical approach regarding the political role of CS groups focused 
on patrimonial power relations. In this discourse, the ‘weakness of CS’ can be 
explained by post-war power structures that are based on patronage of state jobs and 
funds, connections to criminal elements, economic informality, and control of state-
owned enterprises (Andjelic, 2003; Belloni & Hemmer, 2010; Donais, 2005; Segert 
& Džihić, 2012). In addition to their central role in post-war politics, both 
clientelistic relationships and ethnic division are also seen as central for social order 
and as mechanisms by which elites maintain control despite international attempts 
to undermine them (Belloni, 2001, 2007; Donais, 2005). These two characteristics 
are mutually reinforcing, in that patronage networks have been strengthened by the 
ability to divide and conquer potential common interests of groups of citizens along 
ethnic lines. For example, labor unions have remained divided along ethnic lines and 
largely unable or uninterested to engage in joint actions around common goals. 
Indeed, governance in BiH can be characterized as neopatrimonialism, in 
which patronage and clientelistic power relations coexist with institutions of 
rational-legal statehood (Ngin & Verkoren, 2015; Richmond & Franks, 2007). This 
idea may explain the low levels of institutional responsiveness to citizens’ concerns 
and the governmental neglect of marginalized groups, rather than the ‘weakness of 
CS.’ In addition, neopatrimonialism means that ‘formal rules, elections and public 
bureaucracies exist and matter but in the reality of neopatrimonial regime informal 
rules and norms take precedence over formal institutions’ (Guliyev, 2011, p. 578). 
The degree of divergence between formal institutions and informal rules can be 
expected to shape the outcomes that result from civic agency.  
Neither the discussion of CS strengthening nor the discussion of divided 
societies addresses the expectations that Bosnian citizens have regarding CS and 
governance. A recurring and quite relevant theme in the literature concerns ‘anti-
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politics’ as a predominant stance that shapes the actions of CSOs, as well as activists, 
and their efforts to be seen as legitimate (legitimation). This analysis focuses on the 
construction of politics (politika) in Bosnia as a dirty and immoral category, as a 
‘separate universe of (immoral) values, of people who pursue power for the sake of 
it, who are egotistical and untrustworthy’ (Touquet, 2015, p. 398). Anti-political 
stances also reflect the continuity with oppositional activity from the socialist past, 
‘as a non-political, moral activity supported [by] the presumption that there was “too 
much politics” and “too much state” in the former system’ (Jalušić, 1998, p. 14). 
Anti-politics comes from a position of purity and draws on ‘moral voice’ as a source 
of legitimacy. However, anti-politics can also lead to withdrawal from the sphere of 
politics and withdrawal from communication with political actors or parties and any 
possibility of incremental improvements to state policies.  
Touquet (2012) analyzed the framing of the protests that took place in 
Sarajevo in 2008 by protesters and authorities, which encompassed claims of 
legitimation and delegitimation. The protesters framed their actions with respect to 
the articulation of citizenship values, local identity focused on Sarajevo rather than 
ethnicity, and anti-politics. The authorities responded with discrediting counter-
frames, including labelling protesters as an uncivil and violent mob directed by 
political parties and supported by foreigners. Anti-politics is reflected in Touquet’s 
analysis that the protests were delegitimized in the eyes of citizens by accusations 
that the SDP and Naša Stranka, two opposition parties that articulated non-
nationalist ideologies, were supporters of and benefited from the protests. In 
addition, the counter-frames reflect echoes of the ‘legitimacy critique,’ in that foreign 
support by itself was considered by the authorities to have a delegitimizing effect 
among citizens. 
In addition to the above analysis of protests in 2008, scholarship related to 
Bosnian activism has followed a sequence of protest waves, which indicate more 
confrontational repertoires of action and more sustained mobilization. The evidence 
for this idea includes the 'Picin Park' protests in 2012 in Banja Luka that stretched 
over 100 days of continuous street protest (Lippman, 2012a), the 2013 ‘babylution' 
protests in Sarajevo that were motivated by existential danger to infants caused by 
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political deadlock, the annual 'white ribbon' protest that commemorates victims of 
ethnic cleansing in Prijedor (Hodžić, 2014), and most notably, the riots, protests, 
and plenums in February 2014 (Arsenijević, 2014; Gilbert & Mujanović, 2016). A 
key question then for observers of Bosnian activist CS is whether this sequence 
indicates increasing civic agency through the creation of new understandings of 
politika as an alternative to anti-politics.  
While the literature on anti-politics focuses on contentious and non-formal 
activism, it is also the case that anti-politics also shapes CSOs’ opportunities, as 
evidenced by research focusing on women’s CSOs. Dominant donor representations 
of women emphasize their role as ‘peacemakers and natural agents of ethnic 
reconciliation’ (Helms, 2003a, p. 15). Paradoxically, the effect of these discourses 
was to marginalize women from formal political power at the same time that they 
were expected to achieve the political goals of reconciliation and refugee return. 
Women’s CSOs adopted a stance of anti-politics in the face of perceptions of politics 
as a corrupt and male sphere, using ‘moral voice’ as a means to gain legitimacy and 
exercise power. In addition, women’s CSOs used humanitarian actions strategically 
to emphasize their humanitarian nature focused on common and universally-
recognized goals  rather than their political nature (Helms, 2014).  
The literature on the early period of CS strengthening programs in Bosnia 
supports many elements of the ‘legitimacy critique.’ The supported forms of 
organizations were primarily NGOs rather than social movements, trade unions, and 
religious confessions, leading many Bosnian citizens to perceive CS strengthening 
programs as ‘as bizarre and alien efforts that do not take into account Bosnian history 
and society’ (Belloni, 2001, p. 169). Donor-supported NGOs from this period were 
characterized by low levels of citizen participation and separation from society at 
large (Fagan, 2005). The connection between legitimacy and civic agency has been 
made by Belloni (2007), who concludes in a section on ‘civil society that works’ that 
it is organizations with legitimacy based on tradition and socially-accepted values 
due to their perceived independence from donors that made up the rare examples of 
effective CS initiatives. An illustrative example was the Igman Initiative, which was 
legitimated by its well-known founding intellectuals and which was able to initiate 
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legislative changes and exchange programs to strengthen regional, cross-border 
cooperation. 
However, several more recent articles have emphasized a more long-term 
potential for a positive contribution of civic agency. Fagan pointed towards the 
emergence of a new ‘tripartite relationship between NGOs, citizens, and the state’ 
(Fagan, 2005, p. 410), meaning the increasing willingness of some government 
authorities to work with NGOs and increased respect for NGOs among citizens. In 
Fagan’s account, this change was fostered by donors’ shift from the unrealistic goals 
of ‘radical transformation’ to sustainability, development, and capacity building. The 
narrative of incremental positive change is also reflected in the conclusion that CS is 
‘slowly rising to the political role it will have to play to make peace and democracy 
sustainable’ (Belloni & Hemmer, 2010, p. 129). In comparison to the early literature 
discussed above, these more optimistic findings suggest that the literature on the 
political effects of CS strengthening programs may have drawn conclusions about 
their effects that are either premature or too broad. This dissertation’s systematic 
inquiry regarding civic agency, now more than 20 years since the Dayton agreement, 
can therefore provide a needed reconsideration of the long-term effects. 
This review of the literature on CS and governance in Bosnia has focused on 
three analytical approaches. There is widespread agreement that the assumptions of 
the intervenors that CS strengthening programs would lead to a ‘vibrant CS’ that is 
able to oppose nationalist politics and hold governments and political actors to 
account have not been supported in practice. Second, there is also an elaborated body 
of research on the stability of neopatrimonial governance based on patrimonial power 
relations and their influence on the governance outcomes that result from civic 
agency. The third approach concerns the discourse of anti-politics and how its 
resonance for citizens shapes civic agency among both non-formal activists and CSO 
actors.  
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1.2 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework will first cover two structural explanations regarding civic 
agency in Bosnia. The first explanation relates to civic agency in relation to the 
literature on CS strengthening programs (section 1.2.1). The following section 1.2.2 
will discuss the contribution of existing theory regarding civic agency in ethnically 
divided societies. Then, in section 1.2.3, the discussion will turn to the definition 
and theory of civic agency, a definition that includes the capacities that enable CS 
actors to influence governance outcomes. Section 1.2.4 reviews the debate whether 
civic agency is determined primarily by these actors’ participatory capacity to 
mobilize citizens or by their transactional capacity based on ties to political actors 
(Císař, 2010; Petrova & Tarrow, 2007)? A final section (1.2.5) explores the concept 
of CSO legitimacy and reviews the existing knowledge about the instrumental, 
normative, and traditional characteristics of CSOs that might lead these 
organizations to be considered legitimate. 
1.2.1 Civil society strengthening programs 
This section of the theoretical framework focuses on the effects of international CS 
strengthening programs on civic agency. The section begins by elaborating 
contesting discourses about the definition of CS with contrasting views regarding its 
political role. This introduction sets the stage for a discussion of the ‘legitimacy 
critique’ as an explanation of the weak political effects of CS strengthening 
programs, despite high expectations.  This dissertation contributes to the literature 
by addressing the rather deterministic claims of the ‘legitimacy critique’ via its 
examination of the relationships between donor support, local support, and civic 
agency. 
A broad agreement in international policies about the benefit of CS for 
democratization (e.g., Diamond, 1994; Ottaway & Carothers, 2000) has occurred 
despite considerable disagreement about the definition of CS. The following 
paragraphs will describe social capital, neoliberal, and Gramscian approaches to 
understanding CS. The multiplicity of definitions, which contain elements that are 
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diverse, complex, and contentious, has been seen as part of its appeal, in that CS can 
be all things to all people (Spurk, 2010). However, it also complicates discussions 
about CS. As will be seen, the definition that is used heavily influences the resulting 
understanding of the political roles of CS.  
The prominence of CS discourse within international donor policies 
coincided, and was frequently associated, with a conceptualization of CS based on 
social capital (Howell & Pearce, 2001a; Spurk, 2010). Social capital refers to ties and 
trust among people that result from their organizational involvement and has 
become an influential concept for explaining macro-level characteristics of 
governance and institutional performance (Putnam, 1992). Putnam’s finding was 
that a rich associational life (a large number of CSOs) correlated with future 
economic development and better-functioning institutions, from which many 
citizens benefited. The mechanism, however, is indirect. Namely, in the social 
capital literature, the political character of CS derives from the role of CSOs as 
builders of trust (Welzel, Inglehart, & Deutsch, 2005).  
A second CS discourse that is often viewed as dominant within CS 
strengthening programs is the neoliberal viewpoint, as described by its critics 
(Bebbington, Hickey, & Mitlin, 2008). In addition to its focus on a diminished role 
for the state, the neoliberal approach also emphasizes the importance of CSOs as 
service providers. In addition, this approach limits what are considered valid CSO 
actions to the frameworks of a democratic system, human rights and a free market 
economy, as can be seen when donors do not support or respond to protest and social 
movements that challenge these frameworks (Harriss, 2001). Regarding the 
potential for civic agency within such a neoliberal approach, Choudry has argued 
that ‘[t]he dominant notion of “civil society” emphasizes the rights of individuals to 
pursue their self-interest rather than collective rights, and simultaneously upholds 
and obscures the interests of state and capital’ (Choudry, 2010, p. 18).  
Donors’ neoliberal ideological assumptions feature prominently in an 
explanation of the weak political effects of CS strengthening programs, which can 
be called the ‘neoliberal critique.’ The ‘neoliberal critique’ is that CS strengthening 
programs have weak political effects because donors bring an approach to change 
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that is technocratic and a priori apolitical. The context of liberal peace policies has 
been claimed to build states ‘while draining their political substance’ (Pouligny, 
2005, p. 505), leaving a diminished space for the goals that CS advocates might 
pursue. Finally, a focus on service delivery in neoliberal donor understandings of CS 
can supplant an alternative focus on campaigning for the government to provide 
those services (Dagnino, 2008a).  
CS strengthening programs are a political project whose aim has been 
described as  ‘building “new” societies’ (Pouligny, 2005), which calls for adopting a 
critical perspective on the underlying power dynamics. Here, Antonio Gramsci's 
(1971) perspective on CS is useful because CS is defined as, ‘an arena in which 
hegemonic ideas concerning the organization of economic and social life are both 
established and contested’ (Bebbington et al., 2008: 7).  In Gramsci's understanding, 
CS is the non-coercive part of institutions, which creates and (re)produces 
hegemony through consensus within the coerced borders established by the state. As 
will be further elaborated below, the context in BiH can be understood as being 
shaped by the dual hegemony of CS strengthening programs and ethnonationalist 
politics. A Gramscian framework for understanding CS also suggests an interest in 
counter-hegemonic movements. In this case, the political effect is the way that 
competing ideas about social organization come to be broadly accepted or rejected. 
Given the contrasting definitions, defining CS as an analytical category can 
benefit from adopting White’s (2004) position. White advocates for an inclusive 
definition of CS that recognizes existing civil societies rather than an imagined CS 
with normative assumptions. For this reason, the dissertation adopts White’s 
definition of CS, which is ‘an intermediate associational realm between state and 
family, populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy 
autonomy in relation to the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society 
to protect or extend their interests or values’ (White, 2004: 10). This definition 
encompasses both the normative and interest-based aspects of civil society 
organizing, and also includes the dimension of autonomy, which is necessary for 
political struggles to influence the public sphere (the state, as well as individuals, 
families, and other elements of civil society). Non-formal activists, who were also 
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researched, are included within this definition, using a broad understanding of 
‘organizations.’ Such a definition does not assume ‘civil’ characteristics (i.e., as 
‘schools of democracy,’ inclusive, and generally a force for good), as frequently 
inscribed into CS strengthening programs (de Tocqueville, 2002; Ottaway & 
Carothers, 2000). Rather, this definition also includes what some call ‘uncivil 
society,’ which is also autonomous and formed voluntarily but advocates for 
xenophobic, nationalist, or exclusive goals (Kopecký & Mudde, 2003). This point is 
mentioned because although nationalist CSOs were not researched, ethnic CSOs 
that for some are exclusive (e.g., Belloni, 2008) were included in the research 
presented in this dissertation. 
Having adopted a definition of CS, we are now equipped to address the 
disconnect between the assumptions of donors regarding the positive political effects 
of CS strengthening programs and their outcomes. Namely, many externally-funded 
CS strengthening programs in divided societies have been designed with the 
intention that they would enable bottom-up change, increasing the responsiveness 
of democratic institutions to citizens’ material, social, and economic needs 
(Carothers, 2008; Fagan, 2005; Paffenholz, 2010a). This intention developed 
because CSOs are theorized to limit state power and provide alternative non-
electoral channels for representing interests (Diamond, 1994; White, 2004) and to 
facilitate and enhance collective action (Ostrom, 2015). The literature on CS 
strengthening programs, however, has often advanced a ‘legitimacy critique,’ which 
is skeptical of the programs’ ability to foster effective advocates and often explains 
this weakness in terms of those advocates’ low local legitimacy (Howell & Pearce, 
2001b; Kostovicova, 2010; Pouligny, 2005).  
The ‘legitimacy critique’ is based on the way that CS strengthening programs 
provide incentives for CSOs, which contributes to making them weak advocates. 
Many CSOs have been created in response to available donor funding but with little 
local backing. In addition, an extensive literature has elaborated the mechanisms by 
which such programs select and also lead to CSOs with low local legitimacy 
(Pickering, 2006; Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 2014). Donor programs that use the 
limited criteria of ‘nonprofit’ and ‘nongovernmental’ have focused most of their 
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attention on ‘professional’ NGOs while overlooking grassroots institutions, religious 
organizations, trade unions, community organizations, traditional leadership 
institutions, and informal networks (Howell & Pearce, 2001b; Kappler & 
Richmond, 2011; Kostovicova, 2010). In this way, externally-driven CSOs distract 
citizens from a more indigenous civil society (Bebbington et al., 2008; Pouligny, 
2005). 
In addition to these conclusions about the biases by which donors select 
CSOs without existing local legitimacy, donor programs themselves may lead to a 
reduction of the local legitimacy of the CSOs that they support. CS strengthening 
programs have been found to contribute to low local legitimacy due to their focus on 
‘professionalization,’ which distances CSOs and puts them in tension with their 
constituency (Dagnino, 2008a; Heideman, 2013; Kostovicova, 2010) and ordinary 
people (Fischer, 2006; Grødeland, 2006). Groups that are formed by citizens uniting 
for social or political change either receive little assistance or ‘NGO-ize’ to become 
eligible for donor funding at the cost of growing distance from the concerns of their 
supporters (Bebbington et al., 2008; Heideman, 2013; Hilhorst, 2003; Kostovicova, 
2010).  
This section of the theoretical framework has discussed the literature related 
to what donors mean by CS in their CS strengthening programs and put forth a 
definition that aims to serve as an analytical category. The ‘legitimacy critique’ and 
the earlier ‘neoliberal critique’ are not mutually exclusive but rather can reinforce one 
another. First, these critiques are in agreement about the apolitical effects of donor 
CS strengthening programs, which limit and suppress civic agency. These critiques 
are also in agreement about the way that donor programs emphasize professional 
and technocratic approaches to change. The ‘legitimacy critique’ is the most directly 
relevant for this research and will help to establish expectations regarding CSO 
legitimacy. The scientific relevance of this research is to provide evidence in regard 
to these expectations. Now we will turn to the second body of literature that 
addresses the context related to CS in divided societies.  
  Introduction 
 
19 
1.2.2 Civil society in divided societies: Cross-cutting identities? 
The previous section adopted a definition of CS that aims to avoid normative 
assumptions while recognizing diverse elements in existing civil societies. The 
recognition of existing civil societies is nowhere more needed than regarding the 
question of divided societies. Donor policies frequently assume or emphasize the 
multi-ethnic rather than the mono-ethnic character of CS.11 This section will 
propose that the ‘ethnicness’12 of CSOs may in fact be the key to their legitimacy, 
and as a result, may help explain why donor support that focuses on multi-ethnic 
CSOs leads to CSOs with low local legitimacy. Locally grounded CSOs may be 
disregarded by foreign donors because they are often mono-ethnic, leading donors 
to dismiss them as exclusive and polarizing (Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 2014). 
However, the reverse may be true for local legitimacy: CSOs and CSO leaders who 
belong to the same ethnic group as their constituencies may have high legitimacy 
based on their ability to represent those constituencies with ethnic political parties 
and conform to the discourse of ethnonationalism (e.g., Belloni, 2001; Orjuela, 
2010). Adopting a less normative and more empirical approach to CSO ethnicness 
is beneficial for understanding the potential by which both donor and local actors 
envision the strengthening of cross-cutting identities as a means to weaken or 
constrain the hold of ethnic politics. This section will conclude by discussing the 
‘ethnocracy trap’ as a constraint fostered by politics in divided societies on this 
potential to strengthen cross-cutting identities. 
This discussion of ethnicness will begin by describing the positioning of CS 
within divided societies based on the distinction between bonding and bridging 
social capital. Bonding social capital is made up of ties within exclusive and 
homogenous identity groups and is distinguished from bridging social capital, which 
                                                          
11 For example, although the ethnic division in CS is not mentioned in a USAID Request for Applications 
(USAID, 2013), supported local partner organizations all articulate a multi-ethnic character. 
12 ‘Ethnicness’ is chosen for precision since ‘bonding social capital’ has also been applied to local 
community and non-associational ties (e.g., Putnam, 2000) while ‘ascriptive-identity,’ as in Belloni 
(2008), includes ethnic but not other forms of ascriptive identity, such as gender. 
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consists of relationships between such groups (Putnam, 2000). This distinction 
between bonding and bridging social capital has become popular as a way to describe 
CS in divided societies (e.g., Campbell, Hughes, Hewstone, & Cairns, 2008; 
Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006).  
In this literature, bonding social capital is often treated as an obstacle to the 
establishment of bridging ties (e.g., Varshney, 2002). In Putnam’s own work (2000, 
2007), however, the two forms of  social capital do not exclude each other. In fact, 
Putnam suggests that bonding social capital may be necessary for the formation of 
bridging social capital; only once people are comfortable being organized within their 
own identity group can they become active in bridging groups within the wider 
society. Research on migrant communities in Western Europe supports this idea 
(Fennema & Tillie, 1999). By sampling both mono-ethnic and multi-ethnic CSOs, 
this dissertation adds nuance to the debate on CS, ethnicness and division. In doing 
so, the research presented in this dissertation has scientific relevance for the literature 
by evaluating the applicability and relevance of mono-ethnic/multi-ethnic 
categories. 
Both donors and local CS actors have persistently articulated the motivating 
idea that strengthening cross-cutting identities is a way to overcome ethnic division 
and the constraints of ethnic politics.13 Cross-cutting identities are those that reach 
across primary ethnic cleavages and have been claimed to show ‘great promise as a 
palliative to ethnic conflict’ (Van Evera 2001: 20 in Nagle & Clancy, 2012) and to 
form the ‘raw materials for social peace’ (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p. 697). The idea 
that the common interest and solidarity of cross-cutting identities are able to 
overcome ethnic division is supported by research on the positive impacts of the 
                                                          
13 For example, the ‘Cooperation and Mutual Interest’ theory of change in (Babbitt, Chigas, & Wilkinson, 
2013). Also see (Belloni, 2007). In addition, 86% of donors working in BiH fund work with youth 
(BCSDN, 2012). 
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presence of cross-cutting cleavages14 in divided societies (Diamond et al., 1995; 
Horowitz, 1985; Selway, 2011).  
This dissertation’s focus on legitimacy can provide insight into these 
dynamics regarding cross-cutting identities. Namely, the research will provide 
empirical data on the ways that CSOs use potential cross-cutting identities as a way 
to build local legitimacy. The researched CSOs were from three focus areas of 
women, youth, and social welfare.15 The literature on women’s and youth CSOs as 
potential strengtheners of cross-cutting identities has largely focused on a few case 
studies from an ethnographic perspective.16 Within the focus on social welfare 
CSOs, there are also identities as developmentally disabled, while activists frame 
their struggles in relation to their identities as citizens and residents of Sarajevo 
(Touquet, 2015). This dissertation has scientific relevance by applying a common 
analytical framework across these categories and drawing conclusions for political 
theory on divided societies. Namely, the political effect of cross-cutting identities 
derives from their salience vis-à-vis the predominant ethnic divide. CSOs will be 
successful in appealing to such identities to gain legitimacy to the degree that the 
identities are salient for their audience. In addition, the ability of CSOs to mobilize 
citizens based on these identities may strengthen their potential as cross-cutting 
identities (Diamond, 1994). This idea can be seen in the way that women’s CSOs 
appeal to positive images of women’s role as peacemakers in order to engage in 
politically-symbolic actions that reach across ethnic lines (Helms, 2003b). This is 
not to say that all appeals based on these potential cross-cutting cleavages strengthen 
them. Moreover, the potential cross-cutting identities do not exclude ethnic 
identities – there are mono-ethnic youth CSOs and multi-ethnic youth CSOs. 
Returning to the earlier discussion regarding whether strengthening bonding social 
                                                          
14 Cleavage refers to a ‘division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups, or organizations 
[between] whom conflict may arise’ (Lane and Ersson, 1994) in (Selway, 2011). 
15 See Section 1.4.1, page 38, for an explanation of the criteria for selecting the focus areas. 
16 The section on CS and governance in Bosnia drew from the work of Helms (2003b, 2014) and 
Cockburn (2013). The literature on youth CSOs includes (Fischer, 2006b; Gillard, 2001; Hromadžić, 
2015; Jeffrey, 2007; Majstorovic & Turjacanin, 2013). 
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capital can lead to bridging social capital, a relevant question is, to what degree does 
organizing within mono-ethnic youth CSOs strengthen youth organizing in general 
and therefore the potential for multi-ethnic youth organizing? By researching 
women’s, youth, and social welfare CSOs with varying degrees of ethnicness, this 
dissertation will enable drawing conclusions about the potential of these cross-
cutting identities and its implications for their civic agency. 
The civic agency of CS actors in divided societies is shaped not only by the 
divisions in society but also by political institutions. There is a strong tendency for 
politics in divided societies to be predominantly defined by ethnicity, which is 
frustrating for those focused on the potential of democratic institutions for fostering 
liberalism, a situation decried as the ‘ethnocracy trap’ (L. M. Howard, 2012). This 
trend is strengthened because ethnic representation has been applied by intervenors 
as a means to build representative democratic government. Ethnocracy is 
characterized by political parties based on ethnic interests, quotas to determine the 
allocation of key posts, and the segmentation of state institutions. Ethnocracy can 
be found in diverse cases of divided societies, including Bosnia, Iraq, Lebanon, and 
Northern Ireland, as well as growing ethnocratic characteristics in established liberal 
democracies such as Belgium (L. M. Howard, 2012).  
The ‘ethnocracy trap’ also captures one of the primary challenges of divided 
societies, which is the fact that political action is reduced to the ethnic dimension, 
which enables political actors to ‘maintain a certain level of frustration among 
ordinary citizens and thereby to maintain a logic of exclusiveness and distrust toward 
the other ethnic groups and in such a way as to extend their rule.’17 The presence of 
ethnic politics has the effect of suppressing competition by politicians and parties for 
support from other ethnic groups (Jarstad, 2008: 125). Ethnic politics then inhibits 
the formation of politically salient cross-cutting cleavages, which might lessen the 
intensity of ethnic confrontation and create more space for compromise (Horowitz, 
1985).   
                                                          
17 Slavo Kukic, Interview, Dani (Sarajevo), April 9, 2005, 15. In (Mujkic, 2007). 
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This section has discussed two conceptual approaches that connect CS and 
the context of a divided society. The first approach is to make the distinction 
between mono-ethnic (bonding) CS and multi-ethnic (bridging) CS. A relatively 
unaddressed question is to what degree one crowds out the other or whether the 
presence of mono-ethnic CS over time enables the growth of multi-ethnic CS? The 
second approach is the popular idea that CS represents and also strengthens cross-
cutting identities, which work against the limiting factors of ethnocracy. By focusing 
on organizations from multiple potential cross-cutting identities, this dissertation 
contributes to the debate on CS, ethnicness and division. Thanks go to the reader 
for indulging a rather cursory definition of the idea of civic agency to this point. 
However, it is now time to address this central concern of the research more 
rigorously. 
1.2.3 Civic agency 
The theoretical framework has so far focused on the dual effects of CS strengthening 
programs and the context of a divided society on local CS actors vis-à-vis the state. 
This section will elaborate ‘civic agency’ as a concept for understanding the change 
potential (the ‘spark’ from the introduction) of CS actors in such contexts. Civic 
agency theory aims to ‘bring the politics back in’ and provides an overarching 
conceptual lens that spans both formal CSOs and activist approaches. This section 
aims to define civic agency in a precise way to strengthen its utility as an analytical 
framework.  
Civic agency is the central concern of the research agenda of ‘civic-driven 
change’ (CDC). CDC was proposed as a way forward given the limited and de-
politicized way that CS has been applied in donor policies (Fowler & Biekart, 2008). 
Civic agency is adopted here in order to consider whether and under what conditions 
CS actors do demonstrate the agency that is theoretically assigned to CS. This is 
agency with the ability to limit state power, provide alternative channels for 
representing interests (Diamond, 1994; White, 2004), and facilitate and enhance 
collective action (Ostrom, 2015). The proponents of civic agency as a concept argue 
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that, ‘adopting a “civic agency perspective on change” can overcome the “excluding” 
view and analysis of socio-political processes that rely on a ‘sector’ concept of (civil) 
society or a limited “citizen view”’ (Biekart & Fowler, 2012, p. 181). Civic agency 
has utility as a central focus of this inquiry therefore because it avoids the assumption 
that CS actors are inherently oriented towards the state (Ottaway & Carothers, 
2000), an assumption rather definitively rejected in the literature of the ‘legitimacy 
critique.’ Rather, by this focus the inquiry has scientific relevance by systematically 
applying the concept, testing its utility in relation to empirical outcomes, and 
furthering theory about the contributions of local actors and donors in the 
development of civic agency.  
Civic agency in its simplest form is concerned with agency on behalf of groups 
towards the state.18 For the reproducibility and analytical clarity of this research, a 
precise definition of civic agency is needed. In fact, agency itself can be challenging 
to operationalize. As stated by Long, ‘[a]gency is usually recognised ex post facto 
through its acknowledged or presumed effects’ (2001, p. 240). In a general way, 
agency involves developing goals, having the capability to achieve those goals, and 
taking action as the observable and presumed effect. Each of these elements will be 
subject to more detailed analysis. Regarding a definition, however, for this inquiry, 
civic agency was defined as the perception of capacity and action vis-à-vis the state to 
create change for a common good.19   
                                                          
18 This is in contrast to some of the civic agency literature, which defines civic as ‘pro-social behaviors 
that respect social differences and indicates concern for the whole of society beyond self-interest’ (Fowler 
& Biekart, 2013, p. 471). This is because the concern ‘for the whole of society’ has a particular meaning 
in divided societies that is connected to adopting inclusive identities and goal framing, rather than ethnic 
and particularistic ones. Adopting such a definition of civic agency would require accounting for the reality 
that different ethnic groups in divided societies may display different stances regarding the benefit and 
desirability of the specific ‘whole’ in question. This is certainly the case in Bosnia, where a central issue 
remains the tension between the Bošnjak population, many of whom favor a strong central state, and 
Serbs, who largely support the autonomy and even independence of the RS (IPSOS Public Affairs, 2013). 
19 An earlier definition included in the publications from chapters two and five included intentions, which 
was removed since the definition highlights the idea that the goals are ‘for a common good.’ 
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‘Common good’ describes the desired outcomes of civic agency on behalf of 
a group. The theory regarding the enhancing effect of CSOs as alternative channels 
for representing interests (Diamond, 1994; White, 2004), and facilitating and 
enhancing collective action (Ostrom, 2015), concerns this ability of CSOs to achieve 
desired outcomes by representing a group of constituents vis-à-vis the state. A 
common good is thus not a partial or club good which only benefit contributing 
members (Olson, 1971; Welzel et al., 2005) because it is non-excludable20 and a 
group beyond those who directly contribute benefits. Common goods are however 
public goods, subject to the ‘free-rider problem’ and the dynamics of individual 
collective action (Olson, 1971). Common good is used rather than public good 
because public good refers to both those that ‘can only be defined with respect to 
some specific group’ as well as those available to all citizens (Olson, 1971, p. 14). 
Common good is also used because CSOs representing their members’ interests can 
also do so at the expense of the public good writ large (Gugerty & Reynolds, 2010). 
Civic agency on behalf of common goods thus has both instrumental and normative 
dimensions. It is instrumental if there is a direct benefit to the actors, but also 
normative if the benefit is to a wider group. Some examples of common goods from 
the research are activity centers for the developmentally-disabled and increased 
police responsiveness and improved support by the police and new social programs 
for women that are survivors of domestic violence. 
Finally, ‘perception of capacity’ refers to the actors’ reflexive understandings; 
it is not just analysis of the actions undertaken that provides analytical clarity but also 
an exploration of the actors’ perceptions of their efficacy. Briefly put, the CS actors 
that were researched can be said to have civic agency if they act with the goal of 
influencing the state. The outcomes of the actions, which were also researched, 
provide data on whether there is an observable effect of civic agency and also how 
civic agency is reinforced by the outcomes that have or have not been achieved. 
Civic agency thus defined is more explicit in its focus on the connection 
between CS actions and governance than the social capital and neoliberal civil society 
                                                          
20 A good from which members of the group benefit, regardless of whether they have contributed. 
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discourses discussed earlier. Moreover, this definition focuses attention on those 
CSOs and activists who actually articulate political goals despite contextual 
limitations and on what can be learned regarding their experiences of engagement in 
governance processes. In this way, this perspective contributes to the stated potential 
of CDC to look ‘beyond political structures and mechanisms, such as voting, to the 
historical processes and fundamentals of power accumulation and reproduction’ and 
its sensitivity to contention between endogenous and exogenous values, measures 
and processes (Fowler & Biekart, 2013, p. 471). This is relevant in light of the 
‘legitimacy critique’ discussed earlier which indicates such contention in its 
conclusions about how donor (exogenous) approaches and values interact with local 
(endogenous) approaches and values. 
This section has elaborated the civic agency concept within the theory of 
CDC. It put forth a definition of civic agency in which civic simply means focused 
on the state (including municipal and higher levels). Since the definition adopted 
above treats capacities and perceptions of capacities as components of understanding 
and analyzing civic agency, the following section will examine two forms of capacity. 
1.2.4 Participatory and transactional capacities 
The ‘legitimacy critique’ regarding the low legitimacy of donor-supported CS actors 
includes a key assumption about the reason that these actors are weak advocates. The 
assumption is that CSOs and other CS actors with low local legitimacy for citizens 
are not able to mobilize citizens to participate in politics in support of collective goals 
– whether as protesters, petition signers, or voters. The historical legacy of 
communism in Eastern Europe was found to be a key reason for continued low CSO 
membership (an indicator of legitimacy) in comparison to other regions, leading to 
the ‘weakness of civil society’ (M. M. Howard, 2003).21 However, scholarship on 
political mobilization by CSOs in Eastern Europe has also found that low levels of 
                                                          
21 In the 2008 EVS survey, 17% of the population of Bosnia indicated membership in at least one CSO, 
which is below the 26.3% reported for all of ex-Yugoslav and the 24.6% reported for all Post-communist 
countries, and significantly below the 46.2% reported for Western European countries (EVS, 2010). 
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individual participation and CSO membership do not inherently limit CSO 
capacities and the efficacy of CSO action. Rather, this research suggests that the 
analysis of individual participation as ‘participatory activism’ should be 
complemented by the theory of ‘transactional activism’, based on ‘ties—enduring and 
temporary—among organized nonstate actors and between them and political 
parties, power holders, and other institutions’ (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007, p. 79).  
Participatory activism encompasses individual and group participation in civic 
life, electoral politics, and interest group activities, as well as contentious politics, 
such as protest. As a contrasting concept, transactional activism was formulated 
based on the observed salience of linkages between CSOs and authorities that 
facilitated negotiations related to activists’ goals. Its transactional nature relates to 
strategic networking and problem-solving with authorities as means to achieve 
desired ends. Proponents of transactional capacity do not dispute the weakening 
effects of low CSO membership, rather they claim that the transactional character 
of activism merits attention due its implications for the potential of coalition 
building and negotiation with the state and elites (T. Cox, 2012; Petrova & Tarrow, 
2007). This concept is also supported in the literature on BiH, where environmental 
NGOs reported that their political influence tends to depend on personal contacts 
and is highly localized as a result (Fagan, 2006). The two forms are additionally 
distinguished by the way that the media is used in transactional activism to shape 
public debates and influence various publics, rather than to mobilize for protest 
events (Císař, 2010).  
The transactional characterization can be understood to emphasize the short-
term and instrumental nature of the interaction; however, the definition above 
focuses on the ties (i.e., the relationship) themselves. Since many transactions are 
eased by relationships of trust, transactional capacity also includes a relational 
dimension. Although the advocacy actions encompassed within ‘transactional 
capacity’ are similar to those of interest groups within pluralist democratic 
governance (e.g., Truman, 1951), proponents of the concept argue that it is the ties 
themselves and character of the relationships that are the source of capacity within 
democratizing polities rather than participatory mobilization and its influence on 
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public opinion and electoral politics (T. Cox, 2012). This observation may be 
relevant because, as discussed earlier, patrimonial power relations shape provisions 
for participation, in that decision-making power does not reside in formal 
institutions and participation mechanisms. Instead, these institutions become 
permeable to the personal interests and preferences of some state officials. As a 
result, the analysis of civic agency will include both participatory and transactional 
capacities to better understand the way that such a context shapes and constrains 
civic agency.22 Moreover, the research regarding patrimonial power relations in 
Bosnia (Andjelic, 2003; Belloni & Hemmer, 2010; Donais, 2005; Segert & Džihić, 
2012) and weak participatory capacities leads to an expectation from the literature 
that transactional capacity may be more effective than participatory capacity. Finally, 
the potential outcomes of the civic agency of CS actors may have a broader scientific 
relevance for understanding the influence of CS strengthening programs in light of 
the ‘legitimacy critique.’  
This section has presented the debate about whether CSOs that are weakly 
able to influence policies by mobilizing citizens for participatory actions may still be 
able to influence policies by fostering transactional ties to political actors. By focusing 
on these two understandings of capacity in the analysis of civic agency, this 
dissertation research will consider the theoretical expectation that due to the 
characteristics of the context, transactional capacity may be more effective than 
participatory capacity. Yet, both participatory capacity and transactional capacity 
depend on the perceived legitimacy of the CS actors who engage in them. We now 
turn to this central concern of the research. 
1.2.5 Legitimacy of civil society 
The literature related to the ‘legitimacy critique’ of CS strengthening programs has 
made the case that the consequences of the local legitimacy of CSOs are tangible 
and affect both the functioning of organizations and their civic agency. Yet, if CSO 
                                                          
22 See Section 1.4.2, page 40, for an explanation of the method which was used to identify which capacities 
were linked to which actions. 
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legitimacy matters, this opens new questions about how legitimacy should be 
defined, qualitatively assessed or even more challenging, quantitatively measured. 
Moreover, unpacking the ‘technical’ discussions of CSO legitimacy focused on 
accountability, performance, and representativeness reveals issues regarding 
legitimacy with whom and legitimacy to do what (Lister, 2003). Further, how can 
these approaches to CSO legitimacy be applied to non-formal activist forms of CS? 
This section will map out possible approaches to these questions and indicate the 
direction taken for this research. This dissertation has scientific relevance by 
applying the analytical framework described in this section to understand how 
legitimacy from these diverse perspectives influences civic agency and the empirical 
outcomes of CS actions. 
This section will first focus on the question of CSO legitimacy as one with a 
more developed body of literature, after which its relevance for non-formal, activist 
CS will be considered. A review of empirical research reveals several approaches to 
assessing CSO legitimacy in Bosnia. Hemmer (2009) derived quantitative 
assessments by asking 2 key informants from CS to assess the legitimacy of each 
CSO from a pre-established list, as well as by asking how well they know those 
CSOs. In this case, since the definition of legitimate depends on the subjective 
assessment of only 2 key informants, the degree to which the opinion of key CS 
informants represents a broader opinion of the CSO remains unclear. In contrast, a 
study performed by Seibert (2013) polled citizens randomly, basing assessments of 
CSO credibility23 on answers to questions regarding whether the CSOs advocate for 
all people, are competent and capable to have a positive influence on life together, 
and seek to establish justice in society and in public discussions of guilt for the war 
and clarifying war crimes. In this case, the survey provided rare data on the opinions 
of citizens. However, the survey is of limited utility because it defined and therefore 
limited credibility in a heavily normative and potentially biased way. Namely, the 
framing of the questions (i.e., ‘life together’ and ‘guilt for the war’) touched on topics 
                                                          
23 In interviews and surveys during this dissertation research, the terms “legitimacy and credibility 
(legitimnost i kredibilnost)” were used in tandem because pilot interviews indicated that legitimnost was 
understood largely as ‘legality.’  
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that are heavily contested in public discourse and therefore biased the resulting 
assessments of CSO credibility. 
In a general way, organizational legitimacy derives from an organization’s 
environment (Brinkerhoff, 2005, p. 5) and can be defined as ‘a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Lister (2003) has argued that a technical 
understanding of legitimacy that is commonly based on the concepts of 
accountability, representativeness, and performance avoids important questions of 
power, including the ‘dominant cognitive models’ (Scott, 1994, p. 33) of those in the 
environment, the multi-faceted quality of legitimacy, and the enhancement of 
legitimacy through identification with accepted symbols. In the terminology of 
Gramscian theory, legitimacy is then related to the way that CSOs consent to or 
oppose hegemonic discourses, a point to which we will return later in discussing the 
normative dimension. 
Although legitimacy is thus perceived and subjective, its consequences are 
tangible, generating material and other resources and affecting the functioning of 
organizations. To understand how legitimacy arises, one must study the legitimation 
process, through which CSOs come to be considered appropriate and trustworthy 
(Hilhorst, 2003, p. 4). The interest, then, is in the perceptions of those in an 
organization’s environment that ‘legitimate’ the organization, or the ‘subjects of 
legitimation.’ In the literature of the ‘legitimacy critique’, the views of local subjects 
of legitimation can be distinguished from those of donor subjects (Howell & Pearce, 
2001b; Pouligny, 2005). More specifically, relevant local subjects include 
constituencies, government actors and other CSOs, whilst donor subjects include 
employees of donors from Western countries.  
The primary interest here is not only to review the diverse literature on 
possible understandings of CSO legitimacy. Following Lister, the aim of the 
paragraphs that follow is also to describe the potential sources of legitimacy in the 
eyes of different audiences and to categorize those sources into 3 dimensions – 
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instrumental, normative, and traditional. This discussion provides an analytical 
framework for discussing the perceptions of those interviewed and surveyed.  
The instrumental dimension derives from performance, that is the outcomes 
of an organization’s activities (Barnes, 2006). Subjects’ judgment of organizational 
performance relates largely to whether the organization has furthered their own 
interests (Suchman, 1995). Instrumental legitimacy thus follows from a resource 
dependence model that is oriented toward ‘exchange relationships,’ in which an 
organization provides services and benefits while constituencies provide legitimacy 
that supports organizational survival and sustainability (Brinkerhoff, 2005).  
The normative dimension of organizational legitimacy derives from an 
organization’s ability to reflect socially acceptable (or desirable) norms, standards and 
values (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Sources of normative legitimacy include declarative 
mission statements and values, internal democracy and accountability, and whether 
organizational staff and leadership resemble and represent the constituency. In short, 
normative legitimacy addresses whether the priorities, actions, and procedures of a 
CSO are considered to be ‘the right ones’ (Suchman, 1995). Normative legitimacy 
may also derive from an organization’s moral leadership or sound analysis of 
problems (Barnes, 2006).  
The relevance of individual characteristics of founders or key staff has been a 
matter of some dispute. Charismatic legitimacy based on individual characteristics is 
included by Max Weber as a source of political legitimacy (Beetham, 1991). 
Legitimacy frameworks, such as the framework described by Scott (1995), do not 
treat the characteristics of key individuals as relevant for organizational legitimacy. 
However, other authors have emphasized the significance of whether or not CSO 
actors share a similar background with their supporters (Paffenholz, Spurk, Belloni, 
Kurtenbach, & Orjuela, 2010; Sejfija, 2009). The salience of the characteristics of 
key individuals can be observed when others refer to actions as having been initiated 
by the individual rather than by organization or when an organization discontinues 
its work when a leader changes due to external factors (Walton, 2008). Brinkerhoff’s 
assessment is that ‘while less commonly found in industrialized societies, this type of 
legitimacy is more prevalent in developing and transition countries where traditions 
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of paternalism, personalismo,' and (in Africa) the 'big man' syndrome define 
organizations directly in terms of the characteristics of those who lead them (2005, 
p. 4).  
Complicating the normative dimension, conformity with discourses that are 
dominant in the organization’s context has implications for legitimacy. Legitimacy 
can be a mechanism through which discourses shape organizational practices; 
activities that conform to hegemonic discourses are rewarded with organizational 
legitimacy, while contrary activities are sanctioned with illegitimacy (Lister, 2001). 
Indeed, in divided societies that host CS strengthening programs, CSO legitimacy 
is situated within the political projects of both interveners and local actors. The most 
prominent political projects – or hegemonic discourses - in this context are the liberal 
peace and ethnonationalism.24  
The ‘traditional’ dimension is related to perceived connections to existing 
social structures or cultural traditions and whether what the organization does is 
perceived as ‘making sense’ in relation to those practices (Brinkerhoff, 2005; 
Suchman, 1995). It is also possible that an organization is so accepted that no other 
option is imaginable; in other words, the organization is taken for granted. (Barnes, 
2006; Brinkerhoff, 2005, p. 4)  The peace and development literature often alludes 
to this dimension when attempting to explain the lack of impact of interventions, 
with their failure to link up to support grassroots institutions, religious institutions, 
trade unions, community organizations and traditional leadership institutions being 
underlined (Bebbington et al., 2008; Kostovicova, 2010; Pouligny, 2005). 
  
                                                          
24 See Section 1 for a discussion of the ‘liberal peace’ and Section 1.1 regarding ethnonationalism. 
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Table 1-1. Dimensions and sources of CSO legitimacy 
 Instrumental Normative Traditional 
Sources  Performance 
 Self-interest of 
constituencies 
 Representation 
of 
constituencies 
 
 
 Mission & vision 
 Shared background and 
values  
 ‘Doing the right things’ 
 ‘Doing things right’  
(Internal democracy & 
accountability) 
 Moral voice 
 Positionality regarding 
dominant discourses 
 Reputation of key staff 
(founders, leaders) 
 Conformity to 
social 
structures or 
cultural 
traditions 
 Taken-for -
granted status 
 
Table 1-1 lists the possible sources of CSO legitimacy based on a review of 
the literature. This table is also applicable to legitimation processes for activists. 
Legitimation affects activists in the analysis of how they frame their struggles and 
how authorities respond (Tarrow, 2011). To draw from the concrete example of 
Touquet’s analysis of the previously mentioned 2008 Sarajevo protests, the protesters 
framed their actions in terms of the articulation of citizenship values, local identity 
focused on Sarajevo rather than ethnicity, and anti-politics (Touquet, 2012). 
Applying the legitimacy framework from Table 1-1 above, this framing is in relation 
to dominant discourses (‘citizenship’), shared background and values (‘Sarajevo 
identity’), and moral voice (‘anti-politics’). The authorities responded with 
discrediting counter-frames, labelling protesters as an uncivil and violent mob that 
was directed by political parties and supported by foreigners. These de-legitimating 
claims can be analyzed in relation to ‘doing things right’ (‘uncivil and violent mob’), 
as well as ‘moral voice’ and ‘representation’ (‘political direction’ and ‘foreign-
controlled’).  
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This section has defined CSO legitimacy and adopted an approach to 
understanding it that includes questions of power and its multi-dimensional 
character. Second, this section has focused on the processes of legitimation by which 
CSOs come to be considered appropriate and trustworthy. The discussion 
articulated a framework for analyzing legitimation with instrumental, normative, and 
traditional dimensions, each of which has multiple potential sources. Finally, this 
section illustrated how activists’ and authorities’ attempts of legitimation and 
delegitimation can also be analyzed using the same dimensions and sources of 
legitimacy. 
1.3 Research question 
This dissertation aims to examine how different levels of legitimacy with citizens, 
political actors, and donors may explain the kinds of actions in which civil society 
actors engage as advocates with the government and the outcomes of those actions. 
This research question was approached by breaking the question down into four sub-
questions that were organized inductively around the concepts of legitimacy, civic 
agency, and governance outcomes.  
Research question: How do the local and donor legitimacy of civil society actors influence 
their civic agency and their outcomes in the presence of donor CS strengthening programs 
in a divided society? 
Sub-questions: 
1. What is the relationship between donor and local legitimacy of CSOs? 
2. How does CSO legitimacy with donors and citizens influence civic agency? 
3. How do activists build legitimacy with citizens and express civic agency 
vis-à-vis ethnonationalist politics and CS strengthening programs? 
4. Under what conditions can the civic agency of CSOs contribute to 
governance outcomes? 
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Each of these sub-questions is addressed in a separate chapter. The 
dissertation follows a journal article model; three of the chapters have been published 
in peer reviewed journals and one chapter has accepted for publication. Some minor 
changes in wording between the sub-questions and the formulation in the published 
chapters were made to reflect how the research evolved over time. These changes are 
noted in the footnotes. The first sub-question focuses on understanding the 
relationship between local and donor legitimacy. This question addresses the first 
claim of the ‘legitimacy critique,’ which is the claim that high donor legitimacy 
contributes to low local legitimacy (expectation #1). Secondly, this question 
addresses expectation #2 based on the discussion in section 1.2.2 (‘Civil society in 
divided societies’) that there are few CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with both donors 
and citizens because donors are more likely to support multi-ethnic CSOs, while 
local populations are more likely to support mono-ethnic CSOs.25 The first sub-
question is addressed in Chapter Two, ‘Civil society in a divided society: Linking 
legitimacy and ethnicness of civil society organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.’  
Sub-question #2 narrows the focus in the research question to the 
contribution of legitimacy with donors and citizens to civic agency. These two kinds 
of actors are particularly highlighted in the theory on participation and CS 
strengthening programs and are therefore featured in the conceptual model. For this 
sub-question, it was not considered appropriate to formulate an expectation because 
civic agency can vary in terms of the common goods that are pursued, the capacities 
that are engaged, and the actions that are taken in order to achieve them. This sub-
question is addressed in Chapter Three, ‘Civic Agency in Governance: The Role of 
Legitimacy for Citizens vs Donors.’ 
Sub-question #3 is answered by looking at a key moment of protest that 
happened during the research.26 This moment, which was most intensely focused in 
                                                          
25 Chapter two approaches expectation #2 regarding ethnicness as a second question: ‘What is the 
relationship between CSO legitimacy and ethnicness?’ 
26 The research question in Chapter Four is formulated, ‘Along which themes did and do Bosnian-
Herzegovinian activists challenge hegemonic understandings of politics and society produced by the 
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Feb-May 2014, provided an opportunity to investigate the relationships between 
legitimacy, civic agency, and outcomes from the perspective of non-formal actors. 
Chapter Four addresses the legitimacy of activists with citizens and how this 
moment brought forth new approaches to legitimation with citizens. That chapter 
focuses on the civic agency of key activists and of participatory forums (plenums), 
which mobilized citizens in a sustained way that was not previously seen in post-
Dayton Bosnia and occupied public discourse. This sub-question addresses the way 
that activists challenged the expectations of civic agency created by both CS 
strengthening programs and ethnonationalist politics. For this sub-question, the 
activism literature which focuses on their interactions with political actors did not 
support formulating an expectation regarding the dual struggle. Sub-question #3 is 
addressed in Chapter Four, ‘Activism in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Struggles against dual 
hegemony and the emergence of “local first.”’  
Sub-question #4, which is addressed in Chapter Five, arises from a skeptic’s 
question related to why we should care about civic agency (i.e., can causality be 
established between CSO actions and empirically observable outcomes?). It is 
concerned with the conditions under which the civic agency of CSOS contributes to 
governance outcomes. Expectation #3 is that transactional capacities are more likely 
to achieve intended outcomes than participatory capacities because divided societies 
are described by patrimonial power relations.  
Following the lengthy discussion of the theoretical framework and research 
question, it is time to represent graphically the main concepts and relationships 
examined through this research, which is presented above in Figure 1-1. CS civic 
agency, which is positioned centrally, is the phenomenon being investigated. The 
diagram includes 2 types of local actors (political actors and citizens), which are 
represented symbolically as ovals. Variables (local legitimacy, donor legitimacy, civic 
agency, and governance outcomes), are represented by boxes, while arrows represent 
the influence of one actor or variable on another. Transactional capacity is 
diagrammed with a bi-directional arrow that indicates the participation of both 
                                                          
duality of local ethnocracy and international intervention, and how does this dual challenge affect their 
opportunities?' 
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political actors and CS actors. Participatory capacity is diagrammed with a 
directional arrow that indicates the ability to mobilize citizens. Civic agency 
 
1.3.1 Conceptual model 
 
encompasses both participatory and transactional capacities. Governance outcomes 
are diagrammed as the result of decisions made by political actors. The linkages 
addressed in each sub-question are noted next to the appropriate arrows (e.g., SQ 
#1). Therefore, the independent variables are the two sources of legitimacy (local 
legitimacy and donor legitimacy), while the dependent variables are civic agency and 
governance outcomes. 
Governance 
Outcomes 
Citizens (members/ 
beneficiaries) 
Political actors 
Local legitimacy 
Donor legitimacy 
CS civic agency 
M
ob
ili
ze
 
SQ   #1 
SQ   
#2, 3  
SQ  #2 
SQ #4 
Figure 1-1. Model of researched concepts and causal relationships 
Chapter 1 
  
38 
1.4 Methodology 
The research interest in civic agency led to an actor-centered approach, which 
primarily considers individual intention, perception, and agency (Long, 2001).27 
This approach is consistent with a focus on processes of legitimation with different 
kinds of actors. As described in the earlier discussion of CS legitimacy, the 
consequences of these understandings of legitimacy are tangible and generate 
material and other resources that affect the actions of CSOs and activists alike. 
Overall, a triangulation (Flick, 2009: 65) of methods was used, including semi-
structured interviews, document analysis, process tracing, and a survey of 
constituencies. The first section describes the choices made in the research design. 
This description is followed by a detailed description of the methods used for data 
collection and analysis.  
1.4.1 Research design 
Three of the sub-questions focus on formally registered CSOs because a large 
percentage of donor programs only support this category, and they are the focus of 
the ‘legitimacy critique.’ Three focus areas of youth, women, and social welfare CSOs 
were chosen because they represent both potential cross-cutting identities and issue 
areas that are disadvantaged in patrimonial power structures.28  The use of unlikely 
conditions to test a theory, such as considering marginalized groups to understand 
the emergence of civic agency, has been called Sinatra-inference (i.e., ‘if it can make 
                                                          
27 In contrast to classification based on CS functions, such as protection, monitoring, advocacy and public 
communication, in-group socialization, social cohesion, intermediation and facilitation, and service 
delivery (e.g., Spurk, 2010). 
28 As demonstrated by levels of employment (10,9% of youth ages 15-24 actively seeking employment 
and 22,7%  of women vs. 31,7% of the total population) and 2011 CSO grant support for women’s CSOs 
(0,7% of total), youth CSOs (2,8%), and social welfare categories that included disabled and drug 
dependency CSOs (5,1%) (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014; Center for 
Investigative Journalism, 2011). In addition, 17% of Cantonal ministers and 22% of state ministers were 
women (Sarajevo Open Center, 2015). Vulnerable population-recommended CSOs provide assistance 
regarding development disabilities, life-threatening diseases, and children. 
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it here, it can make it anywhere’ (Levy, 2008, p. 12). In addition, these issues are 
objects of international CS-building efforts and also have potential local 
constituencies (Belloni & Hemmer, 2010; Sali-Terzić, 2001). 
The relationship between local and donor legitimacy and the causal 
relationships between different types of legitimacy and civic agency was approached 
using selection criteria for case study CSOs using theoretical sampling (Flick, 2009), 
as reflected in Table 1-2. Table 1-2 also reflects the idea that CSOs were selected 
with high and low ethnicness, in order to test Expectation #2 that ethnicness may 
represent an intermediary factor that contributes to CSOs achieving legitimacy 
among either local populations or donors, but not both. The relationships between 
local and donor legitimacy and the intermediary effects of ethnicness on local and 
donor legitimacy were brought to the fore by selecting similar organizations (in 
urban locations from the 3 focus areas) with varying levels of legitimacy and 
ethnicness.  
Table 1-2. Case study CSO sample selection grid 
  High donor 
Legitimacy 
Low donor 
Legitimacy 
High 
local legitimacy 
Low ethnicness   
High ethnicness  
 
 
 
Low 
local legitimacy 
Low ethnicness  No examples 
found 
High ethnicness No examples 
found 
No examples 
found29 
 
                                                          
29 Table 1-2 represents the expectation that CSOs with low local and low donor legitimacy were both 
unusual and not of interest for the inquiry; in fact, none were identified. In addition, no examples with 
high donor legitimacy, low local legitimacy and high ethnicness were found. 
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1.4.2 Data collection & analysis 
CSOs were assigned to the categories in Table 1-2 based on semi-structured 
interviews with key informants in combination with objective indicators of 
legitimacy, such as donations, volunteering, and membership (see Table 2-2 for the 
full list). The key informants were selected to represent diverse and significant 
organizational perspectives regarding local and donor legitimacy.30 The key 
informants were asked, ‘Which organizations that are working on youth (later for 
each other area of focus) have high and low legitimacy?’31 The informants were also 
asked for their reasons for forming this opinion (declared sources of legitimacy).  
Next, indicators of legitimacy (see Table 2-2) were used to confirm the 
legitimacy assessments. The relatively objective indicators for constituency support 
confirm the legitimacy or lack thereof for parts of the population (i.e., becoming a 
member, providing financial support, and/or volunteering are actions taken by the 
population that indicate legitimacy). This approach is best suited for determining 
‘narrow but strong’ legitimacy for a core group of constituents – people who interact 
with the organization- rather than for a more ‘broad but weak’ legitimacy for the 
population as a whole. Where the key informants or indicators disagreed, preference 
was given to CSOs with consistent indications regarding their legitimacy. Typical 
cases for each of the theoretical categories were in this way selected via the 
triangulation of different sources.  
In total, 27 CSOs were selected for initial interviews, the topics of which were 
the organization’s activities and goals, indicators of legitimacy (types and sizes of 
constituency, sources of funding), understandings of the CSO’s own legitimacy, and 
advocacy actions undertaken in pursuit of the identified goals. For each CSO, a list 
                                                          
30 Twenty-seven key informants from the following categories were included: political actors (4), religious 
CS (3), media and business (3), CS networks (5), international CS (2), CS Building projects (4), donors 
(4), and international political actors (2). Key informants were selected based on their experience relating 
to CSOs, in addition to their primary sectors, and their assessments regarded CSOs to which they did 
not have institutional ties to reduce potential bias.  
31 Feedback to pilot interviews indicated that the local equivalent legitimnost was understood as legality. 
As a result, both legitimnost and kredibilnost (roughly credibility) were used in translation. 
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of change initiatives with political goals was composed based on document analysis 
and the initial interview. Three CSOs were not researched further because they did 
not articulate any policy goals. Rather than a representative sample of all CSOs, 
CSOs were thus selected based on demonstrated articulation of policy goals in order 
to explore their potential contribution to governance outcomes. This choice follows 
from the research question and sub-question #4 on the contribution of civic agency 
to governance outcomes. The degree to which outcomes represented ‘common 
goods’ was investigated using the number of participants and beneficiaries from the 
respective constituencies and whether the outcomes applied to all members of an 
intended group.  
For the remaining 24 CSOs, advocacy actions32 were identified based on 
coding of staff interview transcripts and document review. For example, do the 
CSOs engage in one-on-one lobbying, mobilize protests, or attempt to build CSO 
coalitions? Differences in the incidence of specific strategies and the underlying 
forms of capacity (participatory or transactional) were used as the basis for answering 
sub-question #2 regarding the influence of legitimacy with donors and citizens on 
civic agency.  
The answers to subquestion #2 (How does CSO legitimacy with donors and 
citizens influence civic agency?) are based on a categorization of whether specific types 
of actions represent participatory or transactional capacity. Participatory capacity 
encompasses individual and group participation in civic life, electoral politics, and 
interest group activities, as well as contentious politics, such as protest. Transactional 
capacity was formulated based on the observed salience of linkages between CSOs 
and authorities. The classification used varied from the transactional capacity 
literature regarding two types of actions which concern ties between CSOs. These 
two types of actions ae building horizontal coalitions by strengthening ties from 
CSOs to selected CSO partners (for example, repeated cooperation between a 
                                                          
32 Advocacy actions is used here to mean any actions engaged in by CS actors to influence the state. This 
includes both actions intended to mobilize citizen participation (e.g. protest, participation in 
consultations) as well as those conducted directly with political actors and bureaucrats (e.g. lobbying, use 
of expertise, convening state agencies). 
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Sarajevo-based women’s CSO and municipal women’s CSOs) and building interest 
groups (for example, actions to establish multiple local student and parent councils). 
These actions could be considered transactional (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007), but were 
coded as participatory because they focus on building horizontal links. They are also 
participatory because the partner CSOs are groups for which citizen participation 
plays a role. Finally, actions that focused on active responses to government 
consultations were coded as participatory. This is because most consultations were 
open to any CSO or citizen and depend on their voluntary participation. In a few 
cases, however, only selected CSOs were invited, giving the CSO actions a 
transactional as well as a participatory character. 
The most in-depth research was conducted on 10 case study CSOs, which 
were used to address sub-question #4. Two CSOs were chosen from each of the five 
categories in Figure 1-1, with varying levels of donor legitimacy, local legitimacy, 
and ethnicness. The case study CSOs were also selected to ensure equal 
representation of each focus area (women, youth, and social welfare) and the three 
major urban areas of Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Mostar. Next, each case study 
organization was researched in more depth by following four research steps. First, 
information on the CSO and their own understanding of their legitimacy was 
gathered via staff interviews. Second, a multi-year initiative of each CSO was 
researched using process tracing to follow interactions with government, 
beneficiaries, and other CSOs. Process tracing involved interviews with state and 
other CS actors and relevant internal and public document review, allowing access 
to the perspectives of subjects of legitimation. All interviews were analyzed in 
ATLAS.ti using open coding schemes based on the theoretical dimensions and 
sources of legitimacy (Flick, 2009). The salience of each source of legitimacy (e.g., 
‘performance,’ ‘mission and vision’) was analyzed based on the frequency with which 
a given source was mentioned and expressions of high salience. Third, interactions 
between the case study CSOs and constituencies, political actors, citizens, and 
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donors were observed through participant observations of 16 events.33 Finally, 
constituency construction of legitimacy was assessed via a survey of fifty randomly-
selected members and/or participants34 from each of five CSOs, one per category 
from Table 1-2 (‘Case study CSO sample selection grid’).  
The empirical analysis for sub-question #3 (Activist expressions of civic 
agency vis-à-vis ethnic politics and CS strengthening programs) is based on 26 
interviews with key activists from six cities that were conducted from 2013-2015 and 
written demands and communication between plenums on one hand and 
government institutions and the public on the other.35 Selection was made based on 
evidence of active participation based on participant observation and/or public 
statements supporting protests and plenums. Six interviews that were conducted 
before the protests in 2013 addressed the question of the legitimacy of activist 
initiatives for citizens, political actors, and international donors. Participant 
observation of the Sarajevo protests and plenums was conducted by the author in 
2014. Chapter Four also uses data collected by Felix Fritsch, the chapter co-author. 
Felix conducted ten Skype interviews with activists from January-April 2015 and an 
additional seven interviews from October-December 2015. In addition, he 
conducted participant observation of protests and plenums in Tuzla and a conference 
in Vienna that included plenum activists and international representatives, as well as 
an activist-initiated social and political center in Banja Luka. Documents were 
collected by the author by cross-referencing plenum and independent websites and 
Facebook pages. The analytic approach to the empirical data is a thematic analysis 
following Bryman’s conceptualization (2012). This approach facilitates 
reconstructing, displaying and problematizing the construction of counter-
hegemonic understandings of politics and society by analyzing prominent themes 
                                                          
33 Events lasted 2-8 hours. Most events were public and were attended primarily by CSO actors (5), 
political and CSO actors (3), donor and CSO actors (3), and CSO actors and constituencies (5). Events 
were selected based on a diversity of participants from those organized by the case study CSOs during the 
fieldwork. 
34 For CSOs with both groups, half were from each group. 
35 Documents were reviewed from the plenums in Tuzla, Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica, Zavidovići, and 
Bugojno, which were chosen as a representative sample of both major urban centers and smaller cities. 
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present in local activism before, during and after the 2014 protests. The interviews 
were coded using the ATLAS.ti software and following the recommendations in 
Saldaña's coding manual (Saldaña, 2009). The thematic codes were further grouped 
in coding families and correlated for further analytical purposes. 
1.5 Societal relevance 
This section will explain the societal relevance of the dissertation for both donor CS 
strengthening policies as well as for CS actors in Bosnia. Policy documents from 
USAID and the EU indicate that strengthening the advocacy capacity of CS remains 
a key goal (EU DG Enlargement, 2013; USAID, 2013). This dissertation addresses 
several key assumptions made in these documents related to why CSOs are 
considered legitimate for local populations. In addition, this work also addresses 
more fundamental questions about the limits and negative effects of donor support. 
Do donors’ expectations that it is participatory approaches and issue-based coalitions 
that lead to policy outcomes correspond to the perceptions and civic agency of CS 
actors? This section will further discuss its relevance for societal actors by validating 
local knowledge regarding how CSOs strengthen their local legitimacy and engage 
in policy advocacy. In addition, this section sheds light on the relationship between 
activists and CSOs and the lessons learned from non-formal activism following the 
mobilizations of 2014. 
This discussion will draw on policy documents from USAID and the EU, 
which can be considered to be dominant donors in Bosnia and which reflect the 
current thinking and adjustments regarding CSO legitimacy and civic agency. A 
diagram for the USAID program for the period 2013-2017 represents the idea that 
the program result ‘civil society is representative and credible’ will lead to greater 
(n.b. presumably positive) influence on policy (USAID, 2013). This outcome should 
be achieved through ‘increased partnership and consensus among different 
stakeholders,’ ‘strengthened capacity and viability of core CS partners’ and ‘increased 
engagement by CS and citizens in policy development.’ These results should be 
achieved via the selection of key implementing organizations, each of which should 
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form an issue-based coalition of like-minded CSOs, strengthened by capacity 
building. 
The comparable EU document (EU DG Enlargement, 2013) identifies the 
need for CSOs to improve their ‘autonomy, representativeness, and accountability.’36 
It continues, ‘Moreover, CSOs can increase their effectiveness by increasing their 
capacity for analysis, monitoring and advocacy as well as networking, partnership, 
coalition-building and active involvement in the policy and law making processes.’ 
The document specifically notes that dependence on foreign funding risks de-
legitimizing the activities of CSOs. In addition to political support by the EU, the 
document states that financial support will aim for long-term contracts and a ‘more 
flexible approach that fosters partnership and coalition-building,’ instead of short-
term projects.  
These analyses reflect awareness of critical questions regarding the legitimacy 
of CSOs. The research contributes to policy first by engaging with donor 
understandings of local legitimacy. Given the growing acknowledgement of the 
importance of local legitimacy, what sources of information do donors have 
regarding the legitimacy of supported CSOs? Can they practically make decisions 
based on CSO legitimacy? Next, both documents discussed above connect the idea 
of being ‘representative’ with increased policy engagement. Yet, there is no mention 
of the intersection between ethnic identity and being ‘representative’ in a divided 
society, pointing towards continued donor assumptions regarding the ethnic 
character of supported CSOs. Both key assumptions that being ‘representative’ leads 
to policy engagement and that ethnic identity is irrelevant to local legitimacy were 
tested by the research. Further, the empirical evidence about varied perceptions of 
legitimacy fills in important details and in some cases, modifies what donors believe 
makes CSOs legitimate for local populations.  
Donors’ stated goals of strengthening the advocacy role of CSOs may be 
difficult at best, given the ‘legitimacy critique’ and the ‘neoliberal critique,’ which 
argue that donor support by itself weakens CSOs’ ability to achieve policy outcomes. 
                                                          
36 Closely reflecting Lister’s ‘technical’ understanding of legitimacy (Lister, 2003). 
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The potential for donor programs to strengthen advocacy roles will be tested by 
comparing the civic agency of three categories of CSOs: those that enjoy legitimacy 
with donors but not local populations, those that enjoy legitimacy with local 
populations but not donors, and those with both forms of legitimacy. This 
methodology will also provide insight into whether donor and local legitimacy can 
be reconciled, as well as practical conclusions about the conditions under which this 
happens.  
The donor documents also identify the need for broader partnerships and the 
inclusion of diverse stakeholders in advocacy processes. However, these documents 
do not address the motivations of CS actors to join such partnerships and advocacy 
processes. This dissertation will contribute by providing data on the legitimacy of 
donor-supported CSOs among other CSOs and its influence on the civic agency of 
those CSOs. The research will be able to provide practical recommendations by 
investigating the legitimacy of CSOs among other CS actors (both formal and non-
formal) and to provide insight into the goals and actions in which CSOs engage in 
partnerships and coalitions, as well as when they do not. Finally, the donor 
documents reflect an emphasis on participatory capacity and little awareness of the 
possible importance of transactional capacity for achieving governance outcomes. To 
what degree do donors continue their practices of assuming a model of CS 
organization imported from Western contexts but not contextualized for Bosnia? 
The dissertation will provide data on the kinds of actions in which CSOs engage 
and on how legitimacy with donors influences these actions. In a broad sense, this 
work will address how donor programs influence societal discourses about politics 
and anti-politics and can inform CS strengthening programs by addressing these 
issues. 
This dissertation also provides insight for CS actors in Bosnia. Many of those 
interviewed indicated that legitimacy is the subject of ongoing (legitimation) efforts 
and a subject of active reflection. This research highlights these efforts and provides 
validation for the relevance of this local knowledge. Concretely, this work will 
identify CSOs that are considered to be legitimate among local populations and 
investigate them. The ways that donor programs have favored formal actors and have 
  Introduction 
 
47 
led to NGOization and an NGO elite that is divorced from the everyday concerns 
of citizens are well documented in policy research and popular discourse in Bosnia.37 
How locally legitimate CSOs understand their political role differently from other 
CSOs contributes to these discussions with new insights. The results of the research 
were communicated to a broader audience via a well-received policy brief 
(republished as Puljek-Shank & Memišević, 2017). A second brief regarding the 
influence of forms of legitimacy for advocacy strategies is in process. In this way, the 
dissertation contributes to CSO practices by identifying CSO legitimation and 
advocacy strategies and assessing their success.  
The final area of societal relevance concerns the relationship between formal 
and non-formal actors within civil society. There is evidence that the gap between 
activists and CSOs has been growing, culminating in a broad rejection of ‘NGOs’ 
and their organizing logic, which will be documented in Chapter Four. CSOs are 
assigned a significant role in the social movement literature as social movement 
organizations, which are a factor that influences the degree of success of activist 
efforts (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). However, discussion of the relationship 
between non-formal and formal CS actors related to the protests and plenums of 
2014 has been largely absent from public discourse and activist reflections.38 The 
reflections on the strategies by which CSOs are successful in legitimating themselves 
with citizens and how activists position themselves vis-à-vis the dual hegemony of 
CS strengthening programs and ethnic politics point to types of actions that have 
resonance in the current social and political context of Bosnia. In particular, Chapter 
Four describes a ‘local first’ approach that is used by activists and in the words of an 
anonymous reviewer, ‘move[s] discussion and debate along, both within the academy 
and without.’ 
                                                          
37 See (Papić, 2012) on ‘what to do to have NGOs respond to the real needs of citizens’ rather than 
representing donor interests; (Šavija-Valha, 2009) on the distorting influence of donor support and 
musings on how to strengthen a more locally -rooted version of civil society. 
38 For example, see (Arsenijević, 2014), which includes contributions by key actors in the 2014 
mobilization. 
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1.6 The end of the beginning 
Since we have reached the end of this introductory chapter, dear reader, perhaps this 
is a good time to take stock and restate what has been said so far in the briefest 
possible way. The primary focus of interest is the civic agency that civil society actors 
exhibit towards the government. This research investigates how legitimacy with both 
local populations and donors shapes this agency and whether CS actors are 
ultimately able to achieve the outcomes that they desire. This approach opens the 
possibility of a more nuanced and ultimately complete theoretical and empirical 
understanding of political developments in divided societies than is offered by the 
two predominant approaches, which treat CS strengthening interventions and 
divided societies independently. 
Each of the following four chapters addresses one of the sub-questions. 
Chapter Two concerns itself with the relationship between local and donor 
legitimacy, particularly with whether the ethnic character of organizations plays an 
intermediary role. That chapter addresses critiques of donor-sponsored CSOs by 
local actors and identifies the importance of tangible beneficiaries and benefits for 
those CSOs that are considered to be legitimate. Chapter Two also presents 
innovative findings about those organizations that have legitimacy among both 
donors and locals. Rather than locally legitimate CSOs being ethnic CSOs, as 
expected, many locally legitimate CSOs are those that are ambiguous about their 
ethnic identifications depending on the audience and circumstances.  
Chapter Three focuses on ways that different categories of legitimacy 
influence the kinds of actions in which CSOs engage vis-à-vis the state. Three 
categories that were researched (high local/low donor, low local/high donor, and 
high local/high donor) have salient differences in how they attempt to influence the 
state, particularly whether they focus on participation by citizens or transactions with 
political actors. This chapter reflects on why this is the case and on the implications 
for governance in divided societies.  
Chapter Four turns to the question of how activists outside of formal CSOs 
expressed civic agency in the 2014 protests and plenums. This chapter focuses on 
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how the activists and the plenum demands were positioned against both dominant 
patterns of ethnic politics and the politics of CS strengthening programs. In the face 
of this dual struggle and the resulting complexity, activists largely turned to locally 
scaled struggles in the period since the protests and plenums abated.  
Chapter Five is concerned with whether locally legitimate CSOs are able to 
achieve outcomes as a result of their efforts. On the one hand, there is strong 
evidence that such CSOs are able to achieve outcomes, which strengthens the case 
for the theoretical relevance of civic agency. At the same time, the outcomes are 
often only formal, and it requires much more effort to achieve outcomes that are 
implemented in practice. In addition, it is often transactional capacity rather than 
participation which reaps results. Finally, Chapter Six sums up the implications of 
each sub-question for the overall research question and identifies key findings from 
the dissertation.  
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2 Civil society in a divided society: Linking legitimacy and 
ethnicness of civil society organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Randall Puljek-Shank39 and Willemijn Verkoren 
2.1 Abstract 
Civil society (CS) strengthening is central to peacebuilding policies for divided, post-
war societies. However, it has been criticized for creating internationalized 
organizations without local backing, unable to represent citizens’ interests. Based on 
in-depth empirical research in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article focuses on the 
legitimacy of CS organizations. It explores why legitimacy for donors rarely 
accompanies legitimacy for local actors. We hypothesized that whilst donors avoid 
supporting mono-ethnic organizations, seen as problematic for peacebuilding, 
‘ethnicness’ may provide local legitimacy. However, our analysis of CSOs’ ethnicness 
nuances research characterizing organizations as either inclusive or divisive. 
Moreover, local legitimacy is not based on ethnicness per se, but CSOs’ ability to 
skillfully interact with ethnically-divided constituencies and political structures. In 
addition, we offer novel explanations why few organizations enjoy both donor and 
local legitimacy, including local mistrust of donors’ normative frameworks and 
perceived lack of results. However, we also show that a combination of local and 
donor legitimacy is possible, and explore this rare but interesting category of 
organizations.  
Keywords: civil society, divided societies, legitimacy, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
peacebuilding 
This chapter was published as Puljek-Shank, R., & Verkoren, W. (2017). Civil 
society in a divided society: Linking legitimacy and ethnicness of civil society 
organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Cooperation and Conflict, 52(2), 184–202. 
doi:10.1177/0010836716673088   
                                                          
39 Randall Puljek-Shank was the lead author of this article and conducted all of the field research. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Since 1989, interventions following ethnic conflict have increasingly been based on 
what has been called the ‘liberal peace’, anchored on democratic governance, civil 
society (CS), and a free market (Richmond, 2008). CS, conceptualized as an 
intermediary space between citizens and government, populated by organizations 
enabling representation of citizens’ interests and discussion of public issues, has been 
increasingly seen as vital to peace and democracy (Kaldor, 2003; Putnam, 1992). 
This has led to the rise of ‘CS building’ in international policy on democratization 
and peacebuilding as a way to reform state-society relations and foster responsive 
and legitimate institutions that can effectively deal with conflict (Cousens et al., 
2001; Woodward, 2007).  
However, ‘CS building’ programs have been critiqued for focusing on 
‘professional’ NGOs while overlooking grassroots institutions, religious 
organizations, trade unions, community organizations, traditional leadership 
institutions, and informal networks (Howell & Pearce, 2001b; Kostovicova, 2010). 
Bias in favor of ‘apolitical’, professional NGOs is seen to have reduced CS to a 
technical exercise (Fagan, 2005; Pouligny, 2005), focused on organizations rendering 
services rather than fostering society-state relations (Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 
2012).  
In essence, these debates center on the legitimacy of CS organizations 
(CSOs). Critics of post-war ‘CS building’ emphasize the weak connection between 
foreign-supported organizations and local constituencies. Many CSOs have been 
created in response to available donor funding but with little local backing. 
Conversely, groups formed by citizens uniting for social or political change either 
receive little assistance, or ‘NGO-ize’ to become eligible for donor funding at the 
cost of growing distance from their constituency (Bebbington et al., 2008; 
Heideman, 2013; Hilhorst, 2003; Kostovicova, 2010).  
Indeed, earlier research suggests that CSOs possessing what we call high 
donor legitimacy – access to support due to compliance with donors’ norms and 
standards – often accompanies low local legitimacy, meaning support and confidence 
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by local constituents and societies (Grødeland, 2006; Pickering, 2006; Verkoren & 
van Leeuwen, 2014). International organizations engaged in peacebuilding have 
been encouraged to incorporate local understandings of legitimacy throughout their 
operations (Williams & Mengistu, 2014). However, there is little research 
attempting to analyze local legitimacy and how it develops. This is surprising given 
the shift in peace literature away from interventions and their (lack of) results and 
toward the ‘local turn’ (e.g. Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). 
Our investigation is based on in-depth empirical research in the ethnically-
divided, post-war society of Bosnia-Herzegovina, site of a major peacebuilding 
intervention since 1995, with the highest value per capita of post-conflict aid 
anywhere in the world (Zürcher, 2011). Whilst peacebuilding in Bosnia has been 
the subject of extensive research (e.g. Belloni, 2001; Chandler, 2006; Fagan, 2005; 
Mac Ginty, 2011), the role and legitimacy of local CSOs has not been a subject of 
systematic analysis.  
In ethnically-divided societies such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, CSO legitimacy 
cannot be considered without factoring in ethnicity and identity politics. Locally-
grounded CSOs may be disregarded by foreign donors because they are often mono-
ethnic, leading donors to dismiss them as exclusive and polarizing (Verkoren & van 
Leeuwen, 2014). However, mono-ethnic CSOs may have more local legitimacy 
because they can better represent constituents, with whom they share a similar 
culture, history and political framing. Peacebuilding scholarship could thus benefit 
from empirical testing of assumptions regarding mono-ethnic CSOs and their 
relationship to ‘CS building’ and peace.  
In this light, we investigate the legitimacy of a sample of Bosnian CSOs using 
triangulation of multiple methods. We are particularly interested in two questions: 
first, what is the relationship between local and donor legitimacy? And second, what 
is the relationship between CSO legitimacy and ethnicness? Regarding the first, 
although our findings support the idea that donor and local legitimacy rarely go 
together – for which we offer a number of novel explanations – the combination does 
occur. We devote considerable space in our analysis to the interesting category of 
organizations enjoying both local and donor support. Secondly, we find the 
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relationship between ethnicness and legitimacy to be much more ambiguous than 
expected. 
2.3 CSO legitimacy and peace interventions 
2.3.1 Understanding legitimacy and legitimation 
Organizational legitimacy has been most prominent in the neo-
institutionalism school, according to which legitimacy derives from an organization’s 
environment (Brinkerhoff, 2005, p. 5). As this environment is socially constructed 
(Lister, 2003), we may define organizational legitimacy as ‘a generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.’ 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574) Though legitimacy is thus perceived and subjective, its 
consequences are tangible, generating material and other resources and affecting the 
functioning of organizations. To understand how legitimacy arises one needs to 
study the legitimation process in which CSOs come to be considered appropriate and 
trustworthy (Hilhorst, 2003, p. 4). Our interest, then, is on the perceptions of those 
in an organization’s environment that ‘legitimate’ the organization; the ‘subjects of 
legitimation’. We distinguish between local and donor subjects of legitimation. Local 
subjects include constituencies, government actors and other CSOs, whilst donor 
subjects include employees of donors from Western countries.40  
According to the literature, legitimacy for these subjects can have 
instrumental and normative dimensions. The instrumental dimension derives from 
performance, that is the outcomes of an organization’s activities (Barnes, 2006). 
Subjects’ judgment of  organizational performance relates largely to whether the 
organization has furthered their own interests (Suchman, 1995). Instrumental 
legitimacy thus follows from a resource dependence model oriented to ‘exchange 
relationships’ where an organization provides services and benefits while 
constituencies provide legitimacy supporting organizational survival and 
sustainability (Brinkerhoff, 2005).  
                                                          
40 Being cognizant that each are heterogeneous categories (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 21). 
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The normative dimension of organizational legitimacy derives from reflecting 
socially acceptable (or desirable) norms, standards and values (Brinkerhoff, 2005). 
Sources of normative legitimacy include declarative mission and values, internal 
democracy and accountability, whether organizational staff and leadership resemble 
and represent the constituency; in short, whether the priorities, actions, and 
procedures of a CSO are considered ‘the right ones’ (Suchman, 1995). Normative 
legitimacy may also derive from an organization’s moral leadership or sound analysis 
of problems (Barnes, 2006).  
Complicating the normative dimension, conformity with dominant 
discourses has implications for legitimacy. Legitimacy can be a mechanism through 
which discourses shape organizational practices; activities which conform to 
hegemonic discourses are rewarded with organizational legitimacy, while contrary 
activities are sanctioned with illegitimacy (Lister, 2001). Indeed, in divided societies 
hosting peacebuilding interventions, CSO legitimacy is situated within the political 
projects of both interveners and local actors. The most prominent political projects 
– or hegemonic discourses - in this context are the liberal peace and 
ethnonationalism.  
Table 2-1 summarizes sources of legitimacy mentioned often in the literature 
on legitimacy and CSOs. 
Table 2-1. Dimensions and sources of CSO legitimacy 
 Instrumental Normative 
Sources  Performance 
 Self-interest of 
constituencies 
 Representation of 
constituencies 
 Mission & vision 
 Shared background and values  
 ‘Doing the right things’ 
 ‘Doing things right’  
(Internal democracy & accountability) 
 Moral voice 
 Positionality regarding dominant discourses 
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2.3.2 Legitimacy and ethnicness41 
A highly relevant, but little studied question regarding the legitimacy of CSOs in 
divided societies concerns its relationship to ethnic identity. As mentioned earlier, 
mono-ethnic groups tend to possess lower donor legitimacy than multi-ethnic 
groups. However, the reverse may be true for local legitimacy: CSOs and CSO 
leaders belonging to the same ethnic group as their constituencies may have high 
legitimacy based on the sources ‘representation of constituencies’ and ‘conformity to 
dominant discourses’ (Belloni, 2009; Orjuela, 2010).  
Two strands of relevant literature exist on the positioning of CS within 
ethnically-divided societies. The first concerns bonding and bridging social capital, 
and the second centers on dimensions of ‘inclusivity’ and ‘civilness’. Each framework 
links the ethnicness of CSOs to their impact on social relations in the divided society. 
Social capital refers to ties and trust among people resulting from their organizational 
involvement and has become an influential concept to explain macro-level 
characteristics of governance, institutional performance, and economic development 
(Putnam, 1992). Bonding social capital consisting of ties within exclusive and 
homogenous identity groups is distinguished from bridging social capital concerning 
relationships between such groups (Putnam, 2000). These concepts have become 
popular in describing CSOs in divided societies (e.g. Campbell et al., 2008; 
Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). This literature often treats bonding social capital as an 
obstacle to the establishment of bridging ties. For example, Varshney’s (2002) 
influential study from India found that cities with predominantly mono-ethnic 
CSOs, considered to exhibit bonding social capital, and ‘intracommunal networks of 
civic life’ had higher levels of interethnic violence than otherwise comparable cities 
with predominantly multi-ethnic CSOs.  
In Putnam’s own work (2000, 2007), however, bonding and bridging social 
capital are not inversely correlated. In fact, Putnam suggests that bonding social 
                                                          
41 ‘Ethnicness’ is chosen for precision since ‘bonding social capital’ has also been applied to local 
community and non-associational ties (e.g. Putnam, 2000) while ‘ascriptive-identity’ as applied in Belloni 
(2008) includes ethnic but not other forms of ascriptive identity such as gender. 
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capital may be a prerequisite to bridging social capital; only once people are 
comfortable being organized within their own identity group, can they become active 
in the wider society. This idea is supported by research on migrant communities in 
Western Europe (Fennema & Tillie, 1999). 
The second approach to CSO ethnicness focuses directly on societal division 
and how CSOs relate to it. Belloni’s (2008) analysis categorizes post-war CS into 
three types: groups defending and promoting the politics of inclusion and civic 
principles, ‘uncivil’ and criminal groups, and those only engaged in legal behavior 
but nonetheless divisive for society.42 The framework thus analyzes CSOs based on 
the normative criteria of ‘inclusivity’ vis-à-vis the ethnic division and ‘civilness’, 
meaning whether organizations accept or condone ‘uncivil’ means. Literature on 
divided societies often sees the first category, inclusive and civic groups, as weaker 
than those advocating for division, because CS is as divided as political society and 
there are strong interests to maintain the divided status quo (Belloni, 2008; Bojicic-
dzelilovic, 2006; S. Fisher, 2003; Orjuela, 2010).  
Research in this tradition has tended to focus on extreme cases, analyzing a 
few influential but polarizing ethnic CSOs (e.g. Belloni, 2009; Paffenholz, 2010b; 
Richmond, 2006), not on the more numerous and diverse organizations occupying 
the middle ground.43 Our case study, presented below, will add nuance to the debate 
on CS, ethnicness and division and illustrate the often blurry boundary between 
ethnic and non-ethnic organizations. 
2.3.3 Bringing the theory together 
What does this existing theory on organizational legitimacy and the positionality of 
CSOs within divided societies tell us regarding our research questions? First, it has 
                                                          
42 Belloni’s last category of legal but divisive groups is described as being most frequently based on 
ascriptive criteria such as race or religion, or roles such as military service which are commonly overlaid 
with ethnic markers. 
43 Exceptions are feminist scholars Cynthia Cockburn (2013) and Elissa Helms (2003c) who have applied 
ethnic, multi-ethnic, and anti-nationalist as overlapping categories for the varied positionality of women’s 
CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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made clear that to understand legitimacy, we need to focus on the perceptions of 
legitimating actors in the organization’s environment. Since we are interested in the 
relationship between local and donor legitimacy (our first research question), we 
consider both local and donor actors. To guide this analysis we have identified two 
dimensions of CSO legitimacy – instrumental and normative – as well as several 
sources within each dimension. We shall return to these dimensions and sources in 
the empirical analysis. 
Second, we have hypothesized that in divided societies, ethnicness is 
potentially an important intervening variable in explaining the lack of convergence 
between local and donor legitimacy. Whereas donors are reluctant to support ethnic 
CSOs (perhaps influenced by the work of Varshney, Belloni and others), ethnicness 
may contribute to local legitimacy. Regarding the relationship between local CSO 
legitimacy and ethnicness (our second research question), existing frameworks are 
either inconclusive (with scholars in disagreement on the relationship between 
bonding and bridging social capital) or insufficiently nuanced (with the work on 
divisiveness and ‘civilness’ of CSOs ignoring the middle ground of hard-to-
categorize organizations). Here, we hope our empirical analysis can help to further 
develop the theory.  
2.4 Methodology 
As mentioned above, our inquiry largely aims at theory development rather than 
theory testing. It followed an actor-centered approach, consistent with a 
constructivist orientation, which primarily considers individual intention, 
perception, and agency (Long, 2001). It used triangulation (Flick, 2009: 65) of 
methods including semi-structured interviews, document analysis, process tracing, 
and a survey of constituencies. Three focus areas of youth, women, and social 
welfare44 were chosen since they are objects of international CS-building efforts and 
also have potential local constituencies (Belloni & Hemmer, 2010; Sali-Terzić, 
                                                          
44 Vulnerable populations – recommended CSOs provide assistance regarding development disabilities, 
life-threatening diseases, and to children. 
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2001). These groups are viewed both by local and international actors as 
disadvantaged in patronage-based post-conflict power structures and also as 
potential cross-cutting cleavages, i.e. identities whose common interest are 
conceptualized to be able to overcome ethnic division (B. Reilly, 2001).  
The research questions on the relationship between CSO legitimacy and 
ethnicness and between local and donor legitimacy informed our selection criteria 
for case study CSOs, using theoretical sampling (Flick, 2009) as reflected in Table 
2-2. We aim to elaborate these relationships by selecting similar organizations with 
variations of legitimacy and ethnicness. 
Table 2-2. Case study CSO sample selection grid 
  High donor 
Legitimacy 
Low donor 
Legitimacy 
High local 
legitimacy 
Low ethnicness 
  
High ethnicness 
  
Low local  
legitimacy 
Low ethnicness  
No examples 
found 
High ethnicness 
No examples 
found 
No examples 
found45 
 
CSOs were assigned to these categories based on semi-structured interviews 
with 27 key informants, and analysis of the indicators of legitimacy in Table 2-2. 
The key informants were selected to represent diverse and significant organizational 
                                                          
45 Table 2-2 represents the expectation that CSOs with low local and low donor legitimacy were both 
unusual and not of interest for the inquiry and in fact none were identified. In addition there were no 
examples found with high donor legitimacy, low local legitimacy and high ethnicness. 
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perspectives regarding local and donor legitimacy.46 Key informants were asked 
‘which organizations that are working on youth (later for each other area of focus) 
have high and low legitimacy?’47, and to describe the reasons for forming this opinion 
(declared sources of legitimacy). Next, indicators of legitimacy (see Table 2-2) were 
used to confirm the assessments. We particularly see the relatively objective 
indicators for constituency support as confirming the legitimacy or lack thereof for 
parts of the population, i.e. becoming a member, providing financial support, and/or 
volunteering are actions taken by the population which indicate legitimacy. This 
approach is best suited for determining ‘narrow but strong’ legitimacy for a core 
group of constituents – people who interact with the organization- than a more 
‘broad but weak’ legitimacy for the population as a whole. Where the key informants 
or indicators disagreed, preference was given to CSOs with consistent indications 
regarding their legitimacy. Typical cases for each of the theoretical categories were 
in this way selected by triangulation of different sources.  
In total, 23 CSOs were selected for initial interviews, the topics of which were 
the organization’s activities and goals, indicators of legitimacy (types and sizes of 
constituency, sources of funding), and understandings of the CSO’s own legitimacy. 
We chose two CSOs from each of the five categories in Table 2-2 guided by equal 
representation of each focus area and three major urban areas of Sarajevo, Banja 
Luka, and Mostar, making a total of ten case study CSOs.  
  
                                                          
46 From the categories: political actors (4), religious CS (3), media and business (3), CS networks (5), 
international CS (2), CS Building projects (4), donors (4), and international political actors (2). Key 
informants were selected based on experience relating to CSOs in addition to their primary sectors and 
their assessments regarded CSOs to which they did not have institutional ties to reduce potential bias.  
47 Feedback to pilot interviews indicated that the local equivalent legitimnost was understood as legality 
and as a result both legitimnost and kredibilnost (roughly credibility) were used in translation. 
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Table 2-3. Indicators of legitimacy 
Subject of legitimation Indicator Sources 
Constituencies Amount of voluntary 
financial support  
CSO websites, (Daguda, 
Mrđa, & Prorok, 2013), 
interviews 
Types and intensity of 
interactions 
(volunteering, informing, 
participation) 
Interviews 
Government Frequency of 
interaction/consultation 
Interviews, strategy & 
public consultation 
documents 
Amount, number of 
government grants 
Relevant web sites, 
(Center for Investigative 
Journalism, 2011) 
Successful advocacy Interviews 
Donors Frequency of references 
and consultation 
invitations, nature of 
assessments 
Donor reports48 
 
Next, each case study organization was researched in more depth by following 
four research steps. First, information on the CSO and their own understanding of 
their legitimacy was gathered via staff interviews. Second, a multi-year initiative of 
each CSO was researched using process tracing to follow interactions with 
government, beneficiaries, and other CSOs. Process tracing involved interviews with 
state and other CS actors and relevant internal and public document review allowing 
access to the perspectives of subjects of legitimation. All interviews were analyzed in 
                                                          
48 (Barnes, Mrdja, Sijercic, & Popovic, 2004; BCSDN, 2012; CPCD, 2008; European Commission, 
2005; IBHI, 2005, 2011; Open Society Foundations, 2006; ORT, 2001; Pearson & Robertson, 2008; 
Sterland, 2006, 2003, TACSO, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Thomasson, 2006; USAID, 2011) 
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ATLAS.ti using open coding schemes based on the theoretical dimensions and 
sources of legitimacy (Flick, 2009). Salience of these sources was analyzed based on 
frequency of mention and expressions of high salience. Third, interactions between 
the case study CSOs and constituencies, political actors, citizens, and donors were 
observed through participant observations of 16 events.49 Finally, constituency 
construction of legitimacy was assessed by a survey of fifty randomly-selected 
members and/or participants50 from each of five CSOs, one per category. Salience 
was assessed based on Spearman rank correlation coefficient (ρ) between legitimacy 
assessments and ratings for sixteen statements derived from the sources of CSO 
legitimacy in Table 2-1.51   
Multiple CSOs within each urban area and diversity of context regarding 
local political and ethnic dynamics strengthen the generalizability of the findings, 
although a limitation is that population surveys have found variability between urban 
and rural settings regarding CSO participation rates (22.3% vs. 14.6%, respectively) 
(UNDP, 2009, p. 62). A further limitation is that a population survey was not 
conducted. The study rather focuses on CSO legitimacy as perceived and understood 
by those who interact with them – constituencies, government, and donors. This 
approach avoids the problem that quantitative legitimacy ratings are considered to 
depend on how well the respondent knows the CSO and as a result reliable 
measurements via surveys have only been possible for a few, well-known CSOs. (e.g. 
Seibert, 2013) 
                                                          
49 Events lasted 2-8 hours, most were public, and were attended primarily by CSO actors (5), political 
and CSO actors (3), donor and CSO actors (3), CSO actors and constituencies (5). Events were selected 
based on a diversity of participants from those organized by the case study CSOs during the fieldwork. 
50 For CSOs with both groups, half were from each group. 
51 Legitimacy: ‘In your opinion, how credible and legitimate is the organization?’; sources: ‘In your 
opinion, to what degree do the following statements describe the organization.’ Salience was determined 
if ρ >0.23 based on one-tailed t-test at 0.005 level of significance with n=140 responses. 
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2.5 Legitimacy and ethnicness of CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
2.5.1 Background and previous research 
Before the 1992-1995 war, Bosnia-Herzegovina possessed many mostly 
amateur community organizations (often sports and cultural organizations) which 
were however largely controlled by the Communist Party. In addition, elected 
neighborhood organizations (mjesne zajednice) were a prime channel for local 
planning and community participation (Sterland, 2006). During and after the war, 
most of these associations were either dismantled or reformed with new leadership 
and membership. This period also witnessed the influx of international NGOs and 
international support for new NGOs as service providers. A 2009 study (HTSPE 
Ltd UK) found 12.189 registered CSOs, of which 91% were established after 1991, 
and that 54% of them were active.  
Only a few studies exist regarding local opinions on CSOs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Their findings suggest a preference by citizens for organizations 
offering direct ‘help’ as social services and humanitarian aid (Grødeland, 2006; 
Pickering, 2006). On the other hand, mass mobilization and ‘political activities’ are 
seen negatively (Helms, 2014), probably because politics itself is tainted by conflict 
and corruption. These studies are based on interviews with CSO participants and on 
focus groups’ impressions of all CSOs and articulate why donor support fosters low 
local support. Accordingly they support the view that organizations with local 
legitimacy are not the same as those considered legitimate by donors.52 Our research 
offers a more in-depth view of our case-study CSOs and relies on a wider diversity 
of informants both in- and outside of these organizations. Whilst it further explains 
and nuances the earlier conclusions, it also offers new data on the sources of 
legitimacy for local citizens and characteristics of the CSOs considered to be 
legitimate.  
                                                          
52 (see also Belloni, 2001; Pupavac, 2005). Sali-Terzić (2001) however suggests that some human rights, 
women’s rights, and youth organizations have succeeded at building both donor and local legitimacy, 
without analysis of why these types of CSOs have been successful or the variation in outcomes. These 
studies rely primarily on interlocutors from professional NGOs and donors. 
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2.5.2 Local and donor legitimacy 
In line with earlier research (Belloni, 2001; Pickering, 2006; Sali-Terzić, 2001; 
Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 2014) we have found few CSOs with both high local and 
high donor legitimacy. However, this combination does exist and the possibility thus 
cannot be a priori excluded. These cases are so rare, our results suggest, because many 
local actors view donor support with suspicion. Local respondents referred to ‘foreign 
mercenaries’ and ‘money laundering’ to describe donor-funded CSOs.53 Although 
this discourse was heard particularly from ethnonationalist opponents of liberal 
discourses, its frequency also demonstrates popular mistrust regarding who benefits 
from donor programs. According to one interviewee, ‘the dominant opinion [is] that 
the nongovernmental sector, frequently financed from outside, and that a large part 
of the money that comes to Bosnia-Herzegovina overflows into those 
nongovernmental organizations from which it is withdrawn and returns outside the 
country’ (interview Čehajić, 17-04-13). Additionally, few organizations combine 
local and donor legitimacy because local and donor actors emphasize different 
sources of legitimacy. This point is elaborated in the sub-section below. The next 
sub-section zooms in on the few CSOs that do have both local and donor legitimacy, 
identifying common factors that may explain this extraordinary situation.  
2.5.2.1 Local and donor legitimacy constructs 
What sources of legitimacy do different subjects of legitimation apply in explaining 
why CSOs are more or less legitimate? In the “CSO Legitimacy and Peace 
Interventions” section, we distinguished between instrumental and normative 
dimensions of legitimacy, and separated each dimension into several sources of 
legitimacy. For local actors (government staff, staff of other organizations, and 
constituents), the most salient instrumental sources of legitimacy were performance 
(‘competence and capacity’, ‘meeting basic needs’) and ‘representation’ (‘establishing 
                                                          
53 Interviews: (Ćorić, 24-10-2013, Lepir, 05-06-2013, Salman & Hamzić, 4-10-2012, Žeravčić, 9-3-
2012, Trifunović, 8-4-2012)  See also (Belloni & Hemmer, 2010; Spahić-Šiljak, Spahić, & Bavčić, 2012) 
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social rights’). The most salient normative sources were ‘clear mission and vision’ 
(‘principledness and consistency’), and ‘doing the right things’ (‘working for a 
common rather than a personal good’).54  For donors, the most salient instrumental 
sources were ‘performance’ (‘effectiveness’, ‘oriented towards citizens’) and in the 
normative dimension, ‘mission and vision’ (‘values’, ‘political understanding of CS’, 
‘cooperation with other CSOs’). We will next elaborate how these constructs 
contribute to different assessments of the legitimacy of a CSO by donors and local 
populations. 
Local subjects of legitimation frequently described CSOs with high local 
legitimacy as those that focus on ‘solving concrete problems’ and addressing 
‘everyday needs’. This includes both an instrumental component (the outcomes of 
problems being solved) as well as an implicit normative component (whose problems 
and which problems). Although donor representatives similarly included ‘oriented 
toward citizens’ and ‘articulation of problems and solutions’ as sources of legitimacy, 
locals’ reference to ‘solving concrete problems’ was also a critique of the liberal 
projects and discourses of CSOs with high donor legitimacy. Those were seen to 
promote vague grand norms rather than helping constituencies in their everyday 
struggles. In addition, for local actors, ‘gender equality’, ‘human rights’, ‘Roma 
rights’, and ‘LGBT rights’ were described as discourses which certain CSOs master 
and which provide donor legitimacy and resources. Low local legitimacy for CSOs 
applying such discourses coincided with negative instrumental assessments of their 
results and negative normative assessments of their financial interest and integrity 
(‘foreign mercenaries’ and ‘money laundering’ presented earlier). 55  
That local actors consider donor-promoted values as insufficiently concrete 
vis-à-vis everyday problems is illustrated regarding gender equality, a norm 
promoted by some CSOs with high donor legitimacy. Several local interviewees 
                                                          
54 Constituency survey data: ‘Follow a mission and vision that I support’, ρ=0.53; ‘work for the common 
good’, ρ=0.44 (normative) and ‘Provide important services’, ρ=0.48; ‘has good results’, ρ=0.47; 
‘Professional’, ρ=0.45 (instrumental). 
55 Key informant interviews Šehić, 22-5-2013, Žolja 12-4-2013, Raden Radić 12-11-2012, Pršić 7-3-
2013.  
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supported the idea of gender equality, but felt that donor-supported organizations 
were insufficiently concrete and did not help individual women. ‘We don't say “now 
women should be in politics” but rather a woman has been pushed out because she 
didn’t listen to the orders of her supervisors‘ (interview Čehajić, 17-04-13). As put 
by a journalist, ‘Every year there's an action about [getting] more women in politics 
… Will there be more?  Because their action isn't directed so that it really profiles 
women in politics, protects them, motivates them to be politically strong, they're 
doing a project.’ (interview Rudić, 14-09-2012).  
A second challenge to a focus on ‘gender equality’ was its perceived lower 
priority in relation to other societal issues. As posed by an alternative media writer,  
In a society in which nationalism is growing, sometimes even 
fascism, social exclusion of those who are different, and you 
are concerned with gender balance as the most important 
question in the world. It is important, but practically in this 
society it's only one of the questions that are problematic. If 
in the education system [there is] production of nationalism 
then it is surely more important to be concerned with that?" 
(interview Trifunović, 8-4-2012)   
For the speaker, the political struggle against ethnonationalism and its 
perpetuation through the educational system is more important than a narrow 
concern with gender quotas. In discussing exclusion of families of the 
developmentally-disabled in CSO-government interactions, a CSO staff person 
commented, ‘before every important change of policy by the premier, government, 
elections - regardless, the government held conversations with its social partners 
which includes youth, pensioners, students, veterans, military wartime handicapped, 
even women, but handicapped civilians are nowhere’ (emphasis added) (interview 
Rađen Radić, 12-11-2013). More than just illustrating different norms regarding 
gender, this comment also reflects a critique that women’s CSOs advocating gender 
equality have less normative legitimacy than the other groups mentioned.  
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Although patriarchy may explain why this normative project was most often 
critiqued, the broader delegitimation of initiatives and CSOs applying rights-based 
discourses points to an explanation why CSOs rarely have both donor and local 
legitimacy. Local actors often strongly critiqued the perceived lack of results of CS-
building efforts and by extension the CSOs that are their most visible representation. 
This may help to explain why donor-supported CSOs cannot attract support even 
by ‘moderate and liberal elements of society’ (Ker-lindsay, 2013, p. 261).  
2.5.2.2 CSOs combining high local and high donor legitimacy 
The presence of CSOs with both donor and local legitimacy, although rare, 
demonstrates the possibility of diverse CSO approaches within donor and local actor 
frameworks. We begin by describing an example before reflecting on their common 
characteristics. The Sarajevo CSO KULT was first mentioned by a municipal official 
who praised how it had provided assistance in his initiative to convene institutions 
and CSOs to create a municipal strategy to address youth education, employment, 
and recreation (interview Pršeš, 30-aug-2012). The official highlighted that the 
nature of this assistance was in partnership rather than funds. KULT is a 
professionalized and large organization by Bosnian standards, occupying a spacious 
house in the Sarajevo outskirts of Ilidza. It emerged from student organizing and 
frustrations with the politicized student union. In addition to working across the 
Federation and state levels, KULT operates a youth center with classes in a local 
municipal building. At a KULT-organized conference of youth organizations and 
local officials, staff person Muamer Logo legitimated KULT by reference to the 
critiques of the short-term nature of donor projects, calling on participants to, “use 
the word project less.” and articulating the lasting character of KULT’s work. KULT 
claimed to have helped pass a Federation Law on Youth which enables youth CSOs 
to form a municipal youth council, while others also recognized their contribution. 
In the words of KULT founder Jasmin Bešić, “only youth know what they need.” 
The salience of this ‘representation’ claim as a legitimacy source was demonstrated 
when subjects of legitimation frequently referenced their important role in 
convening and training the youth councils as a reason for KULT’s legitimacy. In 
addition, KULT was mentioned by multiple donor representatives as having high 
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legitimacy because of credibility within the Brussels EU offices, and combination of 
local-level and advocacy programs (Interviews Sijerčić 11-10-2012, Hodžić, 20-9-
2012). A case-study youth CSO also affirmed KULT as a “substantive” organization 
whose training assisted their advocacy efforts. (Interview Čomaga and Bahtijarević, 
16-11-2012)  
The nine CSOs selected based on multiple indicators of both local and donor 
legitimacy may provide a valid basis for drawing some preliminary conclusions. 
Despite heterogeneous locations and focus, they had three common characteristics. 
Each engaged in ‘solving concrete problems’ (largely but not exclusively service 
provision) sustained over at least five years. Secondly, they engaged in advocacy 
focused on institutional change. Finally, all offered geographically-local programs, 
i.e. focused on a particular municipal area and offering – in all but one case - a 
physical space regularly accessible to constituents (See Appendix B in Puljek-Shank 
& Verkoren, 2016 for supporting data). ‘Solving concrete problems’, advocacy, and 
geographically-local activities reflect oft-mentioned sources of local legitimacy with 
instrumental (‘performance’, ‘representation’), and normative (‘doing the right 
things’, ‘mission and vision’) dimensions.  
An additional finding regarding the case study CSOs with local and donor 
legitimacy is that two appeared to function as intermediaries between donors and 
local actors; they had sufficient donor legitimacy and funds, yet could partner with 
organizations with high local but low donor legitimacy. These intermediaries could 
successfully navigate an environment dominated by powerful donor and local actors 
in order to achieve support from both, despite often divergent notions of 
instrumental and normative legitimacy. A characteristic of these intermediaries was 
‘ambiguous ethnicness’ manifested as a lack of overt ethnic identifications 
(terminology, symbols), activities limited to ethnoterritorial divisions and an absence 
of anti-nationalist discourse. The Banja Luka CSO ‘Hi Neighbor’ is an example of 
this. Its ambiguous positionality as non-ethnic but also not anti-nationalist working 
in the RS facilitates interactions with school officials who rely on nationalist political 
support and with local parents’ committees in donor-funded child protection efforts. 
The intermediaries in addition to high donor legitimacy demonstrated legitimacy 
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for some nationalist political actors. ‘Ambiguous ethnicness’ is discussed in more 
depth in the following section. 
To conclude this section, many local actors mistrust donor-supported CSOs 
due to negative instrumental assessments of their results (not connected to everyday 
struggles) as well as negative normative assessments of their priorities and the CSOs 
themselves (financial interest and lack of integrity). In contrast, CSOs with both 
local and donor legitimacy evinced the combination of ‘solving concrete problems’, 
advocacy, and geographically-local programs. Some of these organizations acted 
skillfully as go-betweens between donor and local actors, navigating different 
discourses and views of legitimacy, which was aided by ‘ambiguous ethnicness’. 
2.5.3 CSO legitimacy and ethnicness 
The research question on the relationship between CSO legitimacy and ethnicness 
was reflected in the selection of high local legitimacy CSOs with high-ethnicness or 
low-ethnicness. Operationalization of ethnicness, however, required addressing the 
link between CSOs and populations divided into territories with dominant ethnic 
majorities56 following wartime ethnic cleansing and ongoing ethnoterritorialism 
(Toal & Dahlman, 2011). Only one of the 23 potential case-study CSOs indicated 
to have high local legitimacy by key informants self-declared as mono-ethnic, even 
though key informants considered an additional three of them as such. This 
established that self-identification did not suffice to determine a CSO’s ethnic 
profile. We earlier distinguished between bonding and bridging social capital (intra- 
and inter-ethnic ties) on the one hand, and ‘inclusiveness’ as a value on the other. 
Bonding and bridging social capital can be observed from the ethnic identification 
of those with whom an organization interacts. We operationalized inclusiveness as a 
more subjective indicator of how the organization is seen to be positioned – both by 
its own members and by others – vis-à-vis societal division. Here, what matters is 
whether an organization advocates inclusiveness and civic principles and whether its 
constituents perceive it as doing so. We operationalized ethnicness accordingly based 
                                                          
56 The Republika Srpska, eight of ten Cantons in the Federation, a majority of municipalities. 
Chapter 2 
  
70 
on both social capital indicators (the ethnic composition of a CSOs (claimed) 
constituency, staff, and their area of work) and inclusiveness indicators 
(ethnonationalist vs. liberal citizenship ideology, self-identification via ethnic terms 
and symbols, and perception as mono-ethnic).  
These indicators did not establish a clear picture (exclusive and bonding 
versus inclusive and bridging) for most CSOs. Instead organizations scored 
differently on different indicators. In particular, organizations’ social capital 
indicators were not consistent with their own and others’ perceptions of their 
inclusiveness. For example, organizations gave formal statements of inclusivity, but 
in interviews, participant observation and the constituency survey references were 
made to ethnonationalist political projects and symbols. Many CSOs demonstrated 
some evidence of ethnicness based on bonding social capital without being explicitly 
ethnic. Organizational ethnicness is much more complex than the literature suggests.  
The relationship between ethnicness and local legitimacy was similarly 
complicated. We found no clear correlation between high ethnicness and high local 
legitimacy. Two of eight CSOs with high local legitimacy had consistently low 
ethnicness. They had multi-ethnic constituencies and staff, worked in multi-ethnic 
territories, and were inclusive and civic in their ideology, self-identification and use 
of symbols, and perceptions of subjects of legitimation. To be locally legitimate in a 
divided society, then, an organization does not have to be ethnically based. The 
remaining six CSOs with local legitimacy evinced ‘ambiguous ethnicness’, having 
some but not all of the ethnicness indicators. Regarding organizations with donor 
legitimacy, expectations were confirmed in that none had high ethnicness but some 
did demonstrate ‘ambiguous ethnicness’. Ethnic ambiguity also featured in the small 
but interesting sample of CSOs discussed earlier with both local and donor 
legitimacy. In the remainder of this section we shall elaborate on this largely 
unexplored category of organizations. 
In a divided society, CSOs may be mono-ethnic not by persuasion but in 
practice, simply because of the segregated context. Several CSOs work in territories 
with one predominant ethnic majority and our research did not indicate frequent 
interactions with members and beneficiaries across the ethnic divide (‘bridging social 
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capital’). Many of these ‘ethnic-in-practice’ CSOs, particularly (but not only) in the 
Republika Srpska (RS), declare themselves as ‘non-ethnic’. These ‘ethnic-in-
practice’ CSOs in the RS tended to enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of RS functionaries 
as they received government funding and were included in RS government 
consultations.  
‘Hi Neighbor’ from Banja Luka, for example, focuses on children’s rights and 
youth activities. It demonstrates low ethnicness through universalist rights-based 
advocacy, lack of ethnic symbols, and not declaring its beneficiaries in ethnic terms. 
However, it demonstrates evidence of ethnicness in that the area of direct activities 
is the Serb-majority RS (Zdravo da ste/Hi Neighbor, 2013), while its mission 
statement refers ambiguously to working in ‘our country’. In addition, its advocacy 
primarily targets RS institutions. An initiative to advocate adoption of the Lanzarote 
Convention on Child Protection focuses on RS law and regulations, while Tuzla 
partner ‘Zemlja djece' similarly engaged in the Federation. These pragmatic choices 
demonstrate how ‘Hi Neighbor’ employs ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ in the legitimation 
process.  
Another example comes from the divided Federation city of Mostar. Mostar 
was bitterly contested and heavily damaged during the war and despite a period of 
international administration and extensive peacebuilding efforts, remains socially 
segregated with separate institutions and spaces (Hromadžić, 2008). Located in 
majority-Bošnjak East Mostar, the CSO B&H Woman gives the impression of an 
activist organization with posters informing victims of domestic violence 
prominently displayed towards the street. B&H Woman has legitimacy for the 
police and municipal government, which provides small but ongoing funding for 
their domestic violence shelter. The CSO includes women regardless of ethnicity 
and works in areas with Croat and Serb majorities, but eased acceptance in these 
areas at times by not explicitly referencing their role.57 Consistent with ethnic 
                                                          
57 “Protocol regarding process and cooperation of responsible institutions for protection of victims of 
domestic violence and gender-based violence“, Nevesinje municipality 2011. This is in contrast to 
agreements in other municipalities. 
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territorial divisions and unlike any other city, there are two women’s shelters, one in 
West Mostar run by Catholic (and by association, Croat) Caritas, the other in East 
Mostar by B&H Woman.58 Local populations and beneficiaries can thus perceive 
the CSO as ethnic. Ethnoterritorial division thus influences perceptions of 
ethnicness despite non-nationalist ideologies and expressed liberal norms. 
So far, we have discussed differences between social capital criteria (intra- and 
inter-group ties) and perceptions of inclusiveness. Perceptions themselves can also 
differ: an organization can be perceived to be mono-ethnic whilst considering itself 
to be inclusive. This is demonstrated by the CSO Nahla. A first impression of its 
multi-story building in the urban Otoka neighborhood of Sarajevo is shaped by a 
prominent Islamic architecture-inspired logo and the steady stream of some of its 
5,000 dues-paying female members, many with headscarves, heading to exercise, 
language, and Islamic classes or psychological counseling. In both public perception 
and key informant interviews, the association with Islam implies that Nahla is 
Bošnjak. Founder and director Sehija Dedović, however, emphasized that an 
organizational norm is to not focus on being Bošnjak and that, ‘in each of our 
programs there are women that are not Muslims … from 10 there are at least two if 
not more.’ (Interview Dedović, 2-4-2013)  The prominent use of Muslim 
terminology and Muslim courses, supporting and apparently benefitting from the 
perception of being Bošnjak, coexists with a mission statement that supports the 
liberal ‘principles of freedom of thought, conscience, and faith in modern civil 
society.’ 
How do we explain that the majority of high local legitimacy organizations, 
in addition to some with both local and donor legitimacy, are ‘ambiguously ethnic’? 
We find that legitimate organizations are those best able to maneuver in ethnically-
divided societies and political systems, and adaptive use of ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ 
enables them to do so. In our discussion of legitimacy sources, ‘positionality in 
relation to dominant discourses’ was identified as a source of normative legitimacy. 
‘Ambiguous ethnicness’ offers benefits to CSOs vis-à-vis this positionality, as it 
                                                          
58 (Gender Centar FBiH, 2012) 
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enables them to fit themselves into different and even competing discourses where 
beneficial. Thus, none of the high donor legitimacy case study organizations used 
ethnic labels or symbols, enabling conformity to de-ethnicized liberal donor 
discourses. In addition, most CSOs considered legitimate by government actors 
refrained from public anti-nationalist self-identification, enabling conformity to 
dominant ethnonationalist discourses. Additionally, in the constituency surveys 
‘opposition to nationalism’ was moderately salient for CSO legitimacy (ρ=0.39), 
meaning that this positionality is relevant but is not a major source of legitimacy for 
constituencies.  
To conclude this section, CSO ethnicness is more ambiguous than implied 
by theories which characterize CSOs as either bonding or bridging social capital 
(Putnam, 2000; Varshney, 2002) and either ‘for the politics of inclusion and civic 
principles’ or ‘using legal means but divisive’ (Belloni, 2008). As it turns out, many 
organizations are somewhere in between these extremes. Moreover, contrary to 
expectations we did not find a clear correlation between high ethnicness and high 
local legitimacy or between low ethnicness and high donor legitimacy. Instead, what 
matters for legitimacy is the ability of CSOs to skillfully interact with ethnically-
divided constituencies and political structures.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Though CS strengthening is central to peacebuilding policies for divided, post-war 
societies, its implementation has been criticized for creating internationalized 
organizations without local backing which cannot fulfill the roles theoretically 
attributed to CS, such as representing citizens’ interests. This article has focused on 
CSO legitimacy, exploring why legitimacy for donors rarely accompanies legitimacy 
for local actors. In divided societies like Bosnia, we have hypothesized, an 
organization’s orientation to competing ethnonationalist projects is relevant in 
explaining legitimacy. Whilst donors shy away from mono-ethnic organizations, 
seen as unconducive to peacebuilding, ethnicness may provide local legitimacy.  
Our findings regarding the relationship between local and donor legitimacy 
supports previous research that few CSOs have both high local and high donor 
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legitimacy. One explanation is that local and donor actors apply different norms 
when assessing legitimacy. Another explanation why high donor legitimacy CSOs 
have low local legitimacy is mistrust of international normative frameworks and 
perceived lack of concrete results. However, a few CSOs enjoy both types of 
legitimacy. These were characterized by a focus on ‘solving concrete problems’, 
advocacy, and geographically-local activities which were tangible for beneficiaries. 
Some of them functioned as intermediaries between donor and local actors and 
discourses and an ambiguous relation to ethnicity helped them in doing so.  
The findings regarding CSOs’ ethnicness nuance research characterizing 
organizations as exhibiting either bonding or bridging social capital or as either 
inclusive or divisive. Instead, many organizations relate to ethnonationalism in 
nuanced, complex and ambiguous ways. What appears to matter for local legitimacy 
is not ethnicness per se, but skillful interaction with ethnically-divided constituencies 
and political structures.  
This analysis has contributed to the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding research by 
offering rare empirical data on the relationship between CSOs and their subjects of 
legitimation. It has elaborated the connection between CS and divided societies, 
nuancing existing ideas about organizations being either conducive or detrimental to 
peaceful relations. Our findings offer entry points for donors seeking to support 
locally-legitimate organizations, rather than reinforcing gaps between donor-
supported CSOs and groups with local backing. If low local legitimacy limits 
organizations’ contributions to building peace, donors need a better understanding 
of how legitimacy arises. Our findings suggest that local subjects of legitimation are 
wary of discourses on rights and citizenship and instead seek organizations that can 
‘solve concrete problems’. Local constituents do not expect CSOs to only engage in 
apolitical service delivery, however, as locally-legitimate organizations also engage in 
advocacy. Rather, it is necessary to translate grand projects into concrete and tangible 
activities on the ground. Finally, donors would benefit from better understanding 
the ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ of their recipients and a less dichotomous view of divided 
societies based on “bad” ethnic/”good” non-ethnic divisions. 
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3 Civic Agency in governance: The role of legitimacy with citizens 
vs. donors 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Civil society strengthening programs aim to foster democratic governance by 
supporting civil society organization (CSO) engagement in advocacy. However, 
critics claim that these programs foster apolitical and professional organizations that 
have weak political effects because they do not mobilize citizen participation. This 
literature focuses on how donor programs lead to low legitimacy of CSOs with 
citizens, limiting the means to develop agency towards the state. Here I investigate 
the influence of CSO legitimacy with donors and citizens on civic agency. Empirical 
research was conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina on CSOs considered legitimate by 
donors, citizens, and both. I found that different forms of legitimacy were associated 
with different strategies and agency. CSOs with both forms of legitimacy, which 
have not received much attention until now, turned out to be of particular interest. 
These CSOs demonstrated agency as intermediaries between donors, government, 
and citizens, which enabled greater agency and broader outcomes. 
 
Keywords: Civil society building, legitimacy, civic agency, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
This chapter was published as Puljek-Shank, R. (2018). Civic Agency in 
Governance: The Role of Legitimacy with Citizens vs. Donors. Voluntas: 
International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations. doi: 
10.1007/s11266-018-0020-0. Online first July 9, 2018. 
3.2 Introduction 
International donor agencies frequently provide support to civil society (CS) because 
they expect that the result will be to foster democratic governance by enabling the 
representation of interests and holding elected officials accountable (Diamond, 
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1994; Ottaway & Carothers, 2000). The literature on these CS strengthening 
programs, however, has highlighted their rather weak effects on governance (Belloni, 
2001; Harriss, 2001; Pouligny, 2005; Suleiman, 2012). A critique argues that the 
lack of theorized effects on governance is because donors are essentially looking in 
the wrong place; CS strengthening has focused on ‘professional’ non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) while overlooking grassroots, traditional interest groups and 
non-formal forms of CS (Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Howell & Pearce, 2001b; 
Kostovicova, 2010).  CSOs from the overlooked group, such as unions and 
cooperatives with a grassroots focus and membership base, are being crowded out by 
foreign-funded organizations (Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Howell & Pearce, 2000). 
The approach to change favored by donors is ineffective because it emphasizes 
foreign expertise over local knowledge (Fagan, 2008; Pouligny, 2005). Donor bias in 
favor of technocratic, professional, and apolitical NGOs is seen to have reduced CS 
to a technical exercise (Bebbington et al., 2008; Harriss, 2001; Pouligny, 2005) and 
to focus the supported organizations on rendering services rather than fostering 
society-state relations (Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 2012).  
The conclusion regarding the apolitical organizations that result from donor 
support is that do not engage in political approaches to achieving their goals. Based 
on this literature on CS strengthening programs, we expect that donor-supported 
civil society organizations (CSOs) would have limited ‘civic agency’ (Fowler & 
Biekart, 2013) towards the state. By civic agency, I mean the capacity and actions to 
influence laws and policies on behalf of constituents.  
The literature has increasingly addressed the issue of legitimacy in explaining 
that donor-supported CSOs do not typically engage in political approaches to 
achieve their goals because they lack the means. That is because donor-supported 
CSOs are often not accepted by citizens. A lack of legitimacy in the eyes of citizens 
reduces the ability of these CSOs to engage in political mobilization and citizen 
participation, even though such activities are a key theoretical mechanism for 
impacting democratic governance (Diamond, 1994; Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 
2014; White, 2004). The availability of donor funding leads to the creation of new 
CSOs with little local backing. These organizations are accountable primarily to 
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donors, not citizens. In addition, initiatives in which citizens unite for social or 
political change either receive little assistance or ‘NGO-ize’ in order to become 
eligible for funding, leading to a growing distance from their constituency 
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Hilhorst, 2003; Suleiman, 
2012). The local legitimacy of CSOs is central to these arguments, focusing as they 
do on the weak connections of donor-supported CSOs to local constituencies.  
The critique also draws conclusions about which CSOs are considered 
legitimate with donors; namely, those that are professional, technocratic, and 
apolitical. However, this existing research on CS strengthening emphasizes the 
CSOs supported by donors, while much less research has addressed the CSOs 
without donor support. Due to this selection bias, the ability of the existing research 
to draw conclusions about the impact of local versus donor legitimacy, or a lack 
thereof, is limited. This study addresses this gap by selecting CSOs with variations 
in their forms of legitimacy – those that have high legitimacy with donors but not 
citizens (‘donor darlings’), those that have high legitimacy with citizens but not 
donors, and those that have high legitimacy with both citizens and donors. This 
provides a more solid base from which to understand the effects of both forms of 
legitimacy, as well as their combined effect (following Verba, Keohane, & King, 
1994). 
This article will thus address the research question ‘How do CSO legitimacy 
with donors and citizens influence civic agency and outcomes in the presence of 
donor CS strengthening programs?’ In order to do so, empirical research was 
conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia). Bosnia is an instructive case because the 
recovery from the 1992–1995 war in the immediate aftermath of the cold war meant 
that it was a major focus of donor attention as few other countries in the world. CS 
strengthening formed a core of these efforts and the literature on Bosnian CS echoes 
key elements of the critiques of CS strengthening programs described above 
(Belloni, 2001, 2007; Fagan, 2005). Even more than 20 years later, Bosnia remains 
in fifth place among democracies for the most donor aid per capita (Center for 
Systemic Peace, 2017; World Bank, 2017). As a result, the effects of donor aid might 
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be more pronounced, making Bosnia an extreme and, therefore, an instructive case 
regarding CS strengthening programs (Yin, 2003). 
By illuminating the separate and combined effects of both donors and citizens 
as sources of CSO legitimacy, the research adds empirical data to the literature on 
CS strengthening programs. I show how different types of CSO legitimacy can be 
used to help understand their civic agency or lack thereof. My findings suggest that 
the critiques articulated above need to be nuanced. For one thing, where other 
publications suggest that local and donor legitimacy are mutually exclusive, I 
detected CSOs that combine both forms of legitimacy, which appears to enhance 
their civic agency. Second, I found that, in contrast with Western CS literature, in a 
context like Bosnia, informal ties to political actors – which below will be called 
‘transactional capacities’ – often lead to more civic agency than the ability to mobilize 
citizens – or ‘participatory capacities’. Third, my findings suggest that some forms of 
expertise can be relevant for civic agency but that donors and politicians have quite 
different understandings of professionalism and expertise.  
This article will first elaborate on the literature referred to above regarding 
CSO legitimacy and its influence on civic agency. Next, it will discuss the 
methodology that was used. Each of the three categories of CSOs, defined by 
variations in legitimacy with citizens and donors, will be described and illustrated 
with a case study. A final section makes the arguments introduced above based on 
the differences in civic agency between the legitimacy categories. 
3.3 CSO Legitimacy and Its Influence on Advocacy Roles 
This section will begin by defining CSO legitimacy and justifying the relevance of 
my approach to the study of donor and citizen legitimacy. Next, the literature on 
CSO legitimacy in Bosnia is examined. Then, civic agency is defined and 
operationalized, also in relation to the theoretical distinction between participatory 
capacity and transactional capacity. This section will conclude with a diagram of the 
concepts and relationships present in the research question. 
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3.3.1 Understanding CSO legitimacy 
Organizational legitimacy has been most elaborated in the neo-institutionalism 
school, according to which legitimacy derives from an organization’s environment 
(Brinkerhoff, 2005, p. 5). A CSO’s legitimacy can be defined as ‘a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy arises via intersubjective processes 
of ‘legitimation’ in which CSOs make claims of legitimacy and come to be 
considered appropriate and trustworthy (Hilhorst, 2003, p. 4). Although legitimacy 
is based in subjective perceptions, its consequences are tangible, generating material 
and other resources and affecting the functioning of organizations. The critiques of 
CS strengthening programs described earlier focus on the perspectives of citizens 
and donors as key actors whose perceptions can ‘legitimate’ an organization.  
The literature on CS strengthening programs has frequently put donor-
sponsored organizations in one category and grassroots and traditional organizations 
in another distinct and mutually exclusive category (Chahim & Prakash, 2014; 
Pouligny, 2005; Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 2014). Some studies on Bosnia support 
the idea that organizations with local legitimacy are not the same as those considered 
legitimate by donors (Belloni, 2001; Pupavac, 2005). However, only a few studies 
exist regarding local opinions on CSOs. The findings of these studies are that 
citizens prefer organizations offering direct ‘help’, such as social services and 
humanitarian aid (Grødeland, 2006; Pickering, 2006). On the other hand, 
mobilization and ‘political activities’ are seen negatively (Helms, 2014), probably 
because politics itself is tainted by conflict and corruption. Citizens also have critical 
opinions about donor programs. Citizens often assess donor programs based on 
whether they ‘solve concrete problems’, and their skepticism about donors’ normative 
frameworks and results contribute to the dearth of CSOs enjoying legitimacy for 
both groups. However, earlier research by this author found that the combination of 
legitimacy with donors and citizens is possible (Puljek-Shank & Verkoren, 2017). 
We will return to this below. 
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3.3.2 Civic Agency: Participatory or Transactional Capacities? 
Civic agency is adopted here in order to consider whether and under what conditions 
CS actors do demonstrate the agency that is theoretically assigned to CS. This is 
agency with the ability to limit state power, provide alternative channels for 
representing interests, and strengthen state-society relations (Diamond, 1994; 
White, 2004). This is, after all, what CS strengthening programs have aimed to 
achieve. Civic agency in its simplest form is concerned with agency on behalf of 
groups towards the state. For the reproducibility and analytical clarity of this 
research, a precise definition of civic agency is needed. In fact, agency itself can be 
challenging to operationalize. As put by Long, ‘Agency is usually recognized ex post 
facto through its acknowledged or presumed effects’ (2001, p. 240). To address this 
difficulty, civic agency was defined as ‘the perception of capacity, and action to create 
change for a common good’, leading to operationalization based on the capacities 
and actions.  
‘Common good’ describes the desired outcomes of civic agency on behalf of 
a group. The theory regarding the enhancing effect of CSOs as alternative channels 
for representing interests (Diamond, 1994; White, 2004), and facilitating and 
enhancing collective action (Ostrom, 2015), concerns this ability of CSOs to achieve 
desired outcomes by representing a group of constituents vis-à-vis the state. A 
common good is thus not a partial or club good that only benefits its contributing 
members (Olson, 1971; Welzel et al., 2005). Common goods are, however, public 
goods, subject to the ‘free-rider problem’ and the dynamics of individual collective 
action (Olson, 1971). Common good is used rather than public good because public 
good refers to both those that ‘can only be defined with respect to some specific 
group’ as well as those available to all citizens (Olson, 1971, p. 14). Common good 
is also used because CSOs representing their members’ interests can also do so at the 
expense of the public good writ large (Gugerty & Reynolds, 2010). Perceptions of 
capacities are included based on the idea that actors can only be said to have civic 
agency if they perceive that they can influence other actors in their environment. The 
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following section will examine two distinct forms of capacity from theory and 
empirical research. 
Because of their ability to politically mobilize citizens to a variety of actions 
under the rubric of participation, CSOs are frequently considered relevant for 
governance both in theory and by donors. A theoretical link between CSOs and their 
ability to mobilize political participation has a rich history leading back to de 
Tocqueville (2002) and the early wave of neo-Tocquevillian scholars (Diamond, 
1994; Putnam, 1992; White, 2004). This tradition identifies the effects of CSOs on 
democratic governance due to limiting state power and providing alternative non-
electoral channels for representing interests (Diamond, 1994). CSOs have also been 
found to facilitate and enhance collective action at a local scale (Ostrom, 2015). 
Participatory democracy theory connects participation with greater levels of political 
efficacy (Montoute, 2016). This is because participation increases citizens’ political 
awareness, increases efficacy and empowerment, and promotes a more equal and 
more stable society (Hilmer, 2010; Montoute, 2016). However, many critiques of 
CS strengthening programs conclude that these outcomes rarely happen due to the 
low legitimacy of donor-supported CSOs with citizens. These debates regarding the 
participatory effects of CSOs on governance in democratizing polities are also 
reflected in the literature on the experiences of post-Communist Europe (Crotty, 
2003; Ost, 2005; Raiser, Haerpfer, Nowotny, & Wallace, 2001). Howard’s (2003) 
study, for example, made the case that persistent low levels of CSO membership, an 
indicator of low legitimacy with citizens, were the cause of the ‘weakness of civil 
society’.  
The thesis that CSO impact derives primarily from its ability to mobilize 
participation, however, has been challenged by scholarship, which finds that these 
low levels of CSO membership and individual participation do not inherently limit 
CSO capacities and efficacy. This literature argues that individual participation or 
‘participatory activism’ should be complemented by ‘transactional activism’, i.e., 
‘ties—enduring and temporary—among organized nonstate actors and between 
them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions’ (Petrova & Tarrow, 
2007, p. 79). Participatory activism includes electoral and contentious politics, 
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interest group activities, and – more broadly – individual and group participation in 
civic life. Transactional activism describes the observed salience of linkages to 
authorities that facilitate negotiation related to activists’ goals. It is transactional in 
that strategic networking and problem-solving with authorities are used to achieve 
desired ends. Its proponents do not dispute the weakening effects of low CSO 
membership; rather they claim that the transactional character of activism merits 
attention due its implications for the potential of negotiation with the state and elites 
(T. Cox, 2012; Petrova & Tarrow, 2007; Puljek-Shank, 2017). This literature sees 
the relevance in whether CSOs possess the ‘resources and skills to gain a voice in the 
public sphere’ (Rikmann & Keedus, 2013, p. 161). Finally, a transactional approach 
is of interest because CSOs have been found to have influence to the extent that they 
bring resources lacking but sought by states (Fagan, 2010, p. 73; Montoute, 2016). 
As a result, these dynamics regarding capacities might have broader applicability 
regarding the impact of CS strengthening programs on governance in other 
democratizing polities. To summarize, there are reasons to consider the civic agency 
of CSOs from both participatory and transactional perspectives. 
The concepts examined in this research are represented in Figure 3-1. The 
civic agency of CSOs, positioned centrally, is the phenomenon being investigated. 
The diagram includes three types of actors – political actors, citizens, and donors. 
Transactional capacity is diagrammed with a dashed bi-directional arrow indicating 
the participation of both political actors and CSOs. Participatory capacity is 
diagrammed with a directional dashed arrow indicating the ability of CSOs to 
mobilize citizens. The independent variables are the two sources of legitimacy, 
legitimacy with donors and citizens. The remainder of the article will address the 
separate and combined effects of legitimacy with donors and citizens on capacities 
and civic agency. 
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3.3.3 Methodology 
The first step was to map CSOs from three focus areas of youth, women, and social 
welfare. The focus areas were chosen as marginalized groups59, which are both 
                                                          
59 As demonstrated by levels of employment (10.9% of youth ages 15–24 actively seeking employment 
and 22.7%  of women vs. 31.7% of the total population) and 2011 CSO grant support for women’s CSOs 
(0.7% of total), youth CSOs (2.8%), and social welfare categories that included disabled and drug 
dependency CSOs (5.1%) (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014; Center for 
Investigative Journalism, 2011). In addition, 17% of Cantonal ministers and 22% of state ministers were 
women (Sarajevo Open Center, 2015). Within social welfare, recommended CSOs provide assistance 
regarding development disabilities, life-threatening diseases, and children. 
T
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Figure 3-1. Legitimacy and CSO Civic Agency 
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objects of international CS strengthening efforts and also have potential local 
constituencies (Belloni & Hemmer, 2010; European Commission, 2005; EVS, 
2010). CSOs with high and low legitimacy were initially identified via interviews 
with key informants who were selected to represent diverse and socially significant 
perspectives.60 The use of unlikely conditions to test a theory, such as considering 
marginalized groups to understand the emergence of civic agency, has been called 
Sinatra-inference (i.e., ‘if it can make it here, it can make it anywhere’) (Levy, 2008, 
p. 12). 
Table 3-1. Legitimacy analysis and case study CSO sample selection grid 
 High legitimacy with 
donors 
Low legitimacy with 
donors 
High legitimacy with 
citizens 
14 CSOs identified 9 CSOs identified 
Low legitimacy with 
citizens 
4 CSOs identified No examples found61 
 
I selected those CSOs that could be assigned to one of three categories based 
on combinations of legitimacy with donors and citizens, as indicated in Table 3-1. 
CSOs were selected if there were multiple consistent mentions by key informants as 
described above, and by a cumulative assessment of multiple indicators (see Table 3-
2). The relatively objective indicators for constituency support were used to confirm 
the legitimacy or lack thereof for parts of the population (i.e., becoming a member, 
providing financial support, and/or volunteering are actions taken by the population 
that indicate legitimacy). 
                                                          
60 Twenty-seven key informants from the following categories were included: political actors (4), religious 
CS (3), media and business (3), CS networks (5), international CS (2), CS Building projects (4), donors 
(4), and international political actors (2). Key informants were selected based on experience relating to 
CSOs in addition to their primary sectors, and their assessments regarded CSOs to which they did not 
have institutional ties to reduce potential bias. 
61 Table 3-1 represents the expectation that CSOs with low local and low donor legitimacy were both 
unusual and not of interest for the inquiry and in fact none were identified. 
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Table 3-2. Indicators of legitimacy 
Type of legitimacy Indicator Sources 
With citizens Amount of voluntary financial 
support  
CSO websites, 
(Daguda et al., 2013), 
interviews 
Types and intensity of 
interactions with citizens 
(volunteering, informing, 
participation) 
Interviews, 
constituency survey 
With donors The frequency of references 
and consultation invitations, 
nature of assessments, 
amounts and frequency of 
grants 
Donor reports62 
 
Next, a list of advocacy initiatives with political goals was composed for each 
of the 27 selected CSOs based on document analysis and an initial interview with 
the CSO leadership. Advocacy is used here to mean any actions to influence the 
state. This includes both actions intended to mobilize citizen participation (e.g., 
protest, participation in consultations) as well as those conducted directly with 
political actors and bureaucrats (e.g., lobbying, use of expertise, convening state 
agencies). Advocacy strategies were identified based on the coding of the staff 
interviews and documents. Although the literature includes linkages between 
different categories of CSOs as transactional capacity (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007), 
these were coded as participatory because of their focus on horizontal ties with CSOs 
that enjoy legitimacy with citizens. Those strategies repeated by more than one CSO 
are listed in Table 3-3. Pearson’s Chi-squared tests of marginal independence were 
used to determine the association between the legitimacy variables and the 
application of each strategy. The differences in the incidence of specific strategies  
                                                          
62 (Barnes, Mrdja, Sijercic, & Popovic, 2004; BCSDN, 2012; CPCD, 2008; European Commission, 
2005; IBHI, 2005, 2011; Open Society Foundations, 2006; ORT, 2001; Pearson & Robertson, 2008; 
Sterland, 2006, 2003, TACSO, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Thomasson, 2006; USAID, 2011) 
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Table 3-3. Advocacy strategies 
 
Participatory Capacities63 
 
Active 
participa-
tion 
(strategies, 
‘straddler’ 
institutions
64) 
Mobilize 
for 
contentious 
politics 
Issue public 
statements, 
media 
appearances 
Build 
horizontal 
coalitions, 
establish 
trusted 
CSO 
partners65 
Build 
interest 
groups 
(articulate 
common 
interests) 
Support to/ 
empower 
individuals 
to achieve 
rights 
The incidence of CSOs that demonstrate given strategy 
  
Q1 high local/ 
high donor – 14 
cases 
5 
(36%) 
3 
(21%) 
3 
(21%) 
11 
(71%) 
12 
(86%) 
7 
(50%) 
Q2 high local/ 
low donor – 9 
cases 
6 
(67%) 
5 
(56%) 
5 
(56%) 
7 
(78%) 
9 
(100%) 
5 
(56%) 
Q3 low local/ 
high donor – 4 
cases 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(25%) 
2 
(50%) 
3 
(75%) 
0 
(0%) 
Is there an association between legitimacy and application of specific advocacy strategies? 
Quadrant Yes * Yes *     
Which 
quadrant(s)66 Q2 * Q2 *     
                                                          
63 Some incidence values are < 5 and therefore Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to yield a valid Chi-squared test 
(Greenwood & Nikulin, 1996).  
64 ‘Straddler institutions’ have both state and CS characteristics, for example the youth councils which are legally mandated 
and state funded but created by CSOs (Yumasdaleni & Jakimow, 2017). 
65 This approach and ‘build interest groups’ can be considered transactional (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007), but were coded as 
participatory because they focus on building horizontal links to groups for which citizen participation plays a role. 
66 * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3-3. Advocacy strategies (continued) 
 
Transactional capacities 
 
Apply 
expertise 
Advocate 
signing/ 
implemen-
ting 
conven-
tions, 
coordinate 
strategy 
documents 
Train state 
staff 
Personal 
lobbying 
Convene 
institutions 
Monitor 
govern-
ment 
Create/ 
support 
CSO/state 
‘straddler’ 
institutions 
The incidence of CSOs that demonstrate given strategy 
Q1 high local/ 
high donor – 14 
cases 
9 
(64%) 
9 
(64%) 
6 
(43%) 
9 
(64%) 
6 
(43%) 
9 
(64%) 
3 
(21%) 
Q2 high local/ 
low donor – 9 
cases 
8 
(89%) 
1 
(11%) 
2 
(22%) 
4 
(44%) 
2 
(22%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(11%) 
Q3 low local/ 
high donor – 4 
cases 
1 
(25%) 
1 
(25%) 
1 
(25%) 
3 
(75%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(25%) 
Is there an association between legitimacy and application of specific advocacy strategies? 
Quadrant Yes * Yes **    Yes***  
Which 
quadrant(s)67 
Q3* 
(inhibit) 
Q1*** 
Q2 ** 
(inhibit)    
Q1*** 
Q2 ** 
(inhibit)  
                                                          
67 * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3-4. Association between legitimacy and advocacy strategies 
Independent variable Strategy application Type of Capacity 
(Participatory/Transactional) 
Legitimacy quadrant Yes *** Yes *** 
Local legitimacy Yes *** Yes ** 
Donor legitimacy No Yes *** 
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
and the underlying forms of capacity (participatory or transactional) are the basis for 
the empirical findings. However, with few cases and the resulting low incidence 
values, a result of statistically significant associations between legitimacy and strategy 
use was only possible for five strategies. 
Finally, ten of the CSOs were selected as case studies using theoretical 
sampling (Flick, 2009) based on the three quadrants in Table 3-1. Each case study 
organization was researched in greater depth by process tracing. Process tracing 
involved interviews with state and other CS actors and relevant internal and public 
document review. Process tracing was selected in order to examine the evidence for 
civic agency as a causal mechanism in contrast to the evidence that the observed 
outcomes were caused by the actions of other actors. While the article is based on 
the evidence regarding advocacy strategies for the broader group of CSOs, the case 
studies will be used to illustrate the observed differences in advocacy strategies. 
3.4 Empirical findings 
This findings section discusses the civic agency of the three categories of CSOs. The 
first subsection will address the category least-commonly discussed in the literature, 
those having legitimacy with both donors and citizens. Each of the subsections will 
elaborate on the results presented in Table 3-3 (advocacy strategies) and Table 3-4 
(association between legitimacy and advocacy strategies). The second and third 
subsections will elaborate on the impact of one form of legitimacy without the other. 
This enables revisiting the critiques of CS strengthening programs and drawing 
some conclusions regarding their impact on civic agency.  
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3.4.1 Legitimacy with Citizens and Donors 
This section will discuss the CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with both citizens and 
donors. Compared to the other categories, these CSOs pursue broader goals to 
greater effect by serving as active intermediaries between donors and local actors.  
First, these CSOs are able to achieve these outcomes because they bring donor 
financial and symbolic resources. They also function as intermediaries by 
collaborating with other CSOs that are accepted by constituencies. Second, both 
collaboration and their own legitimacy with citizens strengthen their legitimacy with 
political actors and, therefore, their ability to achieve outcomes. In short, they can 
more often successfully navigate their environment in order to achieve support from 
both donors and diverse local actors. These dynamics are elaborated through a case 
study that highlights the intermediary role of CSOs with both forms of legitimacy. 
This group of CSOs was able to achieve broader outcomes as measured by 
the degree of implementation, their longevity, and the amount of money allocated 
to them by the state (See Appendix B in the supplemental materials). This is based 
on the acknowledged role of CSOs from this category in passing the Federation and 
Republika Srpska (RS) Laws on Youth68, which created youth councils and led to 
new policies and budget allocations at the municipal and (to a varying degree) higher 
levels of governance. In addition, the civic agency of these CSOs led to ongoing state 
funding for domestic violence shelters, criminalization of domestic violence, and 
improved responses to victims by state institutions (United Women, 2007). In 
contrast, the civic agency of the other categories was focused on narrower and more 
incremental governance goals. The other categories were also frequently only able to 
achieve formal but not substantive (implemented and funded) outcomes.  
The combination of legitimacy with donors and citizens is associated with an 
increased prevalence of transactional strategies (Table 3-3). Both policy adoption 
and monitoring strategies enable engagement with the government and the potential 
for in-person lobbying, a form of transactional capacity that many interviewees 
                                                          
68 The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and RS are sub-national entities established by the Dayton 
Peace Agreement with considerable autonomy regarding education, social policy, and policing. 
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indicated is the most effective at achieving desired outcomes (Interviews, 20 
February 2013, 13 April 2013). The case studies provide evidence that this is because 
donor support enables financial and symbolic resources sought by political actors. 
Namely, donor resources are a key element of how advocacy strategies are frequently 
implemented. They enable the use of elegant facilities and cover lodging, travel, and 
food for government participants in training and consultation events. Flashy reports 
and strategy documents, also produced in English, reflect positively on the 
participating institutions. Moreover, publicity events (distributed by media that are 
compensated) provide exposure and political benefits to elected officials (Interviews, 
17 April 2013, 14 September 2012, 4 December 2013, Conference on Youth 
Councils, 22 April 2013). Furthermore, donor support frequently brings 
international diplomatic support and together with the imprimatur of international 
conventions provides foreign support for political narratives of progress and change. 
Moreover, the context of CS strengthening programs means that such trappings are 
common and expected, and engaging with government around goals and processes 
initiated by CSOs is difficult without them. Although transactional strategies are 
also implemented without these donor resources, they are most frequently 
implemented when supported by donors. The importance of the expectation created 
by this context will be seen in comparing this category to those CSOs that also have 
legitimacy with citizens but low legitimacy with donors. 
In addition to the sensitivity to donor resources articulated above, political 
actors are also sensitive to the legitimacy of CSOs with citizens. Political actors tend 
to support CSO initiatives that are not just about appearances but that are also 
constructive and focused on results and the ‘everyday needs’ of constituencies 
(Interviews, 31 August 2012, 11 September 2012, 26 September 2012). They are 
also responsive to whether CSOs are accountable to members (Interview, 12 
November 2013) and if they, in the words of a Federation Member of Parliament, 
‘really represent a wider group of citizens and their interests’ (Interview, 26 
September 2012). 
The CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with both donors and citizens are able to 
function as intermediaries between donors, citizens, and the government. This 
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function as intermediaries is partly financial, referring to the CSOs’ capabilities to 
receive donor funds and apply them to solving concrete needs of citizens. CSO 
legitimacy is relevant for this process because the CSOs in this category frequently 
strengthen their intermediary role through their ability to partner with organizations 
that enjoy high legitimacy with citizens but low legitimacy with donors. Helsinki 
Citizens Assembly (HCA) from Banja Luka advocates with a human rights 
normative framework and fits into this group. Other CSOs that have high legitimacy 
with citizens but low with donors indicated that the legitimacy of HCA led them to 
be willing to cooperate. As stated by a staff person, ‘what separates project “In” from 
many, many others is that it is implemented by HCA … and four high-quality 
partner organizations with long experience which work directly with beneficiaries. 
We created the program with nuances for our end beneficiaries.’ (Interview, 12 
November 2013). In this way, HCA was able to advocate for the rights of the 
disabled by addressing the specific needs of the developmentally-disabled. This is an 
example of a partnership between ‘intermediary’ CSOs that enjoy support with 
donors and citizens and ‘representative’ ones that enjoy legitimacy with citizens but 
not donors. The prevalence of such partnerships indicates the strategic way that these 
different kinds of CSOs approach such partnerships to advance their respective 
goals. The intermediaries could successfully navigate their environment in order to 
achieve support from both donors and diverse local actors. 
The partnerships discussed above are also a way of building legitimacy with 
political actors. Namely, political actors perceive that collaboration between CSOs 
strengthens CSO legitimacy. For an official in the RS Ministry for Health and Social 
Welfare, ‘for a real step forward it would be much better to have an articulated, 
unified position, a high-quality, progressive position. Then the administration 
would be able to take it more seriously’ (Interview, 12 November 2013). The CSOs 
in this group function as ‘intermediaries’ by the way that they strategically foster and 
utilize trusting relationships with other CSOs as a way to legitimate themselves with 
political actors.   
The ways that CSOs utilize both forms of legitimacy will be illustrated 
through the youth CSO KULT. KULT is a professionalized and large organization 
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by Bosnian standards, occupying a spacious house in the Sarajevo outskirts of Ilidza. 
It emerged from student organizing and more specifically frustrations with the 
politicized student union. KULT conducts leadership training programs, capacity 
building for youth CSOs, policy advocacy at the Federation and national levels, and 
runs a municipal youth center. Its staff claimed to have helped draft and pass the 
Federation Law on Youth, a contribution recognized by others. The youth councils 
created by the law were represented as evidence that KULT worked towards and 
achieved empowerment for youth. As stated by a staff person, ‘now government can’t 
say that they don’t have an equal partner to talk to’ (Interview, 31 March 2013). The 
salience of this claim in the legitimation of KULT was demonstrated when others 
referenced their important role in convening and training the youth councils as a 
reason for KULT’s legitimacy. In the words of KULT staff, ‘only youth know what 
they need’. In a KULT-organized conference, presentations by youth council 
representatives from three cities provided indications of the participatory capacity of 
the councils with young citizens in that they were able to mobilize to attend 
municipal assembly and planning meetings. These councils also demonstrated civic 
agency in that they were able to overturn funding reductions and had leverage in 
negotiations with municipal assemblies. This civic agency was pursued for common 
goods, including youth centers and activities, such as language and computer classes. 
To summarize the findings regarding CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with donor 
and citizens: they demonstrate civic agency in pursuit of broader goals and are able 
to more effectively pursue them by serving as active intermediaries between donors, 
citizens, and political interests. In order to achieve these results, they use 
transactional advocacy strategies, such as policy adoption and monitoring, in such a 
way that depends on donor resources as a means to deepen engagement with 
government actors and to create opportunities for personal lobbying. CSOs that 
enjoy legitimacy among donor and citizens also function as intermediaries by 
fostering partnership relationships with other CSOs and interest groups.  
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3.4.2 Legitimacy with Citizens but not Donors 
This section will discuss the civic agency of those CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with 
citizens but not donors, beginning with an illustrative case study. These CSOs are 
distinguished by their more frequent application of contentious politics, their active 
response to participation opportunities, and in the degree to which they develop 
expertise relevant for advocacy. This means that their civic agency is guided by the 
representation of specific constituencies. However, this section will also describe 
how their lack of donor legitimacy limits their ability to achieve governance 
outcomes. 
These strategies will be elaborated via the umbrella CSO MeNeRaLi. 
MeNeRaLi was founded in the midst of the war in 1993 and emphasize that they 
represent parents of developmentally disabled individuals who make up 29 local 
chapters across the RS. It is primarily funded by the RS government and is officially 
recognized via membership in an RS-level alliance of social welfare organizations. 
Since 2011, MeNeRaLi has focused on ‘analysis and giving concrete suggestions for 
social inclusion of our beneficiaries into the community through services within the 
social welfare system’ (Interview, 12 November 2012). During this process, the 
approach has been incremental, emphasizing substantive implementation of a few 
rights over the formal adoption of many. Its major advocacy initiatives have been 
related to the revision of the RS Law on Social Welfare (LSW) (Narodna Skupština 
RS, 2012). MeNeRaLi initially engaged in active participation regarding this 
revision in response to an invitation from the RS Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare (Partner, 2013). The following discussion of capacities will describe 
struggles to achieve outcomes for MeNeRaLi’s beneficiaries. 
One of the most interesting differences is that this group is more willing to 
engage in contentious politics, even though such actions are approached carefully 
and strategically. For MeNeRaLi, the threat of protest was both a potent one and 
one not engaged in lightly. The staff first gauged support for this measure by local 
chapters and sought to engage other CSO allies. They gathered statements from 
their members indicating that the members were ready to stage public protests. In 
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advance of a meeting with the Ministry to which the government-recognized 
alliances were invited, MeNeRaLi staff proposed a joint strategy and negotiating 
position. However, this did not yield a joint position, and in the assessment of 
MeNeRaLi staff, it was this lack of unity that led to failure in achieving their goals.  
A second strategy that was used by these CSOs more frequently was active 
participation in response to participation opportunities. Active participation was 
coded as a strategy if the CSO responded to an invitation to participate by the 
government, e.g., MeNeRaLi’s response to consultations regarding the revised 
LSW. However, for many of the researched CSOs, government consultations are 
only pro-forma and do not lead to substantive outcomes; their lesson after 
participation was that it was a waste of time and, ‘I wouldn’t do it again’ (Interview, 
13 December 2013). This indicates the way that participating CSOs weigh the 
required investment of time against the potential but uncertain outcomes. Given 
these conclusions, why do they keep engaging in these consultations? Donor material 
and symbolic resources that come with legitimacy among donors are what 
distinguish the previous ‘intermediary’ group from the ‘representatives’ described 
here. In the absence of opportunities, such as convening institutions or building 
transactional capacity, CSOs with low donor legitimacy respond to these 
consultations as their only option. In contrast, the ‘intermediary’ CSOs respond less 
to participation opportunities because they have more effective alternatives. 
The final salient strategy is that these CSOs applied expertise more frequently 
than any other category. This is a surprise given the literature which concludes that 
donor support leads to a technocratic and professional approach which inhibits civic 
agency (e.g., Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Harriss, 2001; Pouligny, 2005). Applying 
expertise refers to specialized knowledge, for example, the data that MeNeRaLi had 
gathered regarding their developmentally disabled beneficiaries, and which was 
recognized and sought-after by the government. This information increases their 
capacity in their own eyes because, ‘if I need something from the state it’s in my 
interest to have high-quality information not that of the state’ (Interview, 12 
November 2012). The relevance of expertise to the ability to achieve outcomes was 
supported by a Federation Member of Parliament and frequent CSO ally who stated: 
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‘In a group like handicapped, for example, in which there are 
several problems and some come up repeatedly and they’re not 
addressed adequately in law and regulations, it’s important to 
recognize the problem and then expertly address the needs and 
what can be done. Expertise is important.’ (Interview, 26 
September 2012) 
 
The relevant expertise is focused on the specific constituencies and relevant 
laws and regulations. This discussion of expertise as a strategy will be continued in 
the next section because it is less common for the CSOs that enjoy legitimacy among 
donors but not citizens. 
This section has indicated how the civic agency of CSOs that enjoy high 
legitimacy with citizens but low legitimacy with donors is characterized by the 
representation of specific constituencies via primarily participatory capacities. This 
category is distinguished by their more frequent use of contentious politics, investing 
time in active participation, and developing expertise that is applied in advocacy 
initiatives. However, this expertise is often also narrow (i.e., limited to a particular 
constituency and related set of policy issues). The relevance of expertise as a capacity 
thus supports a narrow civic agency focused on these constituencies. In addition, 
lacking donor financial and symbolic resources, these CSOs are less able to initiate 
and pursue broad advocacy goals. 
3.4.3 Legitimacy with Donors but not Citizens 
This section will address those CSOs that are legitimate with donors but not 
citizens. In doing so, it will return to the strategy of applying expertise, which is 
inhibited for this category. The reason for these varied applications of expertise will 
be discussed in regards to diverse understandings of expertise itself. Next, a case 
study CSO will illustrate how CSOs in this category withdraw from advocacy when 
faced with the lack of implementation of formal outcomes. The civic agency of this 
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category is thus primarily characterized by the pursuit of their goals through means 
other than advocacy, and limited rather than strengthened by their expertise. 
The previous section on ‘representative’ CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with 
citizens but not donors discussed their more frequent strategy of applying expertise. 
The opposite holds for the present category – in fact, the one significant difference 
for this category is that they use expertise less frequently. This is a surprising result 
given the focus in the CS strengthening literature on their bias towards ‘professional’ 
and technocratic CSOs (e.g., Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Pouligny, 2005). The 
explanation is that for donors, expertise refers to project management skills, such as 
grant and report writing, and English language knowledge. Moreover, such skills are 
typically practiced by staff whose epistemological frameworks derive from practical 
experience, or ‘new forms’ of informal or interdisciplinary education. In contrast, the 
expertise applied by CSOs that have high legitimacy with citizens referred to 
knowledge of state policies, institutions, and how bureaucratic government systems 
work, with epistemological frameworks derived from formal education in traditional 
professions such as law and social work. These educational programs are traditional 
in the sense that they existed in the pre-war, Socialist period. Some examples of the 
latter expertise are the procedures of Parliamentary hearings and points of 
contradiction between different laws in the case of MeNeRaLi. Other CSOs 
indicated expertise in medical issues of their beneficiaries, municipal tender 
procedures, and the workings of municipal councils. The conclusion is that these 
different categories of CSO apply very different forms of expertise. 
The civic agency of this category will be presented through the case-study 
Youth Information Agency (YIA), which was formally established in 2001 and 
began earlier as a spin-off organization of the foreign-funded Open Society Institute. 
Over this period, YIA has engaged in diverse approaches including high-level 
political advocacy, trained successive groups of high school youth in activism, and 
runs an entrepreneurship center from its office. Its program Active Youth began in 
2004 with a focus on workshops and lobbying, for example by organizing public 
dialogs between youth and local authorities. These efforts to mobilize participation 
between youth and elected officials reflect the donor expectations described earlier; 
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that they would strengthen civic agency. However, more recent versions implement 
the youths’ priorities via fundraising from companies. The YIA has shifted its focus 
from advocacy because the government is inefficient and fragmented and a staff 
person was told by one government counterpart, ‘strategies are for drawers’ 
(Interview, 8 January 2014). Although YIA no longer gets involved in advocacy via 
strategy documents, it does work with the government on addressing ‘practical 
questions’, such as working with youth employment centers. The YIA case was 
typical of the CSOs with this combination of legitimacy whose civic agency is limited 
and includes a retreat from advocacy. 
An initiative engaged in by YIA illustrates the relationship between forms of 
legitimacy and capacities. One indicator of YIA’s legitimacy for donors was that it 
was invited to implement a program initiated and funded by the European Union 
Special Representative called ‘Generation for Europe’. The concept was to select 200 
successful young professionals and provide them assistance to formulate and 
advocate for reform-oriented advocacy goals. This shows a common approach to 
creating participation opportunities in order to facilitate bottom-up change. 
However, YIA staff indicated that the program’s lack of legitimacy for its 
participants ultimately made it ineffective in achieving these goals. In their view, the 
participants were not motivated to significantly contribute to something they 
perceived as a ‘foreign story’. Ultimately, the departure of its main foreign patron led 
to the abrupt end of the program. Preexisting low levels of legitimacy with citizens 
and the perception of donor support itself contributed to the weakened civic agency 
because such initiatives were viewed by citizens as heavily about form, weakly 
representing their priorities, and not able to contribute to desired outcomes. 
This section addressed those CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with donors but not 
citizens. They are ‘donor darlings’ in the sense that they receive a disproportionate 
share of donor funds at the expense of other categories, despite their lack of 
legitimacy with citizens (Ker-lindsay, 2013, p. 263). The explanation for the 
surprising finding that the use of expertise is inhibited for this category appears to 
lie in the different forms of expertise favored by donors and the state. While donors 
favor project skills, state actors favor traditional professional qualifications and 
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expertise developed in policy arenas. The lack of legitimacy for these CSOs with 
citizens has led to civic agency that has withdrawn from advocacy and is limited 
rather than strengthened by their expertise. 
3.4.4 Revisiting Legitimacy and Civic Agency 
This section aims to connect the empirical findings with the literature and theory on 
the relationship between CS strengthening programs and governance. It will discuss 
two mechanisms in the literature that link CS strengthening programs to the weak 
civic agency and apolitical approaches. The first mechanism is that CS strengthening 
programs lead to low legitimacy with citizens, thereby inhibiting civic agency. The 
second mechanism is that civic agency is inhibited because donors favor technocratic 
and professional rather than political approaches. Next, I will discuss the relevance 
of CSOs’ use of both citizen participation and transactional engagement with the 
state for CS strengthening. This section concludes with a discussion of the 
contribution of legitimacy to these debates. 
First, the findings support the link made in the critique of CS strengthening 
programs that low legitimacy with citizens is a contributing factor to the adoption 
of apolitical approaches by supported CSOs (Bebbington et al., 2008; Kostovicova, 
2010; Pouligny, 2005). Indeed, the ‘donor darling’ CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with 
donors but not citizens tend to follow apolitical approaches. Unlike CSOs that do 
enjoy legitimacy with citizens, they are unable to mobilize citizen participation for 
government consultations or protest. Participation can be a salient capacity available 
to CSOs as theorized (Diamond, 1994; White, 2004) but with an important caveat: 
‘for those CSOs with local legitimacy’.  
Second, the findings question the critique of CS strengthening programs, 
which argues that technocratic and professional approaches inhibit civic agency 
(Harriss, 2001; O’Brennan, 2013). In this light, it is surprising that the 
‘representative’ CSOs with high levels of local support and low levels of donor 
support use expertise the most as an advocacy strategy. As indicated in the findings, 
this is due to differences regarding the nature of expertise. The expertise applied by 
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this group of CSOs is related to their ability to engage in formal state processes via 
an understanding of legal and administrative systems, which is strengthened by 
traditional professional qualifications. Expertise can be a resource by which CSOs 
gain influence if it is sought by the state (Fagan, 2010, p. 73; Montoute, 2016). Yet 
the expertise sought was rarely provided by the ‘donor darling’ CSOs but rather was 
most often by the ‘representative’ CSOs, which were the least involved in donor 
programs. 
Legitimacy adds to the debate about CS strengthening programs for a 
number of reasons. First, it explains the capacities available to CSOs. The salience 
of legitimacy is supported by the finding that the ‘intermediary’ CSOs – those with 
both forms of legitimacy – employ primarily transactional capacities, which leads to 
broader outcomes. Second, legitimacy encompasses the influence of both 
endogenous and exogenous factors on governance patterns. By considering both 
legitimacy with donors and citizens, the findings nuance the often rather absolute 
conclusions that can be drawn from the literature above regarding how donor 
support leads to apolitical approaches (Bebbington et al., 2008; Fagan, 2005; 
Harriss, 2001). 
The findings support claims that despite low participatory capacity, CSOs are 
also able to achieve outcomes by engaging transactional capacities (Císař, 2010; 
Petrova & Tarrow, 2007). This is relevant for the literature on CS strengthening 
programs because donor resources were found to enable these very transactional 
capacities. This effect is surprising because donors frequently imagine a direct effect 
of strengthening and enabling participation (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000). The 
findings also show how donor resources over time influence the expectations of 
political actors regarding how advocacy happens. Namely, political actors come to 
expect benefits such as training away from the office, the status of foreign support, 
and media promotion. These benefits are what donor-supported CSOs bring to the 
table. Thus, the findings point to the unintended consequences of CS strengthening 
programs, which reinforce transactional capacities rather than participatory ones. 
Ultimately, donors and their CS strengthening programs also become part of 
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patterns of governance. Instead, the participatory potential can be found with the 
CSOs that lack donor support. 
Finally, the important role of CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with donors and 
citizens is surprising in the context of the critiques of CS strengthening programs 
which see donor legitimacy and local legitimacy in exclusive terms (e.g., Chahim & 
Prakash, 2014; Pouligny, 2005; Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 2014). This group 
deserves additional scholarly attention because the findings support their broader 
civic agency and greater outcomes. These CSOs were able to go beyond the ‘invited 
spaces’ of existing participation mechanisms and enter ‘claimed spaces’ by creating 
new participation mechanisms, as in the case of the youth councils (Gaventa, 2006).  
3.5 Conclusion 
This article adopted civic agency as a theoretical framework in order to reexamine 
critiques of CS strengthening programs. Civic agency was analyzed in regards to the 
goals selected and whether CSOs use participatory capacities oriented towards 
mobilizing citizens or transactional capacities, based on ties to political actors. This 
contributes to better understanding of how CSOs engage in advocacy, going beyond 
the assumptions that guide both the CS strengthening programs as well as its 
critique. Finally, to examine the claims of the critiques, I examined the civic agency 
of CSOs with permutations of legitimacy for citizens and donors. This highlights 
the active role of citizens as those who grant or withhold legitimacy from particular 
CSOs, a role rather absent in the critiques. This contributes to a better 
understanding of CS strengthening programs and their unintended impacts on 
governance. 
The research found that it is the combined effects of legitimacy for donors 
and citizens that provides insight into the political potential and limitations of CSO 
advocacy in the presence of CS strengthening programs. The most interesting 
category is those CSOs enjoying legitimacy with both donors and citizens; their civic 
agency is applied for broader policy changes, such as creating new participation 
opportunities. Although it is largely based on ties to political actors (i.e., 
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transactional capacity), these CSOs are also engaged in strengthening participatory 
ties to other CSOs, including those with different kinds of legitimacy. This 
combination of capacities increases their ability to be intermediaries between donor 
and local interests and to persist in their goals, giving them the unrecognized long-
term potential to influence governance. 
The civic agency of CSOs that have legitimacy with citizens but not donors 
can be described as a representation of constituencies. These CSOs more readily 
engage in participation, including protest but also consultations. However, their lack 
of donor support limits their goals and civic agency. In contrast, the ‘donor darlings’ 
enjoying legitimacy with donors but not citizens most closely resemble the apolitical 
NGOs frequently described in the literature. However, they surprisingly apply 
expertise less frequently in their advocacy, which can be explained by the fact that 
the expertise that they offer is considered less relevant by the state. 
The findings addressing the potential results of CSO civic agency paint a 
picture that is more complex and less absolute than that given by the critiques of CS 
strengthening programs. CSOs in the two categories that enjoy legitimacy with 
citizens (‘intermediaries’ and ‘representatives’) demonstrate persistent civic agency in 
their goals and actions, and these do lead to observable outcomes. The findings also 
have policy relevance because current multiyear policies in Bosnia respond to the 
critiques by their emphasis on representation, credibility, and autonomy as necessary 
contributing factors for strengthening CS advocacy roles (EU DG Enlargement, 
2013; USAID, 2013). Making decisions based on these factors, however, requires a 
better understanding of the views of citizens and of how donor programs themselves 
shape the potential of civic agency. The implication, both for policy as well as for 
further scholarship, is to pay greater attention to those CSOs that enjoy both 
legitimacy with donors and with citizens because of their potential to play 
intermediary roles. 
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4 Activism in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Struggles against dual 
hegemony and the emergence of ‘local first’ 
Randall Puljek-Shank69 and Felix Fritsch 
4.1 Abstract 
The 2014 protests and plenums in Bosnia-Herzegovina were widely noted for their 
insertion of economic and social justice topics into the stale public discourse of 
ethnocracy. They also signified a potential to break with an anemic civil society 
shaped by international intervention, technocratic ‘project logic’ and apolitical 
service provision. This article argues for treating these struggles in reference to the 
dual nature of the hegemony created by both local ethnonationalists and 
international liberal intervenors. It applies a Gramscian perspective to the processes 
by which hegemony is created and (re)produced via consensus in civil society. The 
challenge to dual hegemony can be seen in the central focus of contestation on social 
justice in economic arrangements as well as in the alternative logics of engagement 
and organizational forms in society. We describe the tensions arising from this dual 
challenge in terms of the degree to which they contest or reproduce the predominant 
anti-politics, a stance of distancing from dialogue or even contact with political 
actors and institutions. We conclude that the events during and since 2014 have 
strengthened the means to build an alternative third bloc via a ‘local first’ approach, 
containing heterogeneous forms of local-scale action with explicitly political 
strategies. 
Keywords: Activism, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2014 protests, plenums, hegemony 
This chapter was published as Puljek-Shank, R., & Fritsch, F. (2018). Activism in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Struggles against Dual Hegemony and the Emergence of 
                                                          
69 Randall Puljek-Shank was the lead author and field research was conducted jointly as described in 
section 1.4.2. Data collection & analysis. 
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“Local First.” East European Politics and Societies: And Cultures. 
doi:10.1177/0888325418767505. Online first April 23, 2018. 
4.2 Introduction 
In February 2014, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) drew global attention not seen since 
the 1992-1995 war. The violent police response to striking workers in multi-ethnic 
Tuzla, the former heart of industrial Yugoslavia, sparked demonstrations and riots 
across the Federation that left a dozen government buildings burnt out and forced 
several cantonal governments to resign. The intensity, determination, and scope of 
these protests indicated a previously unattained level of public discontent 
(Arsenijević, 2015). For a moment, the passive position long ascribed to BiH’s 
citizens was discarded, and new-found solidarity was lived through direct democratic 
participation in plenums. These open fora were public spaces for formulating 
collective demands towards the government and constituted an alternative public 
sphere in which criticizing ethnic elites became possible. In addition to the novel 
scope of the protests and experienced direct democracy, the focus on social conflict 
and demands for ‘social justice’ were also novel for post-war Bosnian protests.  
What soon became apparent was that the overwhelming majority of donor-
supported non-governmental organizations (NGOs) did not support the struggle, 
either materially or morally. From a naive position, this was a surprise: Many had 
been working on ‘democratizing’ society for 20 years and shied away when finally, 
thousands of people participated in a deeply democratic way. Their non-
performance becomes more understandable, though, given the initial reaction of the 
High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a major point of reference for 
NGOs in BiH. On February 8th, Valentin Inzko stated that EUFOR troops were 
ready to intervene if the situation escalated, thereby underlining the primacy of 
security concerns for international actors. Although over time these concerns 
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diminished,70 the relationship between the imagined ‘International Community’ 
(IC) and NGOs on the one side and plenary activists on the other continued to be 
guided by mistrust—foremost by the activists themselves, who in large part refused 
to cooperate with the NGO sector and requested that international embassies not 
get involved. 
This article argues that the potential of the activists’ struggles to ‘reclaim the 
political’ can best be understood in reference to the dual hegemony of 
ethnonationalism and the liberal peace. The literature on activism in Bosnia both 
before and since 2014 has frequently described the consociational Dayton-
established institutions and predominantly ethnic parties as key elements that 
preserve the hegemony of ethnonationalism and hinder progressive mobilization 
(Kurtović, 2016; Mujkić, 2016; Touquet, 2015). In contrast, Horvat and Štiks 
(2014) focus attention on the hegemony of (neo)liberalism that delegitimizes leftist 
politics while supporting (mere) electoral democracy and the free market. Our 
interest is to understand the struggle of 2014 and thereafter in its duality, challenging 
the hegemony of both ethnic politics and the liberal peace. 
These references to hegemony in Bosnia invoke but do not fully reflect 
Gramsci’s (1971) understanding of hegemony as based on ideational as well as 
material power. Within the literature on activism in Bosnia, Jansen (2014) has 
highlighted most explicitly Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony to include both 
coercion but also consent—the way that hegemony frames how political struggles 
can be waged. He turns to the metaphor that these are foremost about who 
establishes the “rules of the game”. While acknowledging that material power shapes 
and guides what is possible by activists and popular mobilization, in this article we 
examine the dual nature of the ideational struggles in reference to the (re)definition 
of what constitutes a 'good society' and the logics of engagement employed to 
achieve it. Despite sanguine analyses that the events of 2014 pointed towards the 
potential to ‘reclaim the political’, our empirical material based on interviews with 
                                                          
70 As could be seen, e.g., at the international conference ‘Civil Society as a Factor for Change in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’ in Vienna in September 2014O, organized by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of 
Human Rights in cooperation with the Austrian Foreign Ministry and the office of the EUSR in Sarajevo. 
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key activists and plenum documents points to the persistence of anti-political stances 
in the lack of willingness to talk to elected officials, parties, and institutions and in 
calls for ‘expert’ governments. Anti-politics is based on the understanding that since 
politics (politika) is inherently corrupt, the best way to maintain popular legitimacy 
is to avoid any contact. Anti-political actions by the plenums also included restricting 
participation by those with experience in local government and international 
organizations which limited potential constituencies. The persistence of anti-politics 
isolated the activists from developing ideological alliances and from engaging in 
political substance with parties and institutions. Thus despite contesting ideational 
power by demands challenging post-war economic arrangements focused on social 
justice and practicing new forms of social organization, the activists and plenums 
also reproduced the persistent anti-politics of the post-Dayton period. 
This theoretical exploration and empirical elaboration of ‘dual hegemony’ has 
relevance for debates regarding the potential for bottom-up struggles in sites of 
international intervention. Namely, this empirical data supporting ‘dual hegemony’ 
contributes to the literature on the hybrid nature of material power within liberal 
peace interventions, e.g., regarding constitutional arrangements, state institutions, 
and political economy (i.e., Boege, Brown, Clements, & Nolan, 2009; Mac Ginty 
& Richmond, 2015). As noted above, much of the literature on activism in BiH is 
in reference to the persistent ideational and material power of ethnonationalism. 
However, the potential for bottom-up material and political struggles has also been 
shaped by 20 years of post-war civil society (CS) strengthening interventions based 
on liberal conceptualizations of CS and democratic governance.71 Hence, we see a 
co-dependent, uneasy stalemate, described in detail by Bell and Pospisil (2017) as 
‘formalized political unsettlement,’ an inherently hybrid institutional structure that 
contains but does not resolve the conflict and in which local and international actors 
compete. Bell and Pospisil meticulously describe what, in their essence, are struggles 
over hegemony in the ideational and material spheres, waged both between 
ethnonationalist parties and against international intervenors. The hybrid state (Mac 
                                                          
71 See (Farrell, 2009; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2014) regarding the implementation of liberal peace in 
BiH.  
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Ginty, 2010a) is thus not dominated under one hybrid hegemony, but rather denoted 
by vastly different visions of statehood competing for support from and influence 
over the populace—a situation we refer to as dual hegemony.  
The struggles of 2014, more than the previous mobilizations, indicate how 
activists contested the dual hegemony of ethnonationalism and the liberal peace 
ideationally and materially. Our article embraces Jansen’s attention to the struggle 
against the “foreign-sanctioned national-clientelistic machine” but further explores 
the implications of this duality in terms of challenges as well as available 
opportunities (Jansen, 2014, p. 91). The investigation will be guided by the research 
question, 'In what ways do Bosnian-Herzegovinian activists challenge the 
understandings of politics and society produced by the duality of ethnonationalism and the 
liberal peace?' 
This exploration of the bottom-up potential within conditions of dual 
hegemony has utility for explaining the emergence of what we term ‘local first’ 
approaches to activism since 2014. By ‘local first’ we mean a strategy of pursuing 
geographically local action with explicitly political strategies. ‘Local first’ can be 
understood as a means to become political by building popular legitimacy in 
opposition to ‘dual hegemony’. Earlier research has found that citizens in Bosnia-
Herzegovina are most supportive of efforts that solve concrete needs, while a focus 
on political and civil rights is perceived as abstract and not connected to everyday 
struggles (Puljek-Shank & Verkoren, 2017). Our research on ‘local first’ approaches 
thus nuances academic debates about the alternatives to the predominant ‘anti-
politics’, characterized by phrases such as ‘reclaiming the political’ and ‘alter-politics’ 
(Gordy, 2014; Mujkić, 2016).  
We begin with a discussion of three areas of focus in the literature: BiH as an 
ethnocracy and international protectorate; the intricate relationship of civil society 
to intervention and Gramsci's critical perspective on CS as a tool of domination; and 
finally, the recent waves of contentious activism. Our empirical findings discuss 
mobilizations in 2014 and thereafter as attempts to articulate a counter-hegemonic 
alternative opposed to both existing loci of material power and their ideational 
foundations. Mobilizing around social justice, the protests and plenums contested 
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the focus in Bosnian politics on ethnic identity as much as the pervasive international 
focus on neoliberal economic reforms. The struggle also challenged logics of ‘civic’ 
engagement, contrasting both the internationals’ concept of CS as organized 
through the market and the local patrimonialism along ethnic lines. We conclude by 
discussing how and why the dual nature of the challenge resulted in problems and 
limitations including fractionalization and the avoidance of coordination to prevent 
co-optation. On a more positive note, the final section discusses the potential as well 
as unresolved tensions that come with ‘local first’ strategies. 
4.3 Civil society in the shadow of the liberal peace and ethnonationalism 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) divided the country into the Republika Srpska 
(RS) as a centralized entity with a large Serb majority (achieved through ethnic 
cleansing), the Federation of BiH as a federal entity consisting of ten rather 
autonomous cantons populated mostly by ethnic Bosniaks and Croats, and Brčko, a 
small autonomous district under international control (Divjak & Pugh, 2008; 
Majstorović, Vučkovac, & Pepić, 2016). Joint state-level institutions were designed 
around consociationalism, power sharing between rather autonomous ethnic elites 
that was inscribed into the state by the division of state institutions along ethnic lines 
and extensive veto rights for each ethnic group (Belloni, 2004; Touquet & 
Vermeersch, 2008). The institutionalization of democracy with ethnicity as the 
guiding rationale of politics supports characterizations of BiH as an 'ethnocracy'—
defined by Lise Howard as “a political system in which political and social 
organizations are founded on ethnic belonging rather than individual choice” (L. M. 
Howard, 2012, p. 155)—with limited democratic substance. In procedural terms, 
the political system is an institutionalized democracy, albeit highly complex and 
limited to its constituent peoples. However, these ‘democratic’ politics have 
repeatedly failed to produce substantive democratic policies in which ‘the public 
good is achieved, citizen preferences are represented, [and] governments become 
accountable’ (Sarajlić, 2014). The logic of ethnocracy benefits ethnonationalist 
parties by constructing ethnic groups as homogeneous blocks led by their respective 
 Activism in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
109 
elites, thereby undermining the potential for the politicization of intra- and inter-
ethnic class antagonisms. Under the architecture of procedural democracy, the ethnic 
card (based on memories of ethnic violence and the fear of its repetition) has been 
used successfully by elites to substitute for democratic substance for two decades, 
demonstrating the longevity of war crimes in producing fear and thereby control.  
While democratic procedures were put in place early on, the focus on 
institutional reform and multi-party democracy did not create a 'functioning' new 
state as envisaged by the IC (Belloni, 2007). By the end of the 1990s, international 
discourse shifted towards CS strengthening as a way of sidestepping 'uncooperative' 
local elites, solving ethnic tensions, anticipating reintegration and enabling post-war 
democratic transition – in short, solving the Bosnian puzzle. The goal changed from 
a rather short-term focus on reshaping institutions to a long-term focus on ‘social 
engineering’ to diminish the harmful influence of nationalism and to build a ‘vibrant’ 
CS according to Western ideals. Civil society development and active citizenship 
became seen by the IC as crucial to democratization and reconciliation processes. 
The underlying theoretical assumption of the IC was one of the state being “open to 
and under the control of civil society, [and] responsive to the advocacy campaigns of 
the local civic groups” (Belloni, 2001, p. 170). However, political deadlock since 
2006 gradually led to the realization that the implementation of CS strengthening 
strategies instead fostered apolitical NGOs frequently focused on narrow and 
technocratic change, weakening the responsiveness to citizen concerns and solidarity 
between CS actors (Puljek-Shank & Memišević, 2017). 
4.3.1 Civil Society as ideational dimension of hegemony—in the footsteps of 
Gramsci 
The research on CS strengthening highlights theoretical questions about the nature 
and role of CS. In Michael Edwards' classic 'Civil Society', CS is discussed first as a 
'part of society' in the shape of (neo-)Tocquevillian ‘associational life’ (Boyd, 2004; 
Edwards, 2004; Putnam, 1992). In a balanced associational 'ecosystem', formal, 
professionalized associations can only constitute the 'skeleton', while informal 
Chapter 4 
  
110 
groups and grassroots initiatives are necessarily self-determined and -initiated. In 
the internationals’ narrow conception of ‘associational life’, however, mainly the 
former were recognized as potential agents for change (Touquet & Vermeersch, 
2008). As in drafting the peace agreement, existing CS elements originating from 
socialist Yugoslavia were only infrequently recognized by international actors 
(Belloni, 2001), and service-providing and policy-oriented professional NGOs were 
created from scratch (Fagan, 2005). 
Second, CS also refers to 'the good society', a desirable social order (Béteille, 
2001). The concept of the ‘newly built’ CS in BiH was based on liberal assumptions 
derived from projecting the Western European concept of CS and guided by 
expectations of BiH’s inevitable progress towards joining the European Union 
(Kappler & Richmond, 2011, p. 265). The de-contextualized approach inherent in 
early CS strengthening projects—implemented mainly by external actors, following 
fixed, external standards with little contextual awareness, and characterized by 
inflexibility, dependence and conditionality—was conceptualized as integral to the 
attempt to radically transform the country's value and societal base. The externally 
provided, neoliberal vision of the ‘good society’ led to NGOs being accountable to 
international donors instead of an independent public sphere. The resulting artificial 
CS has little in common with the Eastern and Western European CS models that 
grew 'organically' (Fagan, 2005) and has “imprisoned or even disabled local agency 
in unintended ways” (Kappler & Richmond, 2011, p. 264).  
As a result of these characteristics, the utility of ‘civil society’ as a conceptual 
framework to explain political developments, particularly including bottom-up 
challenges, has been contested in the post-war literature. The most well-developed 
of these critiques focuses on the intimate connection between the ‘CS’ concept and 
its exploitation within foreign-funded and designed CS strengthening interventions. 
Sampson states that the intervener-driven ‘project society’ in Bosnia acts as a means 
towards the control of what is considered ‘CS’ by acting upon and perpetuating 
cultural boundaries and political asymmetry between actors (the interveners) and 
their subjects (citizens) (Sampson, 2002). Deacon and Stubbs found already in 1998 
that programs supporting NGO development subvert the assumed political meaning 
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of CS by constructing and strengthening servile local NGOs and weakening their 
ability to address grassroots concerns (Deacon & Stubbs, 1998). CS is also the object 
of intervention and seen as a means to achieve donors’ political goals for Šavija-
Valha. He notes that linear and fixed donor assumptions result in repeated and 
inflexible interventions in a vain attempt to create a “vibrant CS” as a precondition 
for government accountability (Šavija-Valha, 2012). Most explicitly, Bilić (2012) 
rejects CS as a concept to explain activism because of its lack of purchase for the 
complexity of political and social interactions and its definitional elasticity in 
addition to its intimate connection to intervention. 
The ongoing and active intervention exactly around the meaning of ‘civil 
society’ and the evident resistance to the processes of CS strengthening as a political 
project call for adopting a critical perspective on the underlying power dynamics. 
Here, Antonio Gramsci's perspective is useful because it focuses on CS as a tool of 
domination. In Gramsci's understanding, CS is the ideational part of institutions 
that creates and (re)produces hegemony through consensus about the ‘rules of the 
game’ within the material limits established by the state. From a Gramscian 
perspective, we can say that CS in BiH is fragmented, similarly to material power 
within the state itself. The Western, international fraction—justifying, advertising 
and entrenching the ideational influence of 'universal' liberal standards and their 
perpetuated control by international actors—can be seen as competing with three 
local “homogeneous national-religious communities” (Sejfija, 2015, p. 167), aligned 
with and supporting the respective ethnic elites. Given this institutionalized 
fragmentation of both the ideational and material spheres, recognizing the duality 
of hegemony is a prerequisite for understanding the tensions counter-hegemonic 
activism faces. 
Both the proponents of liberalism and ethnonationalism seek to gain popular 
support for ideational positions regarding their visions of the state (Bell & Pospisil, 
2017). International CS discourse in BiH emphasizes “the rights of individuals to 
pursue their self-interest rather than collective rights, and simultaneously upholds 
and obscures the interests of state and capital” (Choudry, 2010, p. 18). Local 
fractions, on the other hand, depend on interest groups such as unions and veterans’ 
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associations embedded in the ethnic logic of patrimonialism with the state as a source 
of employment and protector of majority ethnic group rights. The resulting 
competition over support from and influence upon the population leads to 
considerable dispute regarding ethnonationalism as well as human rights, the rule of 
law, secularism, women's equality, minority rights and other liberal credos 
emphasizing individual rights. At the same time, both local and internationally 
legitimate CS reject the notion of (bottom-up) class struggle as a driver of societal 
development and focus of political contestation and thereby disguise the role of and 
relation between the state and capital (Choudry, 2010). Protest waves during and 
since 2014 focused on social justice provide the basis to explore the potential for a 
third, nascent fraction that utilizes contentious action to build counter-hegemonic 
ideational (and, eventually, material) power—sometimes opposing ethnic CS and 
political parties and sometimes also the international fraction of hegemony-
producing institutions. 
4.3.2 The recent rise of contentious activism 
In the first 15 years post-Dayton, few (progressive, non-nationalist) protests took to 
the street, and most of them were rather short-lived, single-issue demonstrations. 
Notable protests were disconnected workers' struggles against privatization and 
factory closures throughout the 2000s, the 2008 Sarajevo protests against street 
violence and the 2009 Tuzla University protests, in which plenums were first 
organized in BiH. The RS, in particular, remained a quiet idyll for its politicians, 
with pressure from the streets rare (Eminagić & Vučkovac, 2015; Lippman, 2012b). 
Activists connect the lack of protest despite ample grievance to the absence of a 
strong protest culture.72 The population’s responses to the property damage and 
confrontations with police that briefly emerged during the 2014 protests also 
indicated that this is exacerbated by the still-existing collective traumatization from 
war, making people hesitant towards forming large crowds expressing dissent.  
                                                          
72 This was raised in multiple interviews and frequently given as a reason for the few protests despite 
extensive unemployment, grievances, and inequality.  
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The literature on activism in BiH that focuses on framing and political 
opportunity structures indicates the ways that activists and the authorities frame the 
ideational struggle in order to build, and in the case of the authorities weaken, 
support among the population (Tarrow, 2011). For example, Touquet analyzed the 
framing of the 2008 Sarajevo protests in regard to an articulation of citizenship 
values, local identity focused on Sarajevo rather than ethnicity (providing evidence 
of the early development of ‘local first’ approaches), and anti-politics. This analysis 
focuses on anti-politics vis-à-vis the construction of politics (politika) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a dirty and immoral category, as a “separate universe of (immoral) 
values, of people who pursue power for the sake of it, who are egotistical and 
untrustworthy” (Touquet, 2015, p. 398). The authorities responded with 
discrediting counter-frames, labeling protesters as an uncivil and violent mob, 
directed by political parties and supported by foreigners. Her analysis addresses the 
de-legitimizing accusations that the SDP and Naša Stranka, two opposition parties 
articulating non-nationalist ideologies, were supporters of and benefited from the 
protests. This analysis shows the reproduction of anti-politics through the responses 
of the authorities and points to its ideational strength among the population. Our 
argument, in contrast, places the positionality of activists vis-à-vis both the foreign 
actors and (even opposition) political parties more centrally in explaining the struggle 
to articulate an autonomous and legitimate identity around which to mobilize. 
Scholarship on Bosnian activism has positioned the events of 2014 within a 
sequence of protest waves from 2012 characterized by more confrontational 
repertoires of action and more sustained mobilization. The evidence for this includes 
the 'Picin Park' protests in 2012 in Banja Luka, stretching over 100 days of 
continuous street protest (Lippman, 2012a), the 2013 ‘babylution' protests in 
Sarajevo motivated by the existential danger to infants caused by political deadlock, 
the annual 'white ribbon' protest commemorating victims of ethnic cleansing in 
Prijedor (Hodžić, 2014), and, most notably, the riots, protests, and plenums in 
February 2014. A key question, then, for observers of Bosnian politics is whether 
this sequence indicates an increasing potential for contesting anti-politics through 
the creation of an alternative understanding of politika, an ‘alterpolitics’ in the 
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language of Eric Gordy (2014). Mujkić's (2016) analysis of 2014 emphasizes the 
participants’ learnings, particularly in terms of ‘reclaiming the political’, that 
authorities were ready to use repressive measures to maintain power and that the 
media and the middle class were loyal to the regime. Our empirical research adds to 
this literature about the potential for new forms of politika by a detailed examination 
of the ideational aspects along which activists contested dual hegemony during 2014 
and how activism has changed since. 
4.4 Empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis is based on 26 interviews with key activists from six cities 
conducted from 2013-2016 and written demands and communication between 
plenums on one hand and government institutions and the public on the other.73 Six 
pre-February 2014 interviews addressed the question of the legitimacy of activist 
initiatives for citizens, political actors, and international donors. Ten Skype 
interviews were conducted from January-April 2015 with activists, and an additional 
seven interviews were conducted from October-December 2015. An anonymized list 
of interviews is available in the online supplemental materials, and in the text, 
informants are identified with a code. In addition, participant observation was 
conducted in 2014-2015 during the Sarajevo and Tuzla protests and plenums, during 
a conference in Vienna which included plenum activists and international 
representatives,74 and in an activist-initiated social and political center in Banja Luka. 
Documents were collected by cross-referencing plenum and independent websites 
and Facebook pages. The analytic approach to the empirical data is thematic analysis 
following Bryman’s (2012) conceptualization. It facilitates reconstructing, displaying 
and problematizing the construction of counter-hegemonic understandings of 
                                                          
73 Selection was made based on evidence of active participation based on participant observation and/or 
public statements supporting protests and plenums. Documents were reviewed from the plenums in 
Tuzla, Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica, Zavidovići, and Bugojno, chosen as a representative sample of both 
major urban centers and smaller cities. 
74 'Civil Society as a Factor for Change in Bosnia and Hercegovina', 8-10. September 2014 in Vienna. 
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politics and society by analyzing prominent themes present in local activism before, 
during, and after the 2014 protests. The interviews were coded using ATLAS.ti 
software and following recommendations in Saldaña's (2009) coding manual. The 
thematic codes were further grouped in coding families and correlated for further 
analytical purposes. 
4.4.1 The return of the social 
This section will establish the social character of the 2014 protests by analyzing 
plenum demands and activists' discourses. Protesters not only opposed local political 
structures but also international actors eager to frame the uprising as 'civic'. The 
activists’ and plenum discourses indicate the meaning of the ‘social’ and reveal 
struggles to articulate an alternative to both the ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ rules of the game.  
Most activists articulated ‘social justice’ as the leitmotif of the 2014 protests. 
In the words of a Sarajevo activist, “[d]emand for social justice is what unites protesters,” 
(Šimičević, 2014) most famously expressed by the slogan ‘we are hungry in three 
languages’ carried as a prominent banner (Kurtović, 2016). Social justice was also a 
long-term goal, after achieving initial demands, for Sarajevo plenum participants. 
“These requirements are only the beginning. In the light of our long-term goal – a society 
based on social justice, it will be necessary to create other fundamental changes that also 
cannot and should not wait too long.” (Declaration of Sarajevo citizens’ plenum, 9.2.) 
Due to its central role, ‘social justice’ requires some unpacking. Social justice was 
thematized in demands to reduce benefits for political actors, restore state control 
over privatized companies, prosecute economic crimes, and articulate everyday 
economic concerns. Demands for reduced benefits for political actors were 
prominent, and indignation about ‘white bread' (ongoing payments to officials who 
had resigned) entered the media and popular discourse. Multiple demands sought to 
reduce public sector salaries and incomes, demanding a limit as a multiple of the 
average salary (three locations) and in "accordance with the current economic 
situation" (Sarajevo). The demands therefore contested post-war economic 
arrangements by seeking a more equal income distribution. 
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The focus on privatization demonstrates social justice as righting post-war 
wrongs and injustices. This discourse included elements of restoring the pre-1992 
economic and social order as in demands for the “revision of privatizations” of 
specific companies (three locations) and generally (five locations). The most specific 
articulation was to "void privatization contracts" and "return the factories to the 
workers and place them under the control of public authority" (Tuzla). Social justice 
as criminal justice was implicit in calls to prosecute economic crimes (three 
locations), most expansively in the "entry of legitimate investigative organs into all 
subjects of post-war privatization" (Sarajevo). Furthermore, demands encompassed 
increasing social services and opportunities for state-supported social mobility and 
reformulating the relationship between capital and labor inscribed in state 
regulations. In this regard, the activists’ social justice discourse adopted a populist 
focus on everyday economic concerns. “Social justice is about social conditions, about 
everyday life, something everybody can unite around” (BL3). Finally, then, social justice 
encompassed all these understandings most broadly as demanding a thorough 
redefinition of the social contract implicit in current Bosnian statehood, reflecting a 
vision of politics focused on the social in contrast to ethnicity. 
The ‘return of the social’ to political discourse has been widely reflected upon 
as a major result of the protests of February 2014 (See Arsenijević, 2014; Gilbert & 
Mujanović, 2016). These analyses have focused on its significance for local power 
structures by breaking up the imagined homogeneity of ethnic blocs as the basis for 
politics within an ethnocracy. The reception of this shift by international power 
structures, however, has received significantly less attention. International actors 
repeatedly attempted to frame the uproar and subsequent plenums as ‘civic’—
highlighting issues of corruption, the rule of law, and human rights while omitting 
substantive political demands for socio-economic redistribution, investigation of 
privatizations and increased social services (Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2014). Doing so both denied the movement’s contestation of the liberal idea of civil 
society and its envisaged changes to politics. This soon opened a second front for the 
activists eager to retain the uprising’s radical character. The ‘civic’ label was widely 
rejected as an effort to guide them into the ‘old’ and well-trodden apolitical paths, 
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taming their potential to constitute a radical movement threatening the economic 
order. 
The trouble here is what we see from my group as an attempt 
at pacification, and the taming of the political energy is this 
sort of lame term of civic... not even movement, civic 
initiatives. Then you can talk of the agenda such as human 
rights, rule of law, which are extremely empty terms in BiH 
nowadays, have been for the last twenty years. We are 
explicitly talking of changing the political order of things. 
Which to us is impossible without changing the socio-
economic terms of our lives (SA2). 
International actors—after a brief shocked phase in which High 
Representative Valentin Inzko threatened to deploy troops—soon started making 
advances. While ignoring most of the social demands, plenums were embraced as 
directly democratic, civic initiatives fighting corruption, nepotism and nationalism 
(and thus supporting the IC’s vision of reform). Rejecting this embrace became a 
difficult endeavor, as the protests indeed were organized as direct democracy and did 
challenge corruption, nepotism and nationalism—because they lead to and disguise 
social injustice. Reactions to this attempted framing varied significantly. While some 
activists (from larger towns and with more political experience and awareness) clearly 
rejected the ‘civic’ label, others embraced it, leading to differences and tensions 
between the activists and complicating coordination efforts. These heterogeneous 
strategies will be further discussed in the section on ‘local first’ activism. 
Plenary activists in 2014—for the first time on such a massive scale—voiced 
an independent, third vision of the state as serving socio-economic needs and 
guaranteeing the social rights of all its constituents, independent of ethnicity. In 
many aspects, this third vision is not new but builds on and connects to memories of 
former Socialist Yugoslavia. This was visible in the calls to revise privatizations, 
which indirectly or directly harkened back to the juxtaposition of “social” (društveno) 
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ownership and the Yugoslav system of worker self-management (samoupravljanje).75 
Reviving and building on memories in itself constitutes resistance against the current 
dual hegemony, as both hegemonic blocs systematically obfuscate and negate 
positive references to the Socialist past. Thus, to the degree that the activists and 
plenums’ concerns articulated a coherent social contract, it was one heavy with the 
echoes of Socialist Yugoslavia. However, while inspiration was partly sought in the 
past, plenums and subsequent local initiatives also posed ideas for how to establish 
new ‘rules of the game’ that are a genuine product of the present moment. This 
challenge to the logics of engagement will be analyzed in the following section. 
4.4.2 Competing logics of engagement 
A second feature of the protests and plenums that demonstrates a struggle against 
dual hegemony is the positioning of activists vis-a-vis conceptualizations of ‘civil 
society’. This was most visible when contesting participation by professional NGOs 
that were seen as articulating ‘civic’ discourses that represent donor interests. Many 
NGOs avoided openly supporting the protests or plenums, and many activists voiced 
suspicion and even outright hostility towards the NGOs, banning them from 
participation (SA3, SA4). This stance was new in the 2014 protests, and activists 
attributed this to learning about the negative impact of visible NGO identifications 
for popular legitimacy in the ‘babylution’ protests in 2013 (SA3). The plenums’ 
rejection of cooperation with (most) NGOs was explained mainly by their assumed 
dependence on the IC and their stabilizing role on the political system (note the 
implicitly Gramscian analysis here). International actors’ requests towards activists 
to 'bridge the gap' to NGOs to build a more comprehensive movement were 
interpreted as demands to accept and become subordinate under the IC-promoted 
model of civil society. Instead, they were met by counter-claims towards the NGOs 
to step down from their professional, detached, apolitical positions and join the 
                                                          
75 In addition to the way that the return of the worker echoes „the prized position of the working class 
and notions of social equality represented pivotal tropes in Yugoslav socialism and served to legitimize 
the state project“ (Archer, 2014, p. 135). 
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movement on its own terms: “They (NGOs) are there, if they want to join at some point, 
join on the terms that are not professional, then we can talk about it” (SA2). 
These continuing tensions arose not only from diverging ideals of the ‘good 
society’ but also from fundamentally different understandings of the means to reach 
these in terms of motivation, organization, representation and participation. The 
activists’ critiqued the neoliberal logic of engagement in ‘civic’ civil society—based 
on the market logic of the third sector, structured by donor conditionalities, aimed 
at producing small-scale, superficial short-term outputs, and distributed as one-
directional charity to passive recipients. 'Ethnic' civil society, on the other hand, was 
seen as exclusive, structured by patrimonial power relations, and reproducing 
ethnicity's central role. In contrast, activists’ alternative visions of social and political 
engagement are sketched out conceptually to explain the obstacles to cooperation in 
an overarching coalition. 
4.4.3 Political dependence through 'follow the money' 
In activists’ discourse, professionalized NGOs were viewed as an extension of the 
intervention due to financial dependence. Their ‘follow the money’ market logic was 
thought to undermine their stated goals due to a focus on institutional interests and 
competition between like-minded actors, constituting a civil sector as part of the 
market rather than as individuals, informal initiatives and organizations genuinely 
contributing to the 'good society.' “[A] great number (…) are really profit 
organizations, I mean that they are receiving a lot of money. (...) I think NGOs lost the 
main thing and that's doing something because you really want to help.” (TZ3). 
Allegations of corruption, personal benefit, and even criminal behavior created a 
generally negative perspective of NGOs in which community and grassroots 
organizations driven by an authentic will to ‘do good’ were seen as exceptional. Self-
censorship was used to explain the initial hesitance even of grassroots NGOs to 
support the protests and plenums. As put by one activist, “[NGOs] were afraid first 
and foremost of the new political situation. They didn't know how to read it. They were 
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afraid that their involvement might negatively... reflect on their donors. So, they actually 
[self]-censored themselves” (TZ2). 
Perceptions of the compromised role of ‘ethnic’ CS actors in the struggle for 
the ‘social’ can be seen in attitudes towards labor unions and veterans’ organizations. 
Unions could be expected to have key importance given that workers’ protests were 
the trigger and workers’ struggles against privatized employers were a salient issue. 
Here, activists portrayed unions as an integral component of the ethnocratic status 
quo by controlling and pacifying the fury of workers for decades. For the President 
of the alternative Solidary Union, the President of the dominant Federation Alliance 
of Unions ‘always collaborates with the government, and he uses this money for his 
collaboration with them' (TZ5). The leader of one established Alliance member union 
also critiqued the Alliance’s decision not to provide organizational support or call on 
its members to protest.(“Danas kongres saveza samostalnih sindikata BiH: Bijegom 
u mišiju rupu sahranili povjerenje radnika,” 2014) Veterans’ organizations were also 
seen as deeply embedded in the logic of ‘ethnic’ CS, meaning dependent on close 
ties with ethnic elites. The Sarajevo plenum emphasized the perceived failings of 
veterans’ organizations via demands regarding veterans’ interests including to unify 
multiple veterans’ organizations. 
Opposing the subjugation of 'civic' CS under the rules of the international 
donors’ ‘market’, as well as obedient patrimonial relationships to local political actors, 
the activists stressed the importance of financial (and political) independence 
through the voluntary work of normal citizens as exemplified by the plenums. For 
some activists, however, the initial blanket rejection of donor funds has developed 
into a pragmatic acceptance of some donor support while prioritizing autonomy and 
pursuing long-term alternative strategies such as cooperatives. Nevertheless, 
autonomy in the choice of aims and means continues to be seen as crucial for voicing 
a fundamental critique of both the local political system and the IC. 
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4.4.4 Organizational forms and ideational influence: 'project logics' and 
formalization as a party 
The activists’ struggle against dual hegemony also addressed the hegemonic 
organizational forms and structure of CS actors. The repeated refusal to introduce 
hierarchies and to turn informal groups into legal entities such as NGOs or parties—
as suggested by multiple international actors—reflected the rejection of top-down 
structures both within and between CS initiatives and organizations. 
Professionalized NGOs were seen as following a set chain of command, which was 
pushed onto the activists’ efforts. “All of them were requesting this, formalize it. Register 
it. Register it as an NGO, as a political party. Do whatever you will but formalize it and 
then we can talk. And by talk I believe they meant we can give you cash. And you have to 
do what they want“ (TZ4). The underlying international goal was understood as 
creating a unified actor that can be co-opted and steered, with an agenda cleansed 
from transformative aims: “Many activists (…) are concerned about this danger of 
institutionalization and professionalization and support by the current institutional 
mechanisms, which are very much either ineffective or underpinned or driven by the 
neoliberal agenda” (TZ1). 
Aside from the activists’ ambitions to maintain autonomy vis-à-vis IC 
material power and organizational logic, they also perceived the ideational power of 
‘project language’ as a threat: “[D]uring the Sarajevo plenum, (...) possibly the widest 
spread fear among people who were participating was that someone is going to turn them 
into a project (...) [T]hey (European Union) speak the language that... I understand, but 
I am not quite sure how, why we should accept it. It is the project language, it is the 
language of goals, and impacts, and effects, it is time limited, it’s rather sort of linear in a 
way” (SA2). The underlying ‘project logic’ was discussed as resulting in top-down 
technocratic approaches predominantly focused on service provision and short-term 
goals. This focus was rejected as a de-politicized approach prevalent among the civic 
sector, incapable of changing the broader picture and in effect stabilizing instead of 
contesting the political system. In contrast, activists stressed the importance of 
continuous work in their local communities including political education, 
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networking and other activities that cannot easily be measured in the short run but 
that are nevertheless deemed necessary for comprehensively building a movement 
from the bottom up. 
The activists’ rejection of calls to formalize also extended to the rejection of 
parties as formal political actors to a degree which delineated the persistence of anti-
politics. “In no way do we want to enter the political waters, no way a party, politics 
doesn’t interest us. We are interested in supervising the work of institutions. The plenum 
is not a means of division, it is a public good for all citizens.” (Begić, 2014). Elected 
political bodies, in several cases communicating openness to hear protesters’ 
demands and even nominations for those who should replace the resigned 
governments, at times were met with a fierce insistence on alternative logics of 
engagement. The plenums challenged representation by elected representatives by 
not responding to requests to appear and state their demands. Some plenums rather 
countered that elected representatives ‘come to them’ on a level playing field with all 
citizens. At the same time, the plenums communicated that political party members 
were unwelcome because they would attempt to co-opt the plenums for their own 
purposes. Appointing plenum representatives to state demands was also resisted 
because individual leaders or spokespeople are vulnerable to co-optation. Opposing 
hierarchical organizations as undemocratic, instead they pointed to the horizontal 
structure and informal character of the plenums—fluidly changing groups without 
(constant) hierarchies and based on direct democratic principles assigning equal 
weight to each voice—as an alternative way of organizing first of all their own 
initiatives, then civil society in general and, in the most utopian sense, society at 
large. This rejection of institutionalized procedures may also be considered in light 
of the long-standing emphasis of previous state-building ventures on procedural 
democracy, which has ever failed to deliver on promises of eventually also producing 
substantive democratic outcomes.  
To sum up, the activists contested the hegemony of internationally-supported 
'civic' CS in which CS professionals are the best representatives of citizens and 
progress is made based on politically ‘neutral’ expert knowledge. Dual hegemony is 
demonstrated in that they also contested the discourse of ethnonationalism as 
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exclusionary and homogenizing, thereby undermining horizontal solidarity and 
social struggles across ethnic borders and entrenching exploitation within these 
imagined communities. The alternative vision of CS we have attempted to trace here 
as potentially counter-hegemonic consists of a heterogeneous mix of individual 
activists, fluid informal groups, community centers and grassroots organizations. 
Coordination within and between them is organized horizontally and 
collaboratively. The experiences of the plenums thus have become elements of an 
emergent 'social' conceptualization of CS that is being built foremost at the local 
scale. The corresponding counter-hegemonic vision of society aims for a 
fundamental transition according to the lived experience of its citizens, who in large 
numbers are seen to represent themselves through struggle. 
4.4.5 The rise of ‘local first’ activism 
This section will elaborate on the dilemmas the struggle against dual hegemony has 
posed for activists during and since the 2014 protests and plenums. These dilemmas 
result from the struggle to maintain legitimacy by avoiding the perception of co-
optation by both local and international established powers. The result is a 
heterogeneous picture of post-2014 activism. One trend, however, is the continued 
development of what we term a ‘local first’ approach focused on issues that are 
concrete for citizens and salient at a local scale. This trend can be understood as a 
further sign of a turn away from procedural matters enshrined in the Dayton 
constitution and towards matters of substantive democracy. As a conceptual 
approach, its utility includes the recognition of contextualized responses to dual 
hegemony and heterogeneous local experiences of the conflict and post-conflict 
period and therefore of different potential alliances based on dynamics at the local 
scale. Tactically, it may enable building popular legitimacy by engaging in local 
struggles that nevertheless have broader symbolic meaning. 
The 'Compact for Growth' initiated by Germany and the UK illustrates the 
difficulty of dual struggle. Positioned as a reaction to the protests of 2014, this 
initiative practically served foreign interests by obfuscating previous international 
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failures while yet again rewarding established political parties eager to claim progress 
towards EU accession.76 The few policy changes contradicted social justice demands, 
adopting instead further liberalization and flexibilization as superficial remedies to 
post-war dispossession (Jukic, 2014). While objecting to its contents, activists were 
neither able to build alliances with opposition political parties nor with other CS 
actors such as unions that actively opposed the initiative, so that Germany and the 
UK managed to hijack the attention plenums had stirred internationally to pursue 
their own goals of further neoliberal reforms. 
In struggling to contest both fronts simultaneously, the plenums at times 
reproduced rather than contested anti-politics. The Sarajevo and Tuzla plenums 
(among others) were invited to send representatives to local governments, while 
international actors advised the formalization of the plenums as a means of obtaining 
legitimacy and a precondition to dialogue. Both of these paths to obtaining 
recognition and influence were rejected, and instead the plenums adopted a strictly 
non-hierarchical and informal structure. This position of 'purity', adopted by the 
plenums to avoid both local and international political actors, at times isolated the 
'movement' and undermined thorough politicization and ideological formation of 
many of its constituents. In rejecting any dialogue with institutions and elected 
officials, the plenums positioned themselves above the (however limited) legitimacy 
of democratic procedures. The rejection of political parties led to an embrace of 'anti-
politics' in that the plenums' way is one of purity by the rejection of any politics as 
'dirty politics'—for example, when the Zenica plenum distanced itself from a 
prominent activist who publicly endorsed a party (“Saopštenje Plenuma ZDK 
1.4.2014,” 2014). Anti-political stances were also seen in demands for expert 
governments to replace elected ones to improve their conduct and results (3 
locations). In these examples as well as in calls for ‘basic human rights’ and the 
                                                          
76 The Compact revoked earlier positions that police reform along non-ethnic lines and constitutional 
reform in response to the ‚Sejdić-Finci’ decision were conditions for BiH to submit an EU membership 
application, thereby rewarding established parties for the 2016 elections (Vogel, Perry, Weber, & 
Bassuener, 2014).  
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prosecution of economic crimes (i.e., the rule of law), the plenums and activists 
challenged the liberal peace while reproducing its conceptual register. 
Rejecting the material and ideational power of political parties, NGOs and 
the IC simultaneously made establishing a comprehensive identity around which to 
mobilize more difficult, and this has become more pronounced in the period since 
2014. Establishing independent positions regarding many pressing issues is made 
more difficult by the constant risk of perceived and/or real co-optation by one of the 
blocs. Especially entrenched state-level discussions such as regarding constitutional 
change have shown significant lacunae in the activists' position—not because there 
is nothing to be said about constitutional change, but because establishing a 
recognizable political position is hampered as many possible solutions are already 
represented among the ethnic parties and the IC. This urge to avoid both local and 
international power holders thematically added to the reluctance to include 
individuals from the local levels of government and international bodies, which 
together limit the potential constituency and breadth of future mobilization. Finally, 
outreach attempts by international actors successfully attracted 'moderate' or 
pragmatic actors and were seen as co-optation by more radical elements which 
remained isolated and weakened.  
Our research indicates that these problems of dual struggle result in a complex 
and heterogeneous picture of post-2014 activism. The breakups of local plenums and 
of the inter-plenum and subsequent '5f7' network—over questions such as how to 
deal with international financial supporters, whether and how to become a political 
movement, and whether to formalize or not—can also be explained by this tension. 
More pragmatic initiatives (aptly delineated by the suggested name 'movement for a 
normal BiH') and more left-leaning groups drifted apart mainly over their positions 
towards international actors. This split, then, can be read as an indicator of the 
success of international attempts at the co-optation and pacification of parts of the 
activists as ‘civic initiatives’. 
The complexity of the dual struggle may also explain a trend towards locally 
scaled approaches observable during and since 2014. During the 2014 plenums, 
transformative social justice claims requiring entity and state-level legislative changes 
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(i.e., revisions of all privatizations, investigations of origins of private wealth) were 
in tension with a focus on more local levels of government and varied local and 
narrow formulations of demands. A bottom-up community development 
understanding of change which we term ‘local first’ grew throughout 2014. It is 
demonstrated in the following quote by contrast to that of donors: 
They don't quite see it. They also don't see why you do some 
things that are completely outside of anything strategic at the 
moment. But for us it is just like a big puzzle. You're adding 
pieces. And sometimes the piece you’re adding is on the far 
end of the puzzle. And that means, you know, being in your 
community.… For them, spending a month talking to people 
who go to public debates on the draft budgets is not 
necessarily seen as education in these circles. ... Going there 
talking just for three hours with people, to them would not 
qualify as work. As educational work. For us, yes.” (SA2) 
Although ‘local first’ can also describe struggles including the 2008 Sarajevo 
protests and the 'Picin Park' protests in 2012 in Banja Luka, the 2014 protests 
strengthened this tendency. ‘Local first’ strategies have been indicated post-2014 in 
local-scale struggles such as supporting the re-opening of the Dita factory in Tuzla 
and the national museum in Sarajevo (“Nakon dugo godina, prva plata za radnike 
Dite,” 2015). Such struggles were also successful against the closing of one hospital 
and the exploitation of the river Una by a hydropower plant (Uzunović, 2015). Each 
of these acts, while being local in scope, also carried symbolic meaning that resonated 
with the wider demands of 2014, but this time some went beyond demanding to 
themselves producing change. The re-opening of Dita, a company that was 
privatized, stripped of assets and led into criminal bankruptcy, self-organized by its 
workers after years of public struggle, in particular sent strong signals across BiH.77 
In the struggles in Sarajevo, activists protesting the decay of public institutions were 
                                                          
77 The mobilization of citizens to buy Dita products can be seen in a supportive video that was shared and 
viewed over 1.4 million times (Kolektiv, 2015). 
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able to foster public outrage over the non-provision of social and cultural services 
and force bureaucracy to take action. Again, while being local in scope, these 
struggles also denounced perceived wrongs on a more abstract level. Similar ‘local 
first’ approaches can also be seen in the Sarajevo initiative ‘Dobro kote’ that began 
in 2016 and focuses on engaging neighborhoods to revitalize abandoned common 
spaces (SA5). In this process, it reflects the themes from 2014 in its successful 
attempt to activate voluntary contributions in time and material donations for the 
shared goal of reclaiming the commons. The initiative also mobilized 800 petition 
signers and participated in a local planning meeting in opposition to the taking over 
of a revitalized space by a commercial development.  
‘Local first’ also highlights the continuity between the protests and plenums 
and the responses to the devastating floods of May 2014, which contributed to their 
disbanding because activists perceived an emergency requiring immediate and 
sustained action. On the surface, the shift from protests and plenums to the 
emergency flood response appears as a retreat from the political into charity. 
However, Mujkić’s analysis supports the continuity of actors and strategies between 
the protests and flood response, highlighting their lack of public leadership, 
horizontality and assemblies with open participation, bypassing and distrust of 
political institutions and reclaiming of public spaces (Mujkić, 2016). Rather than a 
retreat from the political, the flood responses contributed to strengthening ‘local first’ 
approaches in the way that they responded to concrete needs while dismissing 
ethnocratic institutions and reaching across ethnic lines. 
‘Local first’ has utility as a way to conceptualize the current moment for 
bottom-up agency based on recognition of the heterogeneous local experiences of 
the conflict and post-conflict period. While ‘social justice’ was a unifying theme 
across the protest and plenum sites, the context specificity of the claims also 
challenges the homogenizing focus of ethnocracy and the identity politics that 
underwrite it. For example, the plenums in Tuzla, with its continued history of 
multiethnic politics, placed less emphasis on asserting their autonomy from co-
optation than in divided Mostar, which experienced stronger repression. ‘Local first’ 
instead recognizes different potential alliances based on dynamics at the local scale. 
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Some trade unions were accepted as active supporters, while others were discounted 
as supporters of the status quo. In addition, it augments arguments about ‘reclaiming 
the political’ and ‘activist citizenship’, i.e., when citizens act ‘in a way that disrupts 
already defined orders, practices and statuses’, by explaining the available means for 
achieving substantive changes (Isin, 2009, p. 384).78 ‘Local first’ encapsulates the 
heterogeneous issues that have emerged since 2014 based on their salience at a local 
scale. While temporarily losing visibility and civic energy on a national or entity level, 
this trend to 'go local' helped post-2014 activists to establish popular legitimacy via 
local struggles with broader symbolic meaning. ‘Local first’, in this way, also offers a 
pragmatic compromise allowing both political and anti-political activists to continue 
their struggles, often under the radar, without submitting to the pressures of co-
optation by one of the two hegemonic blocs. 
4.5 Conclusion 
For the last 20 years, BiH has been governed as a hybrid state under the dual 
hegemony of local ethnonationalism and international liberalism. This hegemony 
has been reproduced both in the state, where international actors have established 
the right to intervene and ethnic group rights have been institutionalized, and in civil 
society, where explicit or de-facto ethnic CSOs have become clients and a 'civil 
sector' was created consisting of professionalized NGOs accountable foremost to 
donors. Protest waves prior to 2014 challenged the dual hegemony foremost in 
opposition to ethnonationalist political actors. The latent struggle against dual 
hegemony became more publicly expressed in 2014 in the rejection of the ‘good 
society’ and the logics of engagement in CS offered by both the international and 
ethnonationalist blocs. Most notably during and after the February 2014 protests, an 
emergent third bloc was constructed along the themes of the 'good society' as a 
socially just one and logics of engagement in CS that build on the voluntary mass 
participation of citizens, organized bottom-up and crossing ethnic boundaries.  
                                                          
78 See (Milan, 2017) on the relevance of activist citizenship to the case of the 2014 protests.  
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Adding to the obvious challenge posed to the material power of state 
institutions, our research indicates activists’ struggles against ideational power within 
CS. These were directed both against co-optation, ‘project language’ and re-framing 
as ‘civic initiatives’ by international actors simultaneously to opposition to CS as 
ethnically divided clients and anti-politics as a form of consent to the continued rule 
of the established parties. The emergent activists, however, are not homogeneous in 
their positioning towards the IC and 'civic' CS, as became obvious in the rising 
tensions within the activist scene and a growing split between leftist and moderate 
or 'pragmatic' activists. In the absence of a strong, united movement, those 
collaborating with international actors risk being reframed and used to serve 
international interests or being perceived by former allies as traitors or opportunists. 
Attempts of engagement with activists by local moderate politicians or parties may 
also stir mistrust and provoke withdrawal from everyday politics, thereby nurturing 
a continued stance of anti-politics which blocks the identification of ideological allies 
or engaging in a pragmatic politics that prioritizes policy changes and engages in 
dialogue. 
The article has argued that adapting Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony 
to the inherently hybrid nature of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state has purchase for 
understanding the potential and limitations of bottom-up agency. This is because 
the dual nature of the struggle was indicated both in material as well as ideational 
struggles. Second, we have argued that activists during and since 2014 have adopted 
a ‘local first’ approach, which helps to frame the means available to ‘reclaim the 
political’ and produce substantive democratic outcomes given the conditions of dual 
hegemony. ‘Local first’ as a theoretical lens brings the benefit of recognizing 
heterogeneous local experiences of the conflict and post-conflict period. 
'Local first' was found as a medium-term way to continue collective action 
between protest waves and build legitimacy in local communities. Neglecting 
entrenched procedural discussions such as constitutional reform, the turn to the local 
enables avoiding the question of compromise or alliance with the hegemonic blocs. 
We return to the question of whether ‘local first’ as a strategy of recent protest events 
indicates an increasing potential for contesting anti-politics through creating an 
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alternative understanding of politika. ‘Local first’ is a pragmatic strategy in response 
to dual hegemony that has grown since 2014, yet includes heterogeneous approaches 
divided by questions of purity, persistent echoes of anti-politics, and questions of 
formalization and cooperation. The potential in this shift to the local is in the degree 
to which it is not conclusive but rather represents a temporary strategy allowing for 
continuous struggle in the face of adverse conditions and the highly heterogeneous 
constituency of the 'third bloc'. 
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5 Dead letters on a page? Civic agency and inclusive governance in 
neopatrimonialism 
5.1 Abstract 
Neopatrimonialism has explanatory power regarding the limitations of post-war 
democratization because it considers the combination of formally-democratic 
institutions together with power relations based on patronage. Neopatrimonialism 
does not however explain why marginalized groups make political claims in such 
inhospitable climates, nor have their experiences of governance processes been 
adequately explored. This paper addresses this gap based on empirical research in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, applying a framework of civic agency to elaborate the goals and 
capacities of civil society actors. Under what conditions can civic agency foster 
inclusive governance outcomes? The research found that perceptions of limited and 
ambiguous outcomes from engagement in governance processes encourage CSOs to 
have incrementalist goals and limit self-perceptions of capacity. Inclusive outcomes 
were nonetheless more likely with persistent intentions and actions. Transactional 
capacities based on ties to political actors rather than participatory capacities based 
on political mobilization were more likely to lead to inclusive governance outcomes.  
Keywords: civic agency, governance, liberal peace, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
neopatrimonialism 
This chapter was published as Puljek-Shank, R. (2017). Dead letters on a page? 
Civic agency and inclusive governance in neopatrimonialism. Democratization, 
24(4), 670–688. doi:10.1080/13510347.2016.1206081 
 
5.2 Introduction 
Scholarship of democratization within ‘liberal peace’ intervention after war has 
frequently characterized the resulting governance as ‘(mere) electoral democracy’ 
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(Segert & Džihić, 2012; Zürcher, 2011). The (lack of) political and civil rights 
however does not completely describe the ways that formally democratic governance 
can be devoid of a democratic essence that includes all citizens. Elections are not a 
guarantee of accountability to citizens or the public good as implied in Tilly’s 
definition of democratic governance as one in which ‘political relations between the 
state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding 
consultation.’ (Tilly, 2007, p. 13).  
Bosnia-Herzegovina is chronologically the second oldest of 19 major 
peacebuilding interventions since 1989 with the highest per-capita value of post-
conflict aid and as a result provides an extreme and instructive case (Yin, 2003; 
Zürcher, 2011). The persistence of nationalist party elites has been explained by 
post-war power structures based on patronage of state jobs and funds, connections 
to criminal elements, economic informality, and control of state-owned enterprises 
(Belloni & Hemmer, 2010; Donais, 2005; Segert & Džihić, 2012). In addition to 
their central role in post-war politics, clientelistic relationships and ethnic division 
are also seen as central for social order (Belloni, 2007; Donais, 2005). These two 
characteristics are mutually reinforcing in that patronage networks have been 
strengthened by the ability to divide and conquer potential common interests of 
groups of citizens along ethnic lines. 
Based on these findings, governance in Bosnia- Herzegovina can be 
characterized as neopatrimonialism, defined by patronage and clientilistic power 
relations within the institutions of rational-legal statehood (Ngin & Verkoren, 2015; 
Richmond & Franks, 2007). Patrimonial power relationships and 
neopatrimonialism have also been used to describe and explain post-war governance 
in countries including Cambodia, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Rwanda (Bach & 
Gazibo, 2012; Zürcher, 2011). These power relations are used to explain low levels 
of institutional responsiveness to citizens’ concerns and an equilibrium lacking in 
inclusive governance outcomes which benefit marginalized groups. In addition, 
neopatrimonialism means that ‘formal rules, elections and public bureaucracies exist 
and matter but in the reality of neopatrimonial regime informal rules and norms take 
precedence over formal institutions (Guliyev, 2011). The degree of divergence 
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between formal institutions and informal rules provides another reason for 
pessimism if even the few formal outcomes benefiting marginalized groups are not 
followed by substantive outcomes in practice.  
A vigorous civil society, a central stated objective of liberal peace 
interventions, is assigned a role within civil society theory as watchdogs over 
government officials, holding them accountable, and as articulators of public 
interests (Howell & Pearce, 2001b; Kostovicova, 2010; Richmond, 2008). 
Empirically, however, civil society organizations (CSOs) in post-war states have 
rather frequently been observed to play apolitical roles or to articulate illiberal 
ideologies, pointing to the lack of conceptual clarity provided by civil society theory 
in regards to governance roles.79 The literature on Bosnia following civil society 
discourse has been largely pessimistic about the potential for CSOs to influence 
governance outcomes along these lines and has extensively elaborated the ways that 
structural factors (i.e. characteristics of interventions and intervenors, levels of CSO 
membership and generalized trust) lead to CSO-state disengagement and apolitical 
roles (Belloni & Hemmer, 2010; Fagan, 2013; Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). 
Neopatrimonialism however provides an undifferentiated view of society-state 
interactions which empirically demonstrate variability. Lacking in these conclusions 
are a systematic examination of cases of CSO engagement. As a result the 
experiences of civil society-state interactions remain unexplored, while doing so may 
reveal and help to explain this variability and ultimately the characteristics of actors 
that engage in them.80  
Civic agency has been proposed as an alternative to address this plurality and 
ambiguity of civil society discourses and diversity of context-specific expressions 
(Fowler & Biekart, 2013). This article will explore how neopatrimonialist post-war 
governance shapes and constrains the agency of CSOs and the governance outcomes 
that they are able to achieve. Civic agency can thus provide needed nuance to the 
                                                          
79 The withdrawal of many CSOs from participation in governance has been observed in EU grant 
recipients in Serbia and Bosnia (Fagan, 2013) and ‘bottom-out’ peacebuilding NGOs. (Belloni & 
Hemmer, 2010). See also (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). 
80 Following (Verba et al., 1994). 
Chapter 5 
  
134 
rather deterministic structural perspective of neopatrimonialism. This is relevant as 
Dolenec has concluded that in the absence of elite decisions and limited sovereignty 
– conditions that apply to many post-war contexts - democratization “happens 
gradually through the strengthening of independent social spheres, citizens and 
associations that control the abuse of power that is so dear to the political elites of 
the region.” (Dolenec, 2013)  
The incremental, bottom-up democratization thesis however depends on the 
efficacy of citizens and associations in achieving outcomes from their interactions 
with the state. Civic agency is a framework for understanding why CSO actors 
engage with and struggle against the state given an inhospitable neopatrimonialist 
climate and a potentially low sense of efficacy. The article will elaborate and apply 
civic agency to illuminate struggles involving CSO participation in governance 
processes. The research was guided by the following question: Under what conditions 
can civic agency contribute to inclusive governance outcomes?  
The article makes several contributions to the literature on post-war 
governance. The application of ‘civic agency’ provides clarity to debates regarding 
‘local agency’ by elaborating the factors leading to the emergence of agency vis-à-vis 
the state. Adopting civic agency as an object of study can provide insight into its 
origins and development by a longitudinal focus on the self-conceptualization of 
specific actors. Secondly, patronage and clientilism have been commonly referred to 
in order to explain the lack of intended outcomes of intervention, abuse of public 
resources, and low levels of public goods. Neopatrimonialism in contrast is more 
normatively neutral in the way that it describes patterns of interaction and 
expectations which constrain the agency of actors within the state and society. By 
adopting it, this article contributes to understanding the possibilities for agency of 
both CSO and state actors. Its application can provide a framework for clarifying the 
origins and structural limitations to this agency.  
Based on extensive empirical research within eight case study CSOs in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the article applies civic agency as a framework to explain the 
conditions and outcomes of CSO-state interactions. The women’s, youth, and social 
welfare CSOs were selected based on their articulation of political goals as identified 
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by key informants. For each CSO, one to three initiatives were investigated in-depth 
using process tracing to document the goals, actions taken, outcomes, and multiple 
perspectives on the reasons for the outcomes. Interviewees referred to ‘dead letters 
on a page’ (mrtvo slovo na papiru) to describe unimplemented formal outcomes of 
engagement with the state and indicating the experience of neopatrimonialism. 
Despite this description, the article does find that the combination of persistent 
political claims, and application of predominantly transactional capacities vis-à-vis 
political actors can lead to inclusive governance outcomes. 
5.3 Theoretical framework 
Civic agency is situated within debates regarding local agency in the liberal peace 
literature, followed by a discussion of the definitions and literature on the civic 
agency concept which provide a basis for its operationalization. Civic agency is 
approached via the distinction between participatory and transactional capacities. 
The framework concludes by diagramming the relationships explored in the research 
question and two subquestions. 
5.3.1 Civic agency 
The exploration of civic agency can benefit from following Richmond and 
MacGinty’s call towards a ‘local turn’, meaning a shift in epistemology from 
interventionism to the ideational constructions of local actors and the processes, 
practices, and interrelationships that shape them (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). 
Liberal peace literature has emphasized local agency and the ‘hybridity’ that result 
from the meeting of indigenous and external discourses, actors and political projects 
but there are varied meanings for local agency (Millar, 2014; Ngin & Verkoren, 
2015; Richmond, 2010). For authors in the critical IR tradition the locus of local 
agency is resistance to the hegemonic dimensions of liberal peace interventions and 
understanding and engagement with local agency is central to conceptualized 
emancipatory approaches to peacebuilding (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). In policy 
debates about increasing local ownership, interest is largely focused on 
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understanding the agency of elites (Donais, 2012). Local agency can also mean a 
focus on grassroots agency and small-scale and everyday actions, at times considered 
‘hidden agency’ (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Pogodda & Richmond, 2015; 
Richmond, 2011). Finally local agency can mean to focus on the struggles which 
lead to legitimate institutions in different contexts based on local-international 
mixture of identities, norms, and practices (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). These 
myriad definitions raise the question of whether local agency provides conceptual 
clarity given that it reflects respective authors’ epistemological frameworks. This is 
made explicit in David Chandler’s critique of grassroots understandings of local 
agency based on the way that it locates the barriers to development at the ideational 
level without considering structural limitations (Chandler, 2013).  
Civic agency may have utility within these debates because it is explicit about 
its normative assumptions and narrower in its focus. Civic agency was defined by 
Boyte to mean ‘people’s capacities, individually and collectively, to be agents of their 
lives and of development’, within its proponents’ research agenda of ‘civic driven 
change’ (CDC) (Boyte, 2008; Fowler & Biekart, 2008). This agenda focuses on a 
system of governance that fosters self-organization around politically-empowering 
projects (Fowler & Biekart, 2008). Civic agency does not adopt a position restricting 
local agency to grassroots or elites as articulated above. Rather it focuses on agency 
on behalf of collectivities vis-à-vis the state (Dagnino, 2008b). In this point it is 
more explicit in its focus on the connection between CSO action and governance 
than civil society discourses. Moreover its adoption focuses attention on those CSOs 
which do articulate political goals despite the limitations of a neopatrimonialist 
system and what can be learned regarding their experiences of engagement in 
governance processes. This attention may provide insight into the process of 
strengthening pluralist power relations often understood to be central to democratic 
governance (e.g. Dahl, 2005; Truman, 1951). Relevant to neopatrimonialism is the 
potential of CDC to look ‘beyond political structures and mechanisms, such as 
voting, to the historical processes and fundamentals of power accumulation and 
reproduction’ and its sensitivity to contention between endogenous and exogenous 
values, measures and processes (Fowler & Biekart, 2013, p. 471). 
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Although agency is central to actor-based theoretical models, it can be 
challenging to operationalize. As put by Long, ‘Agency is usually recognised ex post 
facto through its acknowledged or presumed effects.’ (Long, 2001, p. 240) To answer 
this challenge, for this inquiry civic agency was defined as ‘the intention, perception 
of capacity, and action to create change for a common good,’ leading to 
operationalization based on the intentions, capacities, and actions. Framing as ‘a 
common good’ lies between the easily contested ‘public good’, subject to the logic of 
collective action, and partial or club goods which only benefit contributing members 
(Olson, 1971; Welzel et al., 2005). A common good is thus understood as a non-
excludable good from which a group beyond those who directly contribute benefit. 
While this definition notes that capacities and perceptions of capacities are a needed 
component to understand and analyse civic agency, the following section will turn 
to examining two forms of capacity from empirical research. 
5.3.2 Participatory and Transactional Capacities 
Scholarship on political mobilization by CSOs in Eastern Europe has found that 
low levels of individual participation and CSO membership do not inherently limit 
the CSO capacities and the efficacy of CSO action. Rather this research suggests 
that analysis of individual participation as ‘participatory activism’ should be 
complemented by theory of ‘transactional activism’, i.e. ‘ties—enduring and 
temporary—among organized nonstate actors and between them and political 
parties, power holders, and other institutions.’ (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007, p. 79) 
Participatory activism encompasses individual and group participation in civic life, 
electoral politics, and interest group activities as well as contentious politics. 
Transactional activism was formulated based on observed salience of linkages 
between grassroots organizations protesting the building of a new ring road around 
Budapest to NGOs with professional advocacy and subject expertise and to 
authorities which facilitated negotiation related to activists’ goals. Its transactional 
nature relates to strategic networking and problem-solving with authorities as means 
to achieve desired ends. Proponents of transactional capacity do not dispute the 
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weakening effects of low CSO membership, rather they claim that the transactional 
character of activism merits attention due its implications for the potential of 
coalition building, and negotiation with the state and elites (T. Cox, 2012; Petrova 
& Tarrow, 2007). The two forms are additionally distinguished by the way that the 
media is used in transactional activism to shape public debates and influence various 
publics, rather than to mobilize for protest events (Císař, 2010). This observation 
regarding the use of media in transactional activism was also observed in the case 
studies. 
The transactional characterization can be understood to emphasize 
temporary and instrumental characteristics, however the definition above focuses on 
the ties – i.e. the relationship - itself. Since many transactions are eased by 
relationships of trust, transactional capacity also includes a relational dimension. 
Although the advocacy actions encompassed within ‘transactional capacity’ are 
similar to those of interest groups within pluralist democratic governance (e.g. 
Truman, 1951), proponents of the concept argue that it is the ties themselves and 
character of the relationships that are the source of capacity within democratizing 
polities rather than participatory mobilization and its influence on public opinion 
and electoral politics (T. Cox, 2012). ‘Perception of capacity’ in the 
operationalization of civic agency refers to the actors’ reflexive understandings; it is 
not just analysis of the actions undertaken that provides analytical clarity but also the 
actors’ understandings of their efficacy. Neopatrimonialism may shape provisions for 
participation in that decisionmaking power does not reside in formal institutions and 
participation mechanisms but rather these institutions become permeable to the 
personal interests and preferences of some state officials. This inquiry then may 
provide insight into the way that a neopatrimonialist context shapes and constrains 
civic agency. The observed distinction between participatory and transactional 
capacity helps to form the expectation before commencing the empirical research 
that transactional capacity may be more effective than participatory capacity given a 
neopatrimonialist context.  
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The article will elaborate and apply civic agency to illuminate struggles 
involving CSO participation in governance processes. The research was guided by 
the following question: Under what conditions can civic agency contribute to inclusive 
governance outcomes? In order to answer this question, two subquestions will be first 
explored: Are governance outcomes formal or substantive? and Do CSOs demonstrate 
participatory or transactional capacities? The addressed concepts and relationships are 
shown in figure 5-1. 
5.4 Methodology 
Data was collected via triangulation of methods using semi-structured interviews, 
document analysis, and process tracing (Flick, 2009, p. 65). Three focus areas of 
youth, women, and social welfare were chosen as groups marginalized within 
patronage-based power structures.81 Interviews with 27 key informants, selected to 
                                                          
81 As demonstrated in levels of employment 10,9% (youth ages 15-24 actively seeking employment) and 
22,7% (women) vs. 31,7% (total population) and 2011 CSO grant support for women’s CSOs (0,7% of 
total), youth CSOs (2,8%), and for social welfare categories disabled and drug dependency CSOs (5,1%). 
(Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014; Center for Investigative Journalism, 2011) In 
Governance Outcomes 
CSO goals 
Citizens 
(members/ 
beneficiaries) 
Political actors Formal Substantive 
Figure 5-1. The concepts and relationships as clarified in the 2 subquestions 
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represent diverse and socially-significant perspectives82, were used to identify change 
initiatives by registered CSOs within each focus area vis-à-vis the state at any level. 
Rather than a representative sample of all CSOs, CSOs were thus selected based on 
demonstrated articulation of political goals in order to explore their potential 
contribution to inclusive outcomes. This choice follows from the research interest in 
the conditions under which civic agency contributes to inclusive outcomes. Inclusive 
outcomes were understood as those that benefit the marginalized groups and the 
narrative will elaborate how the outcomes were assessed for inclusiveness. 
The suggested CSOs were further researched to identify their constituencies, 
defined as members and beneficiaries.83 Selecting cases based on those with 
identified articulation of political goals and constituencies followed a most-likely 
case study methodology in that CSOs were selected which were most likely to 
demonstrate civic agency (Yin, 2003). The restriction to CSOs with constituencies 
further facilitated assessing the object of ‘a common good.’ In addition, the presence 
of constituencies enabled potential participatory capacity through mobilizing of 
constituents, providing better data from which to investigate capacities present in 
the definition of civic agency. 15 CSOs were selected from three major urban areas 
for initial interviews which gathered further information about their change 
initiatives.84 For each potential case study CSO, a list of change initiatives with 
political goals was composed based on document analysis and an interview with CSO 
leadership. 
                                                          
addition, 17% of Cantonal ministers and 22% of state ministers were women (Sarajevo Open Center, 
2015). 
82 From the following categories: political actors (4), religious CS (3), media and business (3), CS 
networks (5), international CS (2), CS Building projects (4), donors (4), and international political actors 
(2). Key informants were selected based on experience relating to CSOs in addition to their primary 
sectors. 
83 Voluntary financial support and membership as determined by CSO websites and (Daguda et al., 2013; 
TACSO, 2012a). 
84 Focus on major urban areas to eliminate related variability in socioeconomic factors and CSO 
participation rates (UNDP, 2009). 
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This article is based on eight case study CSOs which were selected to include 
each urban area and focus area of work. The case study CSOs were diverse in size 
(numbers of staff, budgets) and sources of funding (donor funds, government, 
membership and donations). In selecting one to three of the initiatives for further 
study, a criteria was that given outcomes indicated an ongoing policy change, rather 
than for example a onetime financial allocation. Preference was also given to 
completed processes, although as the narrative will explain this turned out to be more 
ambiguous in practice. In some cases completed meant withdrawal from the process 
without achieving the intended outcome. The inclusiveness of outcomes was 
investigated using the number of participants and beneficiaries from the respective 
constituencies and whether outcomes applied to all members of an intended group. 
Process tracing involved interviews with state and other CS actors and relevant 
internal and public document review. Selected initiatives had existed for at least one 
year in order to provide material for the process tracing. 
 Process tracing was selected in order to examine causal processes between 
initial conditions and governance outcomes, factoring in responses of multiple actors 
in their context, based on its suitability for understanding decision making (R. C. 
Reilly, 2010). It factored in the actions and explanations of other stakeholders and 
the political actors who made the decisions which lead to a given observable 
outcome, rather than taking CSO claims of attribution at face value. In the process 
tracing, the hypothesis that CSO actions contributed to observed outcomes was 
weighed against alternative explanations. It covered the time from assertions of goals 
to the outcomes claimed by CSOs. In addition, ongoing events after the outcomes 
were also investigated. Triangulation provided multiple data streams regarding key 
events and decisions which were used to assemble narrative descriptions. The process 
tracing included contextual analysis of relevant initiatives and actions by other actors. 
The observed outcomes, types of actions taken, and relative contribution of civic 
agency to the outcomes in contrast to actions by other actors formed the basis for 
answering the research question.  
During the process tracing there were several methodological challenges. The 
outcomes were selected based on CSO interviews, thus there was a potential bias 
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based on self-aggrandizing narratives and financial interest to justify outcomes to 
donors. Secondly the neopatrimonial environment fosters obscuring of political 
decisions, often the decisionmaking process, and potential financial interests. Finally 
the subjective nature of determining the relative contribution of CSO action to 
confirmed outcomes creates the possibility of confirmation bias on the part of the 
researcher. In order to mitigate these factors, document review was used to confirm 
the outcomes and sequence of events. The outcomes were also investigated regarding 
their inclusiveness as described above. The actors’ accounts of when one event led to 
another was evaluated based on the sum of the evidence including whether two 
events happened close in time. In a small number of cases, decision makers explicitly 
identified the causal role of CSO agency leading to a given outcomes which was 
given particular weight.85 Both the evidence for the role of CSO actions and for that 
of the actions of other actors is available in the supplemental materials. 
5.5 Findings  
The findings section begins by grounding the narrative with an analysis of each of 3 
fields of action. The two subquestions address civic agency via the components of its 
definition – focusing on goal formulation, the actions taken and their implications 
for understanding the salience of CSO capacities, and the nature (formal or 
substantive) of the outcomes. These subquestions are used as a basis for a more 
challenging examination of the evidence for a causal link between civic agency and 
inclusive outcomes and the conditions that fostered this result. 
5.5.1 Governance outcomes 
The following analysis focuses on civic agency on the part of women’s, youth, and 
social welfare CSOs in turn, particularly addressing whether formal outcomes were 
                                                          
85 For example, “CSOs had their suggestions, a significant part which were adopted particularly about 
people with disabilities, they even influenced that the approach to disability changed from a medical to a 
social approach to the problem of disability.” (Interview Lepir, 12-11-2013) 
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followed by substantive outcomes. Addressing domestic violence was a primary 
governance goal of each of the women’s CSOs identified by key informants and is 
illustrative because of the possibility to study parallel processes in the sub-national 
Federation and RS, each of which have their own criminal codes, police, and 
responsible social welfare institutions. The outcomes claimed by the case study 
CSOs include establishment of domestic violence shelters, criminalization of 
domestic violence, and improved responses to victims by state institutions such as 
the police, schools, and centres for social work. Domestic violence was criminalized 
in both the Federation and RS which was initially resisted by the drafting Ministries 
and remains a subject of ongoing contestation on the part of a case study CSO in 
the RS.86 The system of (partially) publicly-funded domestic violence shelters, run 
by CSOs, represents an atypical success in securing public funds on an ongoing basis. 
When asked about the impact of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
to coordinate responses to domestic violence victims, one policewoman in Mostar 
indicated its relevance by quickly pulling it out of the papers on her desk. However 
she also noted its lack of implementation in practice because of regulatory and 
budgetary factors both in her own but also other signatory institutions.87 Similar 
CSO-initiated MOUs have also contributed to positive changes in the responses to 
calls related to potential domestic violence on the part of local police and centres for 
social work.  
However, most of the formal outcomes beneficial to domestic violence 
victims were infrequently implemented if at all. This was due to institutional 
weaknesses (legal inconsistencies, varied interpretations, lack of developing 
mandated guidelines necessary for implementation of the law) and apparently a lack 
of will to allocate the necessary funds. Having undertaken commitments to fund 
domestic violence shelters, both Federation and RS Ministries introduced extensive 
                                                          
86 Regarding criminalization and opposition from relevant ministries see (United Women, 2007).  
87 Interview Hasandedić, 11-Nov-2014 
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technocratic criteria for the selection of CSOs to run them.88 In the perceptions of 
CSO actors, the intention was to secure state funds for politically-acceptable CSOs 
or to bring them under the control of political actors in place of those that had 
advocated for their adoption. Substantive outcomes regarding police and court 
responses to domestic violence have been similarly limited and inconsistent.  
The outcomes that case study youth CSOs claimed as the result of their 
actions were regular activities and educational efforts with public funds up to 10,000 
euros/year per CSO. The CSO Democratic Youth Movement (DYM) committed 
volunteer time over a one-year period to participate in the creation of the Novo 
Sarajevo municipal youth strategy and lobbied at budget hearings to maintain its 
funding (Služba za društvene djelatnosti, 2012). Its implementation once approved 
however was repeatedly delayed for political reasons (suspension during an election 
campaign) and bureaucratic reasons (budgeting cycles, delays due to writing 
regulations for a tender process).89 A Mostar youth strategy, initially proposed by the 
CSO Abrašević in 2007, and finalized for adoption by November 2012, had not been 
made available nor was scheduled for approval as of January 2016.90 Abrašević’s 
successful claim to a property title was the only such case that was observed over 3 
years of fieldwork, and based on this resource Abrašević continues to offer cultural 
programs as well as demonstrating civic agency by supporting city-level activism with 
broad transformational goals.  
For the families of developmentally-disabled individuals (DDIs) in the RS, 
formal outcomes include the introduction of daily centres and minimal (41-82 
€/month) financial support.91 Substantive outcomes were limited by the introduction 
                                                          
88 creating uncertainty by implementing tenders every 6 months for shelter providers in the RS, Interview 
Jančević, 11-04-2013, and potentially bringing the shelters in the Federation under political control by 
designating that public funds could only be provided to public institutions that would be subject to 
political appointments, Interview Bečirević, 28-11-2013. 
89 Interview Pršeš, 1-10-2013 
90 The proximate reason was the lack of formation of a city government since 2011. (ALDI, 2013) 
Interview Memić, 11-11-2014. 
91 The only form of assistance that disabled individuals including DDIs receive based on their disability. 
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of new procedures which required yearly verification of disability status by several 
doctors, causing a financial burden and delaying benefits particularly for rural 
beneficiaries. An Open Network campaign in order to establish the infrastructure 
for organ transplants appears to have led to the allocation of funds and the 
establishment of transplant teams.92 Substantively however, as of 2016 however only 
a few transplants had been conducted.  
CSO staff repeatedly observed that formal outcomes had not been 
implemented in practice, noting that laws, strategies, and conventions are ‘dead 
letters on a page’. This image supports the neopatrimonialist framing in the way that 
these instruments of rational-legal statehood do not indicate, direct, or bind the 
decisions of state actors or the allocation of state resources. Although weaknesses in 
institutional capacity can be used to explain this lack of substantive outcomes, 
proponents of the neopatrimonialist framing should be sceptical that additional 
capacity would change the underlying power relations and nature of political 
decisionmaking.93 The narrative rather continues by focusing on the implications of 
this context for civic agency and particularly for the articulation of goals vis-à-vis the 
state. 
Interviewees referred to ‘Fighting against windmills’ to describe the 
experience of engagement with state institutions – referring not to the imaginary 
nature of the opponent as in Don Quixote but rather the pointlessness of the battle.94 
Their accounts of their own efficacy were characterized as a series of struggles in 
which the outcomes achieved were followed by retrenchments, leading to the 
conclusion that their net effect was little change. In response, the case study CSOs 
did not abandon engagement but did distinguish intermediate goals, characterized 
by formal and institutionalist characteristics from ultimate goals, characterized by 
substantive outcomes. The discrepancy between formal and substantive outcomes is 
                                                          
92 A Ministry of Health representative agreed that given that implementation had been repeatedly 
announced over 4 years but no funds had been allocated demonstrated its newfound political priority in 
January 2014, 3 months following an Open Network public campaign (Interview, Čerkez, 14-1-2014). 
93 This is the position of authors who advocate statebuilding first such as (Belloni, 2008). 
94 Interviews Hasanbegović, 12-3-2013, Jančević, 4-11-2013 
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likely why CSO intentions regarding CSO-state interactions remain very limited in 
scope and scale. As related by a staff person working on behalf of the 
developmentally disabled,  
In the negotiations with the state, we say we have 10 needs of 
particular rights to be regulated by law or to be implemented, 
let's go with 1 or 2 for the next 3 years, that we'll put aside 
and go step-by-step. … The problem is that the rights which 
exist in certain laws are not implemented in practice or the 
internal inconsistencies within the entity [law].95 
CSOs received responses regarding the lack of available funds for achieving 
CSO goals and perhaps as a result focused on modest improvements rather than 
broader contestation of political priorities. The goals of the studied CSOs were also 
limited in that they were extremely rarely expressed in the form of implementing 
national solutions, likely due to pragmatic calculation of potential success given the 
political salience of centralization/decentralization debate as a focus of dominant 
ethnonationalist political contention, the risks related to challenging nationalist 
political projects, and personal political orientations. Within incrementalist goals, an 
interviewee countered descriptions of ‘dead letters on a page’, ‘Some say it's only 
paper, paper, paper. We're satisfied with what we've done. We're a women's 
organization that works within Mostar and Mostar is saturated with our activities. 
And that's what we figured out we needed to do.’96  The ambiguous picture of the 
outcomes and varied understandings of efficacy provide the context for considering 
the next subquestion regarding the capacities applied by the case study CSOs. 
5.5.2 Do CSOs demonstrate participatory or transactional capacities? 
The process tracing provided significant evidence that transactional capacity, based 
on ties between CSOs on the one hand and state actors, elites, or other CSOs on 
                                                          
95 Interview Rađen Radić, 12-11-2012 
96 Interview Hasanbegović, 12-3-2013 
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the other was necessary in achieving intended outcomes. Despite this salience of 
transactional capacity, the processes studied also include some indications of 
participatory capacities. The interaction of multiple capacities will be explored by 
two case studies, the first of which is related to advocacy regarding treatment of 
domestic violence in the RS. The second considers an initiative regarding local policy 
undertaken by the Sarajevo youth organization DYM. Despite the heterogeneity of 
the two cases regarding location and beneficiary population they demonstrate 
commonalities regarding the links between CSO action and achieved outcomes and 
the ways that the case study CSOs responded to political opportunities. 
United Women’s (UW) office gives the impression of activism and activity 
by the posters informing about domestic violence hotlines, the space filled with staff 
and shelves stuffed with archives of previous projects. Annual reports indicate its 
success in securing donor funds as well as ongoing municipal and RS financial 
support and legislative and regulatory outcomes related to victims of domestic 
violence. Seeking government rather than donor funding is indicated in the awarding 
of land by Banja Luka City for a shelter for domestic violence victims in 2002, 
attributed to cooperation between the organization and allies in the City Assembly 
(Udružene žene, 2003). When the city administration did not provide funding as 
agreed, in 2005 UW lobbied via the use of media and direct advocacy with political 
actors at the local and RS levels and was successful in securing funds for renovation 
and furnishing the shelter which accepted its first beneficiaries in February 2007.97 
Seeking state funds was a strategic choice, as indicated by one staff person, “We 
could have received international funds for the shelter from the very beginning but 
we didn't want that. We wanted the state to systematically address that question and 
that it should be a legal responsibility of the state to provide the service and to 
financially support it.”98 
In 2007, UW responded to an institutional provision for participation by 
submitting written proposals and the participation by UW President Nada 
                                                          
97 (Udružene žene, 2005a, Udružene žene, 2005b, United Women, 2007, United Women Banja Luka, 
2009). 
98 Interview Petrić, 12-Nov-2013 
Chapter 5 
  
148 
Golubović as a sole CSO member in a working group related to the amending of the 
existing Law on Protection from Domestic Violence in the RS. UW’s goals were to 
secure more consistent funding for all 3 safe houses that had been established in the 
RS by obligating the RS to provide funding, and to treat domestic violence only as 
a criminal act. In the discussion regarding whether it is a misdemeanour or a criminal 
act, UW President Golubović was alone in arguing for a change to be treated only 
as a criminal act and ultimately did not support the final recommendation of the 
working group and instead submitted a separate recommendation (United Women, 
2007). UW engaged in subsequent lobbying via female parliamentarians with whom 
it had already established relationships (Udružene žene, 2008). The amended law as 
adopted established that the RS should cover 70% of the cost and municipalities 30% 
for housing victims and children in a safe house but domestic violence continued to 
be treated as a misdemeanour. The relevance of the personal orientation of state 
officials rather than merely implementation of established law was demonstrated 
when Assistant Minister for Health and Social Welfare Ljubo Lepir publicly 
challenged the safe house model, arguing that it did not solve the problem of 
domestic violence because the victims’ only recourse after residing in the safe house 
was to return to the same household.99 Lepir was seen as an opponent because he 
had earlier publicly challenged the analysis of UW related to domestic violence and 
the professional qualifications of the staff. The transfer of administration of the safe 
houses to the Ministry of Family, Youth, and Sports (FYS), headed by previous UW 
ally Nada Tešanović, was welcomed. Although the 2008 revised Law required the 
revision and creation of numerous regulations within 6 months, this had not been 
done as of 2013, 5 years after its adoption. UW’s action to organize a round table in 
cooperation with the Ministry FYS was followed by the formulation and adoption 
of the guidelines related to the operation and funding of safe houses (NS RS, 2013). 
Finally it is worth noting that additional case study CSOs engaged in actions 
regarding both establishment, regulation, and funding of domestic violence shelters 
                                                          
99 Interview Lepir, 12-11-2013 
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and criminalization of domestic violence in the Federation which demonstrated 
largely similar dynamics regarding goals, capacities, and outcomes. 
The Democratic Youth Movement (DYM) began among university students 
in Sarajevo in 2005 articulating opposition to nationalism and in the early days an 
attempt to overcome ethnic division by creation of a Banja Luka (RS) chapter. By 
2011 however, it consisted of 300 members in Sarajevo including 40 active members 
without staff or an office but as will be seen civic agency able to respond to 
opportunities. In 2009 DYM was invited by Faruk Pršeš, the head of the Novo 
Sarajevo municipal Department for Societal Activities along with 8 other 
organizations to nominate members of working groups for creation of a Youth 
Strategy for 2012-2014. Of interest for this analysis are the actions taken by DYM 
in support of adoption of the Strategy and to advocate for its funding despite 
opposition by political parties in the Municipal Assembly. DYM activists reported 
that meetings with municipal assembly members and a reputation for partisan 
autonomy helped to achieve approval in lobbying for adoption of the Strategy over 
expressed political hesitations that doing so would benefit the incumbent mayor 
during an election campaign.100 Further they responded to opportunities for 
participation by advocacy in public hearings on the budget, leading to restoration of 
full funding.101 
These two cases are representative of the case study CSOs in that they 
indicate that a highly salient capacity is relationships with political actors developed 
over multiple interactions. The nature of this capacity and how it develops can be 
examined from the perspectives of CSO actors and political actors. CSO actors 
describe effective lobbying and ‘political action’ as lobbying in person, ‘Now it seems 
in this existing system the most effective method is political action, direct political 
action, lobbying party caucuses.’102 Frequent government changes are seen as an 
obstacle to developing the necessary kinds of relationships which demonstrated the 
                                                          
100 Interview Ernad Deni Čomaga, Denis Bahtijarević 16-11-2012 
101 Supported by comparison of draft and final budgets. 
102 Interview Ćorić, 20-2-2013 
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importance of continuity.103 Women’s CSOs also directly engaged repeatedly with a 
few legislators and political actors related to legal and regulatory change processes.104 
Political actors for their part emphasized that they chose to work together with 
CSOs with particular characteristics. DYM was invited to participate in the Youth 
Strategy based on the assessment that they would complete the task and build 
support for adopting the outcome. In several of the cases political actors emphasized 
working with CSOs that represented particular groups of members or beneficiaries. 
A parliamentarian highlighted the expertise of CSO members of a working group. 
This supports the transactional characterization in addition to the relational one – 
that is CSOs benefit when they can bring effectiveness via expertise and social 
acceptance via their members. A more critical assessment while still confirming the 
transactional nature was given by DYM, whose staff later assessed that the Youth 
Strategy was beneficial for the mayor’s re-election campaign but that neither DYM 
nor youth as a group had received the anticipated benefits.105 
Although transactional capacity was more salient for the outcomes, some of 
the same case study CSOs also demonstrated willingness to mobilize supporters and 
the public. For example, procedures for public calls in order to receive state funds 
were perceived as a front for political preferences and financial interest over those 
favouring better outcomes, but some of the organizations made their case via the 
media. Statements such as, ‘We’ll turn the world upside down’ by a United Women 
staff person in response to experienced retrenchment in governance outcomes could 
be taken to indicate participatory capacity within governance processes via 
contentious politics. On closer examination, however, what was almost always meant 
were calls for protest via mass media that in the opinions of the CSO actors would 
influence key decision makers. This matches previous findings about the use of 
media within transactional capacity. Contentious politics and other forms of 
participatory capacity were by themselves rarely perceived by the CSO actors as 
salient capacities.  
                                                          
103 Interview Ćehajić, 13-04-2013 
104 Attribution of success in securing donated land for a shelter mentioned earlier (Udružene žene, 2003). 
105 Interview Jovančić and Čomaga, 7-14-2014 
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The definition of transactional capacity also addresses the quality of relations 
between CSOs which was observed as an additional factor regarding multiple CSO 
capacities and outcomes in the case studies. In the face of state unresponsiveness, 
CSOs reached out to other potential CSO allies but frequently experienced a lack of 
CSO solidarity and identified this as a reason for reduced outcomes. The case study 
CSOs, claiming to work on behalf of constituencies, attempted broader mobilization 
based on an expectation of similar civic agency but were repeatedly rebuffed. Despite 
these setbacks, several of the case study CSOs were actively working on developing 
transactional capacity by engaging with selected CSOs on a local or thematic basis. 
To summarize the findings to this point, the neopatrimonialist 
characterization was supported in that formal outcomes were infrequently followed 
by substantive outcomes (‘dead letters on a page’). The experience of engagement 
with the state which frequently appeared futile (‘fighting against windmills’) led to 
incrementalist framing of goals and limiting of their scope and scale. Transactional 
capacity via ties between CSO and political actors was an often necessary condition 
for achieving governance outcomes in a neopatrimonialist context. Participatory 
capacity via political mobilization was only infrequently observed and mobilization 
calls also indicated elements of transactional capacity in the strategic use of media. 
Despite these limitations, there was evidence of civic agency in that many of the 
studied CSOs have persisted in political claims.  
5.5.3 Under what conditions can civic agency foster inclusive outcomes? 
This article has advocated the utility of analysing cases of civic agency despite an 
inhospitable climate. This section addressing the research question will begin by 
introducing a case from one of the most difficult climates for inclusive governance 
outcomes, the city of Mostar. Despite the frequent difficulty to achieve substantive 
outcomes following formal ones as discussed earlier, formal outcomes are 
nonetheless a necessary precondition. In addition, formal outcomes can be more 
objectively evaluated as a change and related to the CSOs goals. The section will 
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next summarize the evidence from all of the case studies that civic agency can foster 
formal outcomes and discuss the conditions under which this happens.  
Mostar was divided during the war and despite a period of international 
administration and extensive international efforts, remains socially divided with 
separate institutions and spaces (Bieber, 2005; Hromadžić, 2008). Within this 
context, youth CSO Abrašević demonstrated civic agency through providing 
common space, cultural programs, and support to contentious mobilization. 
Governance outcomes that Abrašević claimed as successful results of CSO actions 
included repeated lobbying for municipal financial support (5.100 €/year) and a 
public campaign to secure title to a pre-war centre which identified obstructionist 
officials followed by a successful court challenge against the city government.106 
Lobbying included direct appeals to municipal assembly members, who indicated 
that these appeals were effective based on their positive opinion of the organization 
and the impact of its activities.107 Further, Abrašević demonstrated agency by active 
voluntary participation within the Youth Council, established by youth NGOs with 
municipal support, and initiated re-shaping the council to include high school 
students’ associations. Their inclusion was accorded significance because they were 
known for their advocacy in favour of overcoming ethnic division. 
The Abrašević case will be used to demonstrate the methodology and support 
for the findings. Multiple sources and perspectives were used to investigate the 
decisionmaking involved in formal outcomes. Abrašević’s advocacy regarding the 
municipal budget was assessed based on review of their written appeals and the 
minutes of municipal assembly meetings and changes between drafts of the 
municipal budget. In addition an assembly member, municipal staff person, and 
Youth Council staff were also interviewed. These multiple perspectives enabled 
consideration of evidence that formal outcomes were the result of CSO action 
against evidence that the outcomes were the results of the actions of other actors. 
Direct attribution by the decision makers to CSO actions as in the case of the Mostar 
                                                          
106 Because the budget had not been officially approved but was rather a temporary funding measure the 
cuts were not allowed by regulation (Appeal, n.d.). 
107 Interview Selma Jakupović, 7-11-2014 
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assembly member, proximity in time between CSO action and outcomes, and review 
of the context including the (lack of) similar decisions were factors considered. Most 
importantly weighing evidence in favour of the role of civic agency against evidence 
in favour of other explanations reduced the reliance on the narratives of CSO actors 
in causal attribution. This evidence was used to assign each outcome to one of the 
categories in Table 5-1 which indicates that civic agency was a contributing factor 
in each of the formal outcomes that was investigated. Supporting evidence for each 
of the cases is available in the online supplemental materials.108  
Table 5-1. Factors that contributed to formal outcomes 
No formal 
outcome 
Civic agency 
not 
contribute 
Both civic 
agency and 
other actors 
contribute 
Civic agency 
predominant 
contributor 
Civic agency 
only 
contributor 
4 0 8 4 1 
 
Given an unfavourable neopatrimonialist context, one contributing factor to 
the outcomes was the consistency of intention and persistence of action over years 
and even decades. As put in one interview, ‘What's most important in the whole 
story is that we don't give up, that where we see a problem we force it, and initiate a 
solution.’109 In another (despite the evident hyperbole), ‘300 times we sent the head 
of the Department for Societal Activities a letter, an invitation, we called him, [they 
say] it's the first time I hear of it, pass us on to somebody else. They don't want any 
kind of cooperation. It's political, now that is politics. We will be so stubborn that 
we will enter there.’110 The goals and means of struggle are demonstrated in the 
                                                          
108 Supporting case documentation is available online (“Process tracing data for ‘Dead letters on a page? 
Civic agency and inclusive governance in an electocracy,’” 2016). 
109 Interview Rađen Radić, 11-04-2013 
110 Interview Hasanbegović, 12-3-2013 
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reflexive understanding of CSO staff that, ‘…we are the constant policemen who 
constantly register problems in practice, register where there are inconsistencies, 
register where rights are violated, constantly apply pressure in the sense of 'people 
change this',’ whose relation to the state is, ‘a struggle, to literally claw rights out of 
your sleeve.’111 In a context demonstrating a lack of accountability and reliability by 
institutions to fulfil their statutory obligations, the utility of civic agency is supported 
by the observation that inclusive substantive outcomes are more likely in the face of 
CSO consistency of intention and persistence of action.  
The findings have implications for understanding bottom-up 
democratization within a neopatrimonialist context. In the absence of established 
democratic norms, the orientation of state officials to civil society actors varied from 
open to rejecting. Just as neopatrimonialism permits exploitation of state institutions 
for personal gain it also frees some state actors from the strictures of bureaucratic 
and institutional logic, increasing the manoeuvring room and autonomy of those 
who are reformist-oriented. Transactional capacity between civil society and state 
actors is a property of dyads of actors and depends on repeated interactions and 
established trust. The transactional dimension however raises the question of the 
stability of CSO-state links and the degree of institutionalization of inclusive 
governance practices. Although governance interactions (consultation and verifiable 
outcomes) were repeated between CSO-state pairs, this rarely expanded to broader 
links with other CSO or state actors.  
This research into the conditions in which civic agency fosters inclusive 
governance outcomes indicates a paradox between the analysis that civic agency does 
foster such outcomes and the perceived lack of increasing capacity on the part of the 
actors. One explanation is the observed distinction between the more common 
formal and less common substantive outcomes leading to a similar distinction in 
CSO goal formulation. The often necessary condition of transactional capacity to 
state actors works against autonomy instead supporting relationships that are at best 
interdependent. In addition, success regarding substantive outcomes occurred after 
                                                          
111 Interview Rađen Radić, 12-11-2012 
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persistent civic agency focused predominantly on incrementalist rather than 
transformative goals. Experiences of limited outcomes resulting from incrementalist 
goals further narrow goal setting regarding future actions oriented towards the state.  
5.6 Conclusion  
This article began by positing that theory and research on governance in a 
neopatrimonialist context does not adequately explain the variability in society-state 
interactions, particularly the factors that foster the emergence of CSOs which make 
inclusive political claims. It adopted the civic agency framework in order to follow 
the epistemological ‘local turn’ and applied it to the goals and struggles of 8 CSOs 
from marginalized groups. The research found that civic agency characterized by 
persistent political claims and primarily transactional capacities can lead to formal 
inclusive governance outcomes. However, experiences of bounded and ambiguous 
substantive outcomes from engagement in governance processes encourage CSOs to 
have incrementalist intentions and limit self-perceptions of capacity.  
The findings support the potential benefits of additional research regarding 
transactional capacities in other post-war contexts. Given the relevance of persistent 
and long-term action in achieving desired outcomes, civic agency can provide insight 
into the self-conceptualization of the actors that engage in such forms of struggle 
despite inhospitable climates. Finally, the finding that reformist-oriented state actors 
often played an enabling (necessary but not sufficient) role in the establishment of 
inclusive outcomes supports the utility of civic agency over civil society theories built 
on functional sectoral conceptualization (Fowler & Biekart, 2013). Concretely, the 
findings point to the relevance of key civil society-state dyads for democratic 
governance processes and suggest civic agency of state actors as an area for further 
research. 
The finding that formal governance outcomes were infrequently followed by 
substantive outcomes provides additional support for framing democratic 
governance as neopatrimonialism, emphasizing the persistence of customary order 
and authority and distinctiveness from consolidated democracy. The relevance of 
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relationships to state actors for achieving given outcomes, regardless of their 
inclusive nature, can be seen to strengthen personal authority and indirectly 
neopatrimonialism rather than democratic governance via the rule of law and state 
capacity. However, the persistence of civic agency applied in order to achieve 
outcomes demonstrates the potential to use norms of democratic governance to 
contest the ‘rules of the game’ and hegemony of neopatrimonialism, shedding light 
on local action and contestation as necessary conditions for long-term processes of 
post-war democratization.
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6 Conclusion 
This dissertation has aimed to investigate the civic agency of CS actors towards the 
state112 in divided societies. To briefly recap the argument as laid out in the 
introduction, civic agency is of particular interest given the theoretically assigned 
roles of CS to limit state power, provide alternative channels for representing 
interests (Diamond, 1994; White, 2004), and facilitate and enhance collective action 
(Ostrom, 2015). This dissertation has particularly addressed the ‘legitimacy critique,’ 
which claims that donor-funded CS strengthening programs lead to weak advocates 
because they foster CSOs with low local legitimacy (Fagan, 2005; Howell & Pearce, 
2001b; Kostovicova, 2010; Pouligny, 2005).113 Bosnia is an instructive case regarding 
CS strengthening programs in ethnically divided societies because these programs 
have had a duration of over 20 years with the second-highest per-capita investment. 
Therefore, the research was organized to answer the following research 
question: How do the local and donor legitimacy of civil society actors influence their 
civic agency and their outcomes in the presence of donor CS strengthening programs 
in a divided society? The question was approached by taking a systematic look at 
how levels of legitimacy with local actors and donors may explain both CSOs’ civic 
agency vis-à-vis the state and what they are able to achieve. The civic agency of 
CSOs with different levels of legitimacy was also compared to that of activists 
outside of formal CSOs.  
This concluding chapter will first address each of four sub-questions in turn. 
The sub-questions were derived from the diagram (Figure 6-1) of the concepts and 
relationships that were addressed.114 The first sub-question focuses on unpacking 
what locals and donors believe makes a CSO legitimate as a basis for exploring the 
relationship between local and donor legitimacy. The second sub-question teased 
out the influence of legitimacy with two key groups, donors and citizens, on CSO 
                                                          
112 State is used to mean all levels of political institutions, not only the contested Bosnian national-level 
institutions (Belloni, 2007; Bose, 2005). 
113 See section 1.2.1, page 14, for an elaboration of the ‘legitimacy critique.’ 
114 See Section 1.3.1, page 37, for a description of the elements of the conceptual diagram. 
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advocacy actions. During the field research, a wave of protests and participatory 
forums (plenums) mobilized citizens in a way that was not previously seen in post-
Dayton Bosnia. This moment provided an opportunity to investigate how activists 
express civic agency vis-à-vis both ethnic politics and CS strengthening programs; 
the third sub-question. The final sub-question turns to the topic of outcomes and 
asks under what conditions does civic agency lead to desired outcomes? 
The answers to the sub-questions are then used as the basis for addressing 
the research question and supporting three key findings. The first finding is that the 
combined effects of local and donor legitimacy explain the potential and limitations 
of the civic agency of CSOs and the outcomes that can be achieved. CSOs that enjoy 
legitimacy with citizens and donors have unrecognized potential to serve as 
intermediaries between donors, citizens and the state. The second finding is that 
civic agency is expressed through the innovative and strategic ways that CSOs seek 
to legitimate themselves in relation to both ethnic divides and CS strengthening 
programs, for example, through ‘ambiguous ethnicness’. The third finding is that 
transactional capacities with political actors are more salient than participatory 
capacities with citizens in explaining the link between civic agency and desired 
outcomes.  
Following the discussion of the findings, the chapter continues by addressing 
the implications of the dissertation for the literature. Next, a methodological 
reflection discusses key choices that were made during the research process. Finally, 
how does the research indicate ways that activists, CSOs, and donors can do better? 
A final section discusses the policy implications of the research. 
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6.1 Sub-question #1: What is the relationship between local and donor 
legitimacy of CSOs?  
Understanding the relationship between legitimacy with donors, political actors, and 
citizens starts with a solid understanding of which civil society actors are considered 
to be legitimate by whom and why. This is because what legitimacy means for these 
three groups of stakeholders may vary in significant ways due to their different roles 
(i.e., as members or authorities) and their varying participation in power relations. 
The different meanings of legitimacy help us to understand how support from one 
group can influence support from another group. These answers about the 
relationship between local and donor legitimacy help us to understand their influence 
on civic agency in the research question. 
Governance 
Outcomes 
Citizens (members/ 
beneficiaries) 
Political actors 
Local legitimacy 
Donor legitimacy 
CS civic agency 
M
ob
ili
ze
 
SQ   #1 
SQ   #2 
SQ #2 
SQ  #4 
Figure 6-1. Conceptual model 
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Both citizens and political actors assessed CSO legitimacy through the idea 
of ‘solving concrete problems.’ This approach to determining legitimacy incorporates 
both an instrumental understanding of legitimacy based on results (i.e., problems are 
solved) and a normative assessment (whose problems, and which ones are ‘concrete’). 
Some examples of solving concrete problems included shelters for victims of 
domestic violence, work with schools to protect children, and activity centers for 
people with developmental disabilities. Although donors also described legitimate 
CSOs in similar ways, the perceived lack of concrete benefits and beneficiaries was 
the basis for a frequent critique of donor-supported CSOs by local actors. 
Interviewees particularly rejected liberal rights-based frameworks of donor programs 
due to their perceived lack of concrete results and relevance for everyday concerns. 
Interviewees also indicated suspicion about whose interests are really represented by 
donor CS strengthening programs and about the CSOs’ emphasis on personal and 
narrow financial interests at the expense of the common good. Thus, many local 
actors mistrust donor-supported CSOs due to negative instrumental assessments of 
their results (not connected to everyday struggles), as well as negative normative 
assessments of their priorities and the CSOs themselves (i.e., they are ‘foreign 
mercenaries’ motivated only by financial interest and engage in ‘money laundering’ 
that shows a lack of integrity). 
Although these findings suggest that donor support leads to reduced local 
support, a small number of CSOs were found to have legitimacy with both local 
populations and donors. The combination of ‘solving concrete problems’ for a clearly 
identified constituency, advocacy with government, and providing micro-level spaces 
for citizens (such as centers for women or youth) was frequently found together with 
this combination of legitimacy. ‘Ambiguous ethnicness,’ which is discussed below, is 
also found as a common (although not universal) characteristic of this category of 
CSOs. These CSOs that enjoy local and donor legitimacy will also be of particular 
interest for answering the main research question because they demonstrated the 
ability to serve as intermediaries between donors, citizens, and the state. 
Chapter Two also considered the degree to which the ethnic character of 
CSOs (their ethnicness) is an intervening factor between local and donor legitimacy. 
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Foreign donors may disregard locally grounded CSOs because they are often mono-
ethnic, leading them to be dismissed as exclusive and polarizing (Verkoren & van 
Leeuwen, 2014). However, mono-ethnic CSOs may be better able to represent 
constituents, with whom they share a similar culture, history and political framing, 
contributing to higher legitimacy (Belloni, 2009; Orjuela, 2010). However, CSO 
ethnicness was found to be more ambiguous than the existing literature suggests 
because many organizations are somewhere between these extremes. Moreover, 
contrary to expectations, there was not a clear correlation between high ethnicness 
and high local legitimacy or between low ethnicness and high donor legitimacy. 
Instead, what matters for legitimacy is the ability of CSOs to interact skillfully with 
ethnically divided constituencies and political structures. CSOs use this ‘ambiguous 
ethnicness’ to legitimate themselves, strategically presenting themselves as more or 
less ethnic depending on the audience and situation in order to advance their goals.  
These answers have several implications for the research question. The first 
implication is that donor support does contribute to low local legitimacy because 
those interviewed have negative normative assessments of the motivation and lack of 
results of donor-supported efforts. High local legitimacy is frequently derived from 
‘solving concrete problems’ (i.e., tangible benefits for concrete groups). However, 
local and donor support are not exclusive, as some literature claims (e.g., Chahim & 
Prakash, 2014; Grødeland, 2006; Pickering, 2006; Pouligny, 2005). It is possible to 
have both forms of legitimacy. In addition, this category has a common set of 
characteristics that includes advocacy actions that aim to influence policies. Second, 
the observed strategy of ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ questions the categories, such as 
bonding and bridging social capital, that have been applied to describe civil society 
in divided societies (Korac, 2009; Paffenholz, 2009). This finding is relevant for the 
research question because ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ is an approach to legitimation 
given the different expectations of donors, citizens, and political actors regarding the 
positioning of CSOs towards the ethnic divide. Thus, the CSOs that were 
researched achieved agency in ways that were not expected by the divided society 
literature (e.g., Belloni, 2008). The next sub-question will now address what these 
categories of legitimacy mean for the civic agency of CSOs. 
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6.2 Sub-question #2: How does CSO legitimacy with donors and citizens 
influence civic agency? 
This sub-question narrowed the focus from ‘local legitimacy’ to legitimacy with 
citizens (not political actors) in order to tease out the contribution of citizens in terms 
of both granting and withholding legitimacy, since democratic governance depends 
on citizen participation. The analysis focuses on the self-reported forms of action 
(advocacy strategies) that CSOs conduct to achieve their goals vis-à-vis the state. 
Three groups of CSOs, which were defined by the combination of levels of 
legitimacy with donors and with citizens, were found to exhibit different strategies. 
The ‘donor darlings’ that enjoy legitimacy with donors but not citizens have 
civic agency similar to the apolitical and technocratic NGOs that are frequently 
described in the literature (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2008; Fagan, 2008; Vetta, 2009). 
An example is the Youth Information Agency (OIA), which began its Active Youth 
program focused on connecting youth to municipal politicians in order to address 
youth needs. However, more than a decade later, the OIA instead focuses on raising 
funds from companies.115 The reason given for the shift was that the government is 
inefficient and fragmented. Regarding the futility of policy advocacy, OIA founder 
Jan Zlatan Kulenović related that he was told by one government counterpart that 
‘strategies are for drawers.’ However, a surprising finding about this category of 
CSOs is that they used expertise as an advocacy strategy less commonly than other 
categories of CSOs. This is surprising given the central role of expertise in the 
literature on the ‘technocratic’ and ‘professional’ focus of donor-supported CSOs 
(e.g., Bebbington et al., 2008; Harriss, 2001; Howell & Pearce, 2001a). This 
difference may be because political actors and bureaucrats indicated that the kinds 
of expertise that they bring was not considered relevant. 
The second category consists of CSOs that have legitimacy with citizens but 
not donors. The civic agency of these CSOs can be described based on their self-
conceptualization as constituency ‘representatives.’ These CSOs were illustrated in 
                                                          
115 See Section 3.4.3, page 95, for more details. 
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Chapter Three by MeNeRaLi, which is an umbrella organization for 29 local 
chapters that are predominantly made up of parents of developmentally disabled 
individuals. MeNeRaLi was typical for this category in the way that they actively 
participated in government consultations and were ready to mobilize their members 
for protest to achieve their goals. The CSOs in this category empirically support the 
relevance of theory, according to which CSOs can play a role as alternative channels 
to represent citizen interests and do so by mobilizing citizen participation (Diamond, 
1994; White, 2004). However, the civic agency of these CSOs was frequently 
characterized by the futility rather than utility of participation. This conclusion was 
based on their experiences of the limited outcomes that resulted from engagement 
with the state, a topic which will be dealt with more in sub-question #4. One 
transactional strategy (i.e., based on ties to political actors) that these CSOs applied 
more frequently was using expertise. In MeNeRaLi’s case, this expertise was 
knowledge of the rules of the RS Parliament, analysis of inconsistencies between 
laws, and expertise about their beneficiaries and their needs. However, the 
opportunities to apply this expertise depend on invitations by the state. Due to their 
limited outcomes, CSOs in this ‘representatives’ category play an active role but are 
not frequently positioned to exercise their agency directly. 
The third and most interesting category are those CSOs that are considered 
to be legitimate by both donors and citizens. The CSOs studied in this category 
initiated and sustained advocacy for two initiatives with the broadest and most 
substantive outcomes: the creation of youth councils and providing support to 
victims of domestic violence. These outcomes were the most substantive outcomes 
in terms of degree of implementation, funds allocated, and longevity. How these 
CSOs use both forms of legitimacy was illustrated in Chapter Three through the 
Sarajevo youth CSO KULT.116 KULT was acknowledged for having helped draft 
and pass a Federation Law on Youth which enabled youth CSOs to form municipal 
youth councils and led to increased funding for youth programs on the part of 
municipalities, as well as higher levels of governance.117 Also typical for this category 
                                                          
116 See section 3.4.1, page 89, for additional details. 
117 Although at the Cantonal and Federation levels, this occurred with more mixed outcomes. 
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is that these outcomes were possible primarily via KULT’s transactional capacity and 
engagement with political actors, rather than via participatory strategies. However, 
these CSOs do commonly engage participatory capacities by strengthening 
partnership ties to other civil society actors (for example, the local youth CSOs in 
the case of KULT). Such partnership relationships are focused on either building 
horizontal coalitions with other CSOs or fostering interest groups based on the 
articulation of common interests (e.g., local councils of parents or students). In 
addition, these partnerships are often formed with civil society actors from the 
‘representatives’ category (high local/low donor legitimacy).  
These partnerships facilitate the role of these CSOs as intermediaries 
between citizens, the state, and donors. One aspect of this role is in a financial sense, 
meaning the CSOs’ ability to receive donor funds and apply those funds to 
‘addressing everyday needs’ at a local scale. Chapter Three also makes the case that 
after so many years and so many CS strengthening programs, donor resources 
become part of the expected ways of performing advocacy. An example is the 
conference on the “Position and Outlook for Youth” organized in April, 2013 by the 
‘intermediary’ CSO KULT.118 The way KULT organizes such an event, which 
included paid speakers, professional photographers, and catered food, is part of this 
expectation. This approach provides perks and status for state employees and 
diplomatic and media visibility for political actors. This finding does not contradict 
earlier findings that donor efforts are viewed with suspicion (i.e., ‘money laundering’ 
and ‘foreign mercenaries’ discussed above). Rather, such advocacy efforts are 
frequently part of a rather elaborate performance that is accommodated by political 
institutions because of the benefits that institutional participation brings. In this 
context, such trappings are common and expected, and engaging with the 
government around goals and processes initiated by CSOs is very difficult without 
them. Such forms of advocacy can certainly be funded in other ways. Such forms are 
also not caused by donor approaches or funding. But they are enabled by donor 
                                                          
118 See Section 3.4.1, page 89 for a lengthier description of KULT and their advocacy efforts. 
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funding and most commonly occurred when organized by those CSOs that could 
bring donor funding. 
Legitimacy among citizens is an asset to the degree that political actors are 
sensitive to what citizens want and therefore receptive to the CSOs that are 
considered to be legitimate by citizens. These CSOs are able to function as 
‘intermediaries’ when they can bring donor resources and the forms of advocacy 
expected by political actors and described above to advocate for policies that political 
actors perceive will benefit citizens (e.g., ‘solving concrete problems’ as a source of 
local legitimacy). In sum, the ability of these CSOs to combine capacities increases 
their ability to serve as active intermediaries between donors, political actors, and 
citizens. 
6.3 Sub-question #3: How do activists build legitimacy with citizens and 
express civic agency vis-à-vis ethnonationalist politics and CS 
strengthening programs? 
This sub-question turns to the perspectives of activists and their perceptions 
regarding the politics of a divided society and the ‘NGOs’ supported by CS 
strengthening programs. The protests of February-May 2014 were larger and had 
more sustained participation than any protests since Dayton. Moreover, those 
protests were closely connected to plenums in many cities. Plenums are new forms 
of participatory democracy that are open to all citizens on an equal footing. These 
events also sparked public discussion about the (lack of) legitimacy of the protestors 
and plenums. In addition, the activists quite publicly rejected the participation of 
‘NGOs,’ and prominent donor-funded organizations decided not to issue any 
statements of support, fearing that such actions would delegitimize the protests and 
weaken public participation. In short, the protests themselves and their outcomes 
were closely connected to both the legitimacy of civil society actors and the capacities 
available to express civic agency. 
The plenum demands and the activists' discourses from 2014 articulated their ‘social’ 
character, meaning a vision of politics that focused on the state as a provider of socio-
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economic needs and a guarantor of the social rights of all constituents, independent 
of ethnicity. The protesters opposed and actively rejected not only local political 
structures but also attempts to frame the uprising as 'civic' by international actors, as 
well as the involvement of ‘NGOs.’ Chapter Four draws on Gramsci’s 
conceptualization of hegemony to describe the political ‘rules of the game,’ which 
reaches into civil society to shape the options available and manufacture consent in 
addition to exercising coercion. Most concretely, Chapter Four analyzes the struggle 
against the ‘dual hegemony’ of ethnonationalist politics and CS strengthening 
programs using evidence from an analysis of interviews with key activists and plenum 
demands.  
The dual nature of the struggle pertains not only to the diverging ideals of 
the state and society but also to the means used to achieve them. The plenums and 
subsequent local initiatives also aspired to constitute an activist civil society, distinct 
from and challenging its counterparts: elements of civil society that support ethno-
nationalist elites on the one hand and (neo-)liberal, foreign-funded 'professional' CS 
on the other. Moreover, the discourse shows this dual struggle and the resulting 
challenges of articulating an alternative to both the ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ rules of the 
game.  
Scholarly attention placed the protests and plenums in the context of a series 
of moments of activism over several years. A key concern for this literature was the 
potential for the events of 2014 to introduce new forms of struggle, to expand 
conceptualizations of Bosnian politics (politika) that were otherwise mired, as 
described in Chapters Two and Five, in the symbolic discourse of ethnonationalism 
(Arsenijević, 2014; Mujkić, 2016). The focus in this sub-question on activists who 
are often not located within formal CSOs makes three primary contributions 
towards answering the research question. First, the discourse of the activists and 
plenums provided a perspective on citizens’ opinions regarding CSO legitimacy. CS 
actors, such as unions and veterans’ organizations, were described as having low 
legitimacy based on the normative dimension arising from their complicity with the 
political status-quo and division along ethnic lines. In addition, donor-funded CSOs 
were rejected using the label ‘NGO.’ NGOs were rejected based on low instrumental 
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sources of legitimacy (lack of ‘good results’), as well as low normative sources due to 
whose interests are served (not ‘doing the right things’).  
The second contribution to answering the research question is that activists’ 
experiences in 2014 are indicative of the dynamics and possible outcomes of civic 
agency. Namely, the experiences of the non-formal activists tell us about the 
outcomes of contentious politics and participatory capacities more broadly. On this 
question, the outcomes of the 2014 mobilizations and the popular discourse that 
followed support the idea that participatory engagement with the state is rather 
pointless (i.e., fighting against windmills119). This is because although several 
Cantonal governments did resign and a few benefits for elected officials were 
curtailed, the same parties were largely reelected nine months later, and some of the 
few curtailed benefits were even restored later (Center for Investigative Journalism, 
2015). 
Despite these questions among citizens regarding the limited potential of 
participatory mobilization, the findings also have broader implications for civic 
agency in terms of new forms of politika within the context of dual hegemony. The 
rejection of ‘NGOs’ and of the ‘civic’ terminology as the lingua franca of CS 
strengthening programs, together with a rejection of dialogue with political 
institutions, can point to a purist perspective that struggles to build alliances. This 
finding may not be surprising given that activists may be prone to a black and white 
ethics rather than one that accepts compromise and moral ambiguity. Alternatively, 
however, this development can be seen as a turn towards legitimacy with citizens 
given the critical perceptions of citizens regarding both political institutions and 
foreign-supported NGOs.  
The events post-2014 point to the activists’ perceived opportunities to 
legitimate themselves given the dual nature of the struggle. Namely, Chapter Four 
concludes with a discussion of the emergence of ‘local first’ approaches by activists. 
‘Local first’ refers to activist efforts which focus on concrete local issues such as 
opposing a hospital closing, supporting the restarting of a worker-managed factory, 
                                                          
119 See Section 5.5.1, page 142. 
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and restoring unused public spaces. These issues are struggles at a micro scale yet 
which also have broader symbolic meaning and resonance. This development 
accompanied a decrease in the visibility of activist efforts and civic energy at the 
entity and national levels. However, this approach should be understood as a 
pragmatic strategy in response to the dual nature of the struggle. 
6.4 Sub-question #4: Under what conditions can the civic agency of CSOs 
contribute to governance outcomes? 
This sub-question was addressed in Chapter Five using process-tracing data from 
17 advocacy initiatives that were pursued by CSOs with high local legitimacy. The 
focus on those CSOs with high local legitimacy was intended to strengthen the 
analytical focus by holding the variable of local legitimacy constant. In this way, the 
focus also increased the comparability of the CSOs and focused on those with 
potentially greater participatory capacities to mobilize citizens. The CSOs included 
are from both the ‘intermediary’ category (high legitimacy with both citizens and 
donors) and the ‘representatives’ category (high legitimacy with citizens but not 
donors) discussed in Sub-question #2. The analysis focused on the actions taken, 
whether the actions indicated participatory or transactional capacities, and the 
outcomes that were achieved. 
All of the advocacy initiatives that succeeded in their intended outcomes 
showed that CSO actions contributed to some degree. In other words, the research 
found that there is a causal link between the actions of locally legitimate CSOs and 
the outcomes they seek. Moreover, CSOs were also frequently able to achieve their 
desired results. In other words, civic agency frequently led to the desired outcomes, 
and the achieved outcomes were frequently found where there was civic agency. 
These two findings appear to be strong evidence for the potential of civic agency to 
provide alternative (i.e., beyond electoral) channels to represent citizen interests. 
However, Chapter Five also discusses at length the struggle to turn formal outcomes 
into substantive (implemented and funded) outcomes and how the way that 
governance works from the perspective of CSO actors influences this potential. The 
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formal outcomes that were sought (adoption of laws, strategies, and conventions) 
were frequently achieved but became ‘dead letters on a page,’ lacking implementation 
in practice. That chapter turns to the concept of neopatrimonialism to explain these 
discrepancies between formal and substantive outcomes due to the persistence of 
patrimonialist power relations within the formal institutions of democratic 
governance. The ‘dead letters on a page’ image represents the experience of the gap 
between formal state instruments and decisions regarding financial and institutional 
priorities. In addition, CSO actors frequently referred to the conclusion that their 
experience of engagement with state institutions taught them the pointlessness of 
the battle.120 The discrepancy between formal and substantive outcomes and 
experiences of pointless battles constrain civic agency because they lead to 
incremental and limited goals on the part of CSOs regarding what is possible from 
the state. 
The discussion of actions and outcomes under this sub-question contributes 
to answering the research question because despite the constraints on civic agency, 
there are still some CSOs that persist in their engagement with the state. While 
Chapter Three considered a larger group of CSOs and all of the advocacy actions 
they used, Chapter Five considered the subset of locally legitimate case study CSOs 
and focused on which actions contributed to achieving desired outcomes. In the 
studied cases, transactional capacities were found to be more salient than 
participatory capacities, a conclusion that was also supported under sub-question #2. 
In particular, ties with political actors that CSOs developed over multiple 
interactions were found to play a key role. CSO actors describe effective ‘political 
action’ as lobbying that is done in person. Additional common actions that fit into 
transactional capacity include providing training to government staff and convening 
political actors from multiple agencies. This finding supports the formulated 
expectation that transactional capacities can help CSOs to navigate patrimonialism 
and provides empirical detail about the conditions under which transactional 
capacity is developed. Finally, for some of the outcomes that were researched, the 
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civic agency of political actors was observed to play a role. Such reform-oriented 
actors enlisted selected CSOs that they considered to be legitimate as allies, and both 
CS and political actors played a role in the resulting outcomes. 121  
The salience of transactional capacities raises the question of how these 
capacities can be distinguished from the patron-client interactions of 
neopatrimonialist governance. One difference concerns the nature of the benefit 
given by political actors. As a component of civic agency, transactional capacity is 
pursued with the goal of common goods for a group. In contrast, patrimonialism is 
often furthered by personal benefit. This distinction was made by the CS actors 
(both formal and non-formal), who criticized CSO staff who received personal 
financial benefit from the state, arguing that this was how the CSOs became co-
opted and restrained from engaging in autonomous actions (Interviews 12-3-2013, 
11-4-2013). Further, these benefits are part of their public function (e.g., budget 
allocations, regulations) rather than benefits awarded by circumventing the laws and 
regulations that govern these functions (for example, in the common cases of 
clientilism in employment). Finally, the two types of interactions are distinguished 
by the power relations that are indicated. In patrimonial interactions, political actors 
have relatively more power and clients therefore have less ability to reject or negotiate 
what is offered. In contrast, transactional capacity was used to describe moments 
when the studied CSOs demonstrated their power relative to political actors.122 In 
other words, while patronage is more about coercion by political actors, transactional 
capacities are more about persuasion by CSO actors.  
Despite the limitations discussed above (lack of substantive outcomes and 
experiences related to the pointlessness of struggle), some of the studied CSOs have 
persisted in making political claims. This demonstrated civic agency was able to lead 
to formal outcomes, as well as substantive outcomes with much more sustained 
effort. To achieve substantive outcomes, in addition to consistent intentions, 
                                                          
121 Such a broader locus of attention regarding civic agency is supported by the civic agency literature 
(Fowler & Biekart, 2013). 
122 This distinction was made to the degree possible during the process tracing based on the impressions 
of the same moments from the perspectives of CSOs and political actors. 
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persistent and primarily transactional actions based on developing ties with political 
actors were required. This discussion of outcomes provides the last piece of the 
puzzle. The following section will now integrate the sub-questions as a basis for 
findings related to the links between legitimacy, civic agency, and outcomes, as posed 
in the research question. 
6.5 Linking legitimacy and civic agency 
Based on our understanding of the key concepts of legitimacy, civic agency, and 
outcomes provided by the sub-questions, what answers can be given to the following 
research question:  How do the local and donor legitimacy of civil society actors influence 
their civic agency and their outcomes in the presence of donor CS strengthening programs 
in a divided society? The answer is formulated around the three findings that were 
briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and the supporting evidence from 
the chapters. 
The first finding of the dissertation focuses on the civic agency of the three 
categories discussed in sub-question #2: ‘donor darlings’ (legitimate with donors but 
not citizens), ‘representatives’ (legitimate with citizens but not donors) and 
‘intermediaries’ (legitimate with both groups). The finding is that the combined 
effects of local and donor legitimacy explain the potential and limitations of civic 
agency and the outcomes that can be achieved. The ‘combined effects’ in this finding 
refers to the three categories based on variations in levels of local and donor 
legitimacy. The groups of CSOs defined by legitimacy category varied in the 
capacities that they brought to interactions with the state and the outcomes that they 
were able to achieve. The next paragraphs will describe the finding in relation to the 
expectations of the literature on CS strengthening programs. 
First, this finding challenges the ‘legitimacy critique.’123 That is because the 
CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with both donors and citizens provide counterexamples 
to the ‘legitimacy critique.’ Moreover, not only do such CSOs exist, but they are also 
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of interest because they are able to foster broader outcomes. This factor is related to 
the idea that the ability of these CSOs to influence the state is facilitated by donor 
resources. Secondly, political actors are more likely to support CSO goals that are 
considered to be legitimate by citizens, despite the contrary expectations of the 
literature on neopatrimonialism.  
Some of the conclusions of the ‘legitimacy critique’ were also confirmed. The 
‘donor darlings’ that were researched have largely withdrawn from the intention to 
influence state policies. However, the findings suggest caution against applying the 
‘legitimacy critique’ broadly to describe the effects of CS strengthening programs. 
This is because the group of ‘donor darlings’, while certainly prominent, are 
numerically few. They are prominent in terms of the high percentage of donor funds 
that they receive and their resulting visibility. However, because they comprise a 
small percentage of the total number of CSOs, the conclusions of the ‘legitimacy 
critique’ must be modified with respect to the other two categories. 
The finding regarding the importance of the combined effects of local and 
donor legitimacy for civic agency is also relevant in light of the ‘neoliberal critique.’124 
Authors following this critique frequently conclude that donor CS strengthening 
programs favor providing services rather than advocacy (e.g. Harriss, 2001). 
Providing services, however, does not preclude advocacy, but rather services can be 
beneficial together with advocacy in certain circumstances. Namely, the cases 
showed that ‘solving concrete problems,’ often by directly providing services, such as 
domestic violence shelters, were significant for citizens’ perceptions of legitimacy. 
The CSOs in the ‘intermediary’ category were able to combine advocacy and ‘solving 
concrete problems.’ The prevalence of this combination may play a significant role 
in being able to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of donors and citizens, as was argued 
in Chapter Two. 
The finding also questions the logic of the ‘neoliberal critique’ in relation to 
the role of expertise. The technocratic nature of both assistance and the approach 
favored by CSOs is a central part of the critique. In particular, it is control over 
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institutions and communities by outside experts that is viewed as the characteristic 
of such technocratic approaches (Boyte, 2008; Kurki, 2011). However, expertise was 
applied most commonly by the ‘representative’ CSOs with low donor legitimacy. In 
addition, the CSOs that were invited into consultation processes by the state have 
locally rooted forms of expertise.125 These beneficial forms of expertise included 
understanding the language and modes of communication of state bureaucracies and 
understanding the ‘way that the system works.’ This idea notably favored CSO staff 
who were trained in traditional occupations, such as law, social work, and 
medicine.126   
The finding also refers to how the three categories are connected to the 
limitations of civic agency. To sustain outcomes, some of the ‘intermediary’ category 
of CSOs positioned themselves close to the state and limited their degree of critique 
and the scope of issues that they addressed. Their advocacy success in engaging state 
resources leaves them dependent on the state and at times stifles potential 
opposition. For example, one CSO withdrew from a constitutional change initiative 
focused on improving the interests of women of all ethnicities in order to avoid 
jeopardizing the services for domestic violence survivors funded by hard-won state 
funding. They were concerned that the connection to the contested state would 
negatively affect their ability to receive funding from the ruling Serb parties in the 
RS. Their success in advocacy meant that they were in the position to weigh the 
common good of domestic violence survivors against broader but less tangible 
common goods.  
A second dynamic regarding ‘intermediary’ CSOs can be viewed as an 
opportunity or a limitation depending on the point of view. Namely, at times, CSOs 
took on roles such as coordinating multiple state institutions that the state itself 
might be expected to play. For example, the women’s CSO United Women127 
convened multiple state agencies, which was successful in leading to the creation of 
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126 These are traditional professional qualifications based on the metric that they existed during the 
socialist era. 
127 See section 5.5.2, page 146, for more details. 
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official regulations for domestic violence shelters. On the one hand, this is a 
pragmatic approach that led to results. However, at the same time, in this way 
‘intermediate’ CSOs can enable state dysfunction, rather than call for responsibility 
to follow the law. 
The key weakness of the ‘representative’ category is that their civic agency 
was largely limited to invitations issued by the state, such as invitations to participate 
in consultations which were open for all CSOs. The CSOs in this category used 
participation (including protest and participation in consultations) more commonly 
than the other categories, but their agency was largely limited to these ‘invited spaces’ 
(Gaventa, 2006). Finally, the civic agency of ‘donor darlings’ was shown to be limited 
by their acquiescence to the limitations of neopatrimonialist governance. 
Acquiescence refers to either an acceptance of unimplemented formal outcomes or a 
retreat from advocacy due to its lack of efficacy. Their lack of legitimacy with citizens 
appears to play a role in this development because political actors paid attention to 
indicators of the (lack of) support by citizens.  
The second finding addresses how civic agency influences processes of 
legitimation.128 For example, the answer to sub-question #1 presented evidence that 
‘ambiguous ethnicness’ is often a successful technique of legitimation given different 
expectations on the part of citizens, donors, and the state. ‘Ambiguous ethnicness’ 
supports the second finding, that civil society actors exhibit civic agency through the 
innovative and strategic ways in which they legitimate themselves towards both 
ethnic divides and CS strengthening programs.  
This finding refers to ways in which both CSOs and activists respond to this 
‘dual hegemony’ that was created by ethnic division and donor programs. It is shown, 
for example, in the adoption of ‘local first’ strategies by activists following the 2014 
protests and plenums. ‘Local first,’ as presented in Chapter Four, describes locally 
rooted struggles but with broader symbolic meaning (for example, the struggle to re-
open the DITA factory in Tuzla and the struggles against a hospital closing in 
Sarajevo and a hydropower plant on the Una River). This approach is a legitimation 
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strategy due to the way that it builds on citizens’ concerns and strengthens legitimacy 
by ‘solving concrete problems.’ It is strategic in its focus on local-level problems in 
contrast to activism that is focused on challenging ethnic-based division directly 
(e.g., the ‘babylution’ protests of 2013). 
A final strategy that supports this finding is the fostering of ‘straddler’ 
institutions with both CS and state characteristics. One such case that was discussed 
at several points is youth councils. Youth councils are a legitimation strategy on the 
part of the researched CSO KULT that created them and successfully lobbied to 
have them included in laws on youth. As described in Chapter Three, the 
combination of CS and state characteristics of ‘straddler’ institutions are a 
legitimation strategy given political actors’ objections that providing support for 
CSOs’ activities means picking favorites, while they are tasked with representing the 
broad public interest. Domestic violence shelters were also established as state-
funded and -regulated but CSO-implemented institutions. The ‘straddler’ 
institutions are legitimated by a legal mandate and state funding while also using the 
‘moral voice’ and ‘doing the right things’ legitimacy provided by CSOs. 
The legitimation strategies described above are of interest given the 
predominance of anti-politics, a stance that favors withdrawing from contact with 
political actors and institutions. Chapter Four on activists discussed the echoes of 
anti-politics even amid the protests and plenums with very political goals. Anti-
politics has been used in the literature on Bosnian women’s CSOs as a legitimation 
strategy based on ‘moral purity’ (Helms, 2014).129  The alternative legitimation 
strategies to anti-politics described above are of interest because they allow more 
space for civic agency by breaking down the divides between society and politics, 
which are maintained and reinforced by anti-politics. 
The empirical findings tell us about the ways that activist CS actors and 
CSOs show civic agency. In doing so, the distinction between participative and 
transactional capacities has been applied quite extensively. These abstractions are 
used to describe two quite different logics concerning how to influence the state – 
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whether it is by mobilizing citizens (participation) or via ties to political actors 
(transactional capacities). The third finding is that transactional capacities with 
political actors are more salient than participatory capacities with citizens in 
explaining the link between civic agency and outcomes. 
Justifying this finding will require revisiting several elements of the answers 
to the sub-questions. The limited potential of participatory capacities was 
demonstrated by the ‘representative’ CSOs, which were described in sub-question 
#2. Given their legitimacy among citizens but not donors, it is not surprising that 
these CSOs used participatory actions more often. These actions included using 
protest as a means of power and a substantive threat, but also as a means that they 
viewed as having mixed efficacy at best. The investigated CSOs were hesitant to use 
protest without first securing support from other CSOs. This decision is based on 
pragmatic calculations (i.e., the idea that success is more likely with wider support, 
while legitimation of the CSO based on its results would be weakened by the failure 
to achieve the desired goals).  
The activist expressions of civic agency that were described in Chapter Four 
were also focused on participatory capacity via contentious politics and the 
egalitarian participatory model of the plenums, while rejecting communication or 
negotiation with political structures. The outcomes of these actions that included 
numerous government resignations, however, turned out to be formal but not 
substantive. Although the potential of future participatory mobilizations remains 
unknown, the hope that such an uprising will bring new policies and a new politics 
(for example in Mujanović, 2017) must reckon with the empirical reality that the 
potential of participation was weakened rather than strengthened in the public 
discourse, which largely referred to the events of 2014 as being without results.130 As 
discussed in Chapter Five, substantive outcomes were also quite rare for CSOs and 
happened in cases of persistent CSO engagement over years or even a decade. CS 
actors’ skepticism about the results of participatory capacities may thus be caused by 
                                                          
130 For example, performance artist Damir Nikšić received attention and 8,420 views with a video arguing 
that democratic change would be built not on the freewheeling participation of the plenums but by 
alternative candidates putting themselves forward (Nikšić, 2014). 
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the fact that such sustained engagement is difficult for non-formal actors based on 
voluntary engagement. In addition, the potential of broad protests may remain 
limited as long as such protests adopt the echoes of ‘anti-politics,’ as when the 2014 
actors rejected potential alliances (with either ‘NGOs’ or established actors, such as 
unions or veterans), as well as any contact with political parties, political actors or 
institutions.  
Finally, this research provided ample evidence that the lessons learned from 
participation, particularly by the ‘representative’ CSOs, is not that this approach 
works but that it does not work, echoing the public discourse following the activist 
mobilizations of 2014. Participation also commonly included participation in 
government consultations and building alliances with other CSOs. However, the 
space for participation via consultation was narrow, and participation opportunities 
were either pro-forma or required sustained engagement with bureaucratic and slow-
moving state institutions and rules. The same ‘representative’ CSOs also focused on 
fostering legitimacy with state actors based on developing expertise, supporting the 
salience of transactional capacities, which will be discussed next. 
As described under sub-question #4, transactional capacities were more 
salient in the CSO case studies than participatory capacities for achieving the desired 
outcomes. This finding regarding the salience of transactional capacities is based on 
the perceptions of the CSO actors who were interviewed and the process tracing to 
determine what led to given outcomes. This finding may be because CSOs perceived 
that more collaborative approaches to the state are more conducive to getting results 
than confrontational approaches.131 Despite the differences in advocacy actions, 
there was strong support across all of the legitimacy categories for the idea that what 
makes a difference in influencing the state is direct engagement.  
6.6 Implications for the literature 
This section turns from presenting the findings to covering the second major task of 
the conclusion, describing the contributions of the dissertation for theoretical 
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debates. The primary contribution concerns the intersection between civil society 
and divided societies theories, particularly the benefit of civic agency in this regard. 
Although theoretical frameworks for analyzing civil society in divided societies apply 
binary categories regarding their orientation towards ethnic cleavages (i.e., 
bonding/bridging, inclusive/exclusive Belloni, 2008; Putnam, 2000), civic agency is 
relevant in the way that many CSOs engage in ‘ambiguous ethnicness’. A 
contribution is also made to the literature on activism in divided societies by the 
framing and description of ‘dual hegemony’ and how it helps to explain the strategies 
adopted and their potential to challenge the status quo. In addition, this work added 
analytical substance to the civic agency concept and tested its utility by applying it to 
both heterogeneous CSOs and non-formal activism. By doing so, the limits on the 
potential for civic agency to strengthen cross-cutting identities are also identified. 
The second area of contribution is to further legitimacy theory through its 
application to the concrete case of CSOs in Bosnia. The contribution here is 
identifying strategies commonly used by CS actors to legitimate themselves (i.e. 
‘ambiguous ethnicness’, ‘straddler’ CSO-state institutions and ‘local first’). The third 
contribution concerns the benefit of the findings regarding civic agency for 
theoretical debates regarding ‘local agency’ and the ‘local turn’ within IR theory of 
liberal peace interventions. This section concludes by presenting the argument for 
the generalizability of the findings in other divided societies with CS strengthening 
programs. 
The first contribution is to question the way that CSOs in divided societies 
have been categorized as representing either bonding or bridging social capital in one 
framework and based on their ‘inclusivity’ and ‘civilness’ in another. What is not 
accounted for in these frameworks is that many CSOs use ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ – 
an approach and strategy that has not previously been described in academic studies. 
The concept of ethnicness was introduced to describe the mono-ethnic or multi-
ethnic character of CSOs because it is more precise than ‘ascriptive identity’ or the 
bonding/bridging distinction, which also have other meanings. Ethnicness is useful 
for focusing on the characteristic that is theorized to be salient for the influence of 
CSOs on wider society and on governance in a divided society. In the detailed 
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descriptions of ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ in practice, the dissertation has moved beyond 
a previous focus on extreme cases, which have analyzed a few influential but 
polarizing ethnic CSOs (e.g., Belloni, 2009; Paffenholz, 2010b; Richmond, 2006). 
Instead, this work illustrates the often blurry boundary between mono-ethnic and 
multi-ethnic organizations. As a result, the contribution of ethnicness for explaining 
why few CSOs have both local and donor legitimacy from some divided societies 
(e.g., Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 2014) may not apply more generally. This also 
meant that the expectation that ethnicness could explain why many CSOs are 
legitimate for either local actors or donors but not both was not confirmed, because 
it was difficult to identify CSOs that fit the categories of mono-ethnic or multi-
ethnic. 
Civil society in divided societies is also discussed in Chapter Four on activism. 
The major contribution on this point is in relation to literature that examines the 
struggle for new understandings of politics (viewed through an analysis of the 
Bosnian concept politika) focused around common interests rather than symbolic 
ethnonationalist politics. In contrast to the literature that emphasizes the economic 
struggle against ethnic elites (e.g., Arsenijević, 2014; Mujkić, 2016), this work shows 
the benefit of applying a Gramscian understanding of hegemony. For example, the 
hegemony of ethnonationalism is also reflected in the stance of anti-politics on the 
part of activists and citizens which influenced the protests and plenums despite the 
many ways that these actions at the same time were quite explicitly oriented towards 
political change. In contrast, the CS strengthening literature has emphasized the 
ways that these programs constrain the opportunities available to activists by their 
focus on NGOization, professionalization, and apolitical approaches (Bebbington et 
al., 2008; Pouligny, 2005). This dissertation provides evidence that activists 
position themselves against the dual hegemony of ethnonationalist politics and CS 
strengthening programs which makes challenging the status quo more difficult 
from the perspective of the activists.  
This dissertation also contributes to the literature on civic agency due to its 
operationalization of the term (focused on goals, capacities, and actions) and its 
systematic application to heterogeneous CSOs. By applying civic agency as an 
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analytical framework, this research contributes through descriptions of how 
organizations adapt their strategies based on their experiences of their efficacy. To 
name one example, the ‘representatives’ (high local, low donor legitimacy) have 
adopted a stance critical of broad, rights-based frameworks based on the experience 
that such frameworks are rarely implemented. Instead, such CSOs focus on 
incrementalist approaches. The literature on civic agency is furthered by the 
investigation of the outcomes of CS action and the description of the resulting shifts.  
This dissertation aimed to consider the potential of civic agency as a theory 
of change for divided societies. Namely, the work tested whether the theorized 
common interest and solidarity of cross-cutting identities was in fact applied to 
strengthen the salience of these identities rather than ethnic ones (Heilman & 
Kaiser, 2002; Nagle & Clancy, 2012). The findings largely do not support this 
potential. CSOs certainly did engage citizens in actions with the goal of 
strengthening cross-cutting identities in the categories of women, youth, and social 
welfare. Activists also appealed to common interests and attempted to strengthen a 
‘citizen’ identity. But attempts of multi-ethnic mobilization also quickly encounter 
the structural limits established by the predominant ethnic nature of politics, 
ethnically-defined polities, 132 and the governance outcomes that are possible.  
An illustrative example of these limits are the youth councils which were 
designed to represent the voices of youth in a way that follows the cross-cutting 
identities thesis. While many functioned well at the municipal level, progressively 
higher levels (Cantonal, entity, national) were subject either to control by political 
parties or were not able to be formed due to political opposition. Ethnonationalist 
parties actively opposed the establishment of such mechanisms which have the 
potential to increase the salience of cross-cutting identities. CS actors at times also 
had to choose between emphasizing multi-ethnic appeals and goals and a pragmatic 
civic agency that worked within given ethnic lines. An example of this is the 
intermediary CSOs from the earlier example whose successful but tenuous outcomes 
                                                          
132 See discussion in Section 2.5.3, page 69, on ethnoterritorialism and a list of such polities in BiH. 
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meant that they had to balance the common good of domestic violence survivors 
against broader common goods. 
The second contribution concerns the theoretical understanding of how 
CSOs come to be considered legitimate. Despite increasing references to legitimacy 
in the literature, these different sources have not been analyzed extensively. The table 
on sources of legitimacy (1-1) integrated the theory and was used to guide this 
research. This approach resulted in a survey instrument that was used with CSO 
constituencies and is available for future research in this and other contexts.133 
Although legitimacy resides in the perceptions of others, the empirical material has 
illuminated strategies (‘ambiguous ethnicness,’ ‘straddler’ CS-state structures, and 
‘local first’ activism) that are used by CSOs that are engaged in legitimation 
processes. Legitimacy, then, is not just an abstract theoretical concept but was 
observed as an active focus of CS actors and how they attempt to shape perceptions 
to gain support from those around them. Further, understanding the variations in 
CSO legitimacy matters because legitimacy was found to be linked to different forms 
of civic agency and to the ability of CSOs to engage in pluralistic ways and achieve 
outcomes. 
The third contribution concerns the literature on liberal peace interventions, 
which has increasingly emphasized the way that actors in countries that ‘host’ post-
war foreign interventions play an active role in shaping governance. This literature 
has emphasized local agency and the ‘hybridity’ that results from the meeting of 
indigenous and external discourses, actors and political projects (Mac Ginty, 2010b; 
Millar, 2014; Richmond, 2010). A key debate is the locus of local agency – whose 
agency is of interest, which forms of agency matter, and what is its relationship to 
peace interventions and the state. The findings in this dissertation have implications 
for three approaches to understanding local agency in the literature. The 
contributions towards this literature are to provide empirical detail regarding the 
relevance of the micro scale for grassroots perspectives (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 
2013; Pogodda & Richmond, 2015), the power relations created by both foreign 
                                                          
133 See Appendix A. 
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programs and local governance within theory of emancipatory approaches to 
peacebuilding (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015), and transactional capacity for 
struggles that lead to the development of legitimate institutions (Mac Ginty & 
Richmond, 2013).  
The research first emphasizes the importance of attention to the micro scale, 
such as community centers, within the consideration of local agency. Such micro 
scale spaces helped CSOs show that they ‘solve concrete problems’ and therefore 
establish their local legitimacy. The implication is not that what merits attention is 
only micro scale actions but rather that CSOs can use micro scale actions to 
strengthen local legitimacy as a resource for advocacy, particularly for CSOs in the 
‘intermediaries’ category. ‘Local first’ strategies used by activists also focus on the 
micro scale as a possible beginning point for civic agency. As argued in the answer 
to sub-question #3, these actions merit attention not because of their micro scale per 
se, but for their potential to be ‘local first’ and point the way towards ongoing civic 
agency with potentially broader goals. In this way, the work addresses grassroots and 
small-scale perspectives on local agency (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Pogodda 
& Richmond, 2015) but suggests that they have more potential than suggested by 
the characterization as ‘hidden agency’ (Richmond, 2011). 
In the literature on emancipatory approaches to peacebuilding, local agency 
as resistance to the interventions is central (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). Resistance 
is shown in the agency of citizens regarding the ‘donor darlings’ (low local, high 
donor) and their suspicion about the ultimate beneficiaries and the financial integrity 
of donor-supported CSOs, contributing to their low local legitimacy.  However, the 
findings also show how CSOs appropriate donor support and adjust to the 
expectations that donor programs create on the part of political actors. The 
implication is that the study of resistance and potential emancipation must consider 
the power relations created by both foreign programs and local governance, as 
described by the ‘dual hegemony’ framing. This conclusion is supported by the 
finding that it is the agency of the intermediaries (high local, high donor) that is of 
the highest interest because such CSOs are best able to balance the interests of 
donors, citizens, and the state, leading to the most substantive outcomes. 
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The final perspective concerns local agency as a focus on the struggles that 
lead to legitimate institutions based on local-international mixture of identities, 
norms, and practices (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). The findings contribute to 
this understanding of local agency by offering empirical data on the emergence of 
agency vis-à-vis the state based on the perceptions of civil society actors about the 
state and about the potential of democratic governance. The findings provide insight 
into this struggle in the discussion of the outcomes that are possible and the 
importance of transactional capacity in this process. This concept argues for 
attention to the ways that local agency is influenced by proximity and cooperation 
with the state.  
6.6.1 Generalizability 
The following paragraphs will discuss the generalizability of the findings and the 
limitations of the study in this regard. First, three focus areas (women, youth, and 
social welfare) based in three cities provided diversity in order to strengthen 
generalizability for CSOs in BiH. The cities are situated in both Bosnian entities 
(RS and Federation) with varied ethnic compositions, thus mitigating bias based on 
resulting differences in attitudes regarding CSOs, donor support, and governance, 
as well as institutional differences. In addition, diverse CSOs were also sampled by 
selecting CSOs both with and without ethnic identifications. A limitation is that the 
focus areas may have influenced the findings because they are of particular interest 
to donors. As a result, there may be additional factors that determine the applicability 
of the findings to other potential cross-cutting identities, particularly those of less 
interest to donors and more enmeshed in neopatrimonial governance (e.g., unions, 
veterans). 
The findings may be generalizable for a wider group of divided societies with 
donor CS strengthening programs. Table 6-1 lists countries featuring a combination 
of ethnic division, democratic governance, and being recipients of donor aid. Ethnic 
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division is considered by using an index of ethnic fractionalization.134 Ethnic 
fractionalization captures the number and relative size of ethnic groups, and higher 
values represent greater potential for salient social divisions along ethnic lines. 
Democratic governance is included as a factor because the definition used for divided 
societies refers to the salient role of ethnicity in electoral (i.e., democratic) politics.135 
In addition, the literature on CSO roles as alternative channels for representing 
interests (Diamond, 1994; White, 2004), and facilitating and enhancing collective 
action (Ostrom, 2015) are also based on the assumption of democratic governance. 
Finally, the overall level of donor aid per capita is used as a proxy for the amount of 
support to civil society (following Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
2012). 
The generalizability of the findings to the other divided societies with donor 
CS strengthening programs that are listed in Table 6-1 is based on the argument 
that the presence of ethnic politics and CS strengthening programs lead to similar 
possibilities and limitations for civic agency. Each of the countries listed has a degree 
of ethnic division as measured by ethnic fractionalization as high as Bosnia. The 
degree of ethnic division has been found to affect governance outcomes by reducing 
                                                          
134 Ethnic fractionalization (selected if >=0.6) and ethnic-religious cross-cuttingness from (Selway, 2014). 
Low values of ethnic-religious cross-cuttingness indicate that religion is rarely cross-cutting with 
ethnicity. Governance (selected if >=5 indicating democratic governance) from (Center for Systemic 
Peace, 2017).  Net official development aid received per capita (selected if >0) is the yearly average in 
current US$ for 2010-2015 (World Bank, 2017). The following countries were eliminated based on a 
review of the empirical literature, which found few or no ethnic parties: Ghana (Elischer, 2013), Mali 
(Basedau & Stroh, 2009; Vengroff, 1993), Paraguay (Chandra, 2011), Burkino Faso and Niger (Basedau 
& Stroh, 2009). In addition, some ethnic or religious parties have been banned in Nigeria and Zambia 
(Becher & Basedau, 2008) and Indonesia (Hillman, 2012). 
135 Low ethnic fractionalization ‘is a key factor for the formation of nonethnic parties’ (Elischer, 2013, p. 
9). However, a measurement of the number and relative size of politically relevant ethnic groups was only 
identified for African countries (Posner, 2004). However, the reliance on ethnic fractionalization may pay 
too much attention to only ethnic cleavages in society (Selway, 2011b). What may matter more is whether 
ethnic divisions overlap or rather are cross-cutting with religious, linguistic, geographic, or income 
cleavages.  
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Table 6-1. Divided societies with donor programs 
Country 
Ethnic 
Fractionali-
zation 
Ethnic-
Religious 
Cross-
Cuttingness 
Governance 
(Polity IV) 
Donor aid 
per capita 
(USD) 
Belize  0.613  0.444  NA 95  
Benin  0.793  0.311  7  58  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina  
0.600  0.090  NA136 149 
Ethiopia  0.755  0.455  NA 37  
India  0.818  0.565  9  2  
Indonesia  0.623  0.581  9  0.1  
Kenya  0.898  0.240  9  61  
Liberia  0.891  NA 6  172  
Malawi  0.600  0.376  6  61  
Mauritius  0.695  0.430  10  100 
Mozambique  0.845  0.263  5  79  
Namibia  0.704  0.384  6  101  
Nepal  0.777  NA 6  33  
Nigeria  0.828  0.254  7  13  
Philippines  0.794  0.559  8  2  
Senegal  0.658  0.627  7  73  
South Africa  0.780  0.343  9  23  
Tunisia  0.626  NA 7  74  
Zambia  0.827  0.346  6  65  
 
                                                          
136 The Polity IV database categorizes Bosnian governance as ‘foreign “interruption”’, although as noted 
in the introduction, active (i.e., non-diplomatic) international intervention in Bosnian politics ended in 
2006 (Center for Systemic Peace, 2017). 
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the provision of public goods, a statement characterized as among ‘the most powerful 
theses of political economy’ (Banjeree, Iyer, & Somanthan, 2005). In addition, not 
only are ethnic differences present in these countries but politics based on ethnicity 
is also present in each as in Bosnia. Since donors invested the second highest amount 
per capita of the 19 countries listed in Bosnia, the effects of CS strengthening 
programs may be more pronounced, making Bosnia an instructive case. The 
empirical research on such programs has found that they have broad effects on the 
structure of CSOs (e.g., professionalization, service provision focus) and establish 
‘constraints, transmitted to them through funding decisions and the ever more 
constraining conditionalities linked to them’ (Bebbington et al., 2008, p. 4). In 
addition, donor programs have been found to follow similar modalities and create 
similar organizational characteristics despite operating in diverse contexts (Kamstra 
& Schulpen, 2015). If such programs did not foster effective CSO advocates and 
activists within CS in Bosnia with very high levels of financing, they are therefore 
also not likely to have succeeded in similar goals in other contexts with lower levels. 
The following paragraphs will consider the evidence for such a broader relevance of 
each of the findings. 
Let us begin from the finding that transactional capacities with political 
actors are more salient than participatory capacities with citizens in explaining the 
link between civic agency and desired outcomes.  This finding may be relevant for 
the broader category because of the neopatrimonialist character of governance in 
Bosnia. That is, neopatrimonialist governance favors the logic of using ties with 
political actors rather than participatory mobilization of citizens in order to achieve 
governance outcomes. Neopatrimonialist governance has also been quite extensively 
applied to describe governance in many of the cases listed in Table 6-1 (Bach & 
Gazibo, 2012; Kraft, Al-Mazri, Wimmen, & Zupan, 2008; Zürcher, 2011). The 
salience of transactional capacity is also suggested in Handmaker’s (2009) account of 
civic-state interactions in newly democratic South Africa, which emphasized the 
importance of social distance137 between civil society and state actors as a strategic 
                                                          
137 Social distance was determined by ‘divergences in interests, meanings and political positions, or the 
externally grounded reasons for participating in a given civic-state interaction’ (Handmaker, 2009, p. 205). 
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factor that influenced their civic agency and its outcomes.  Finally, there is also 
reason to think that as in Bosnia, donor support can also enable transactional 
capacities. For example, donor-supported organizations in the divided societies of 
Indonesia and Ghana are highly likely to engage in institutional advocacy but not 
protest (Kamstra, Knippenberg, & Schulpen, 2013). CSOs reported that within 
these non-confrontational strategies, ‘the best guarantee for getting access and being 
heard is having informal contacts’ (Kamstra et al., 2013, p. 10).  
The finding that civic agency is expressed through the innovative and 
strategic ways that CSOs seek to legitimate themselves in relation to both ethnic 
divides and CS strengthening programs is based on the argument that these two 
characteristics shape the opportunities available for the expression of civic agency. 
As in Bosnia, the predominant organization of politics on the basis of ethnicity in 
other divided societies could contribute to the adoption of an approach of anti-
politics among both CSOs and non-formal activists in order to be seen as legitimate. 
For example, anti-political approaches have been described in youth CSOs in 
Lebanon (Bortolazzi, 2013). However, anti-politics has been commonly ascribed as 
a result of the politics of donor programs (Büscher, 2010; Deacon & Stubbs, 1998; 
Ferguson, 1990; W. F. Fisher, 1997). In contrast, this dissertation has provided 
evidence that a stance of anti-politics is also an approach adopted by both CSOs and 
activists as a strategy to gain legitimacy among skeptical citizens. Continued 
exploration of the ‘local turn’ calls for more research into how CSOs align their 
politics not only to seek support from donors but also to seek support from their local 
constituencies.  
The review of literature on CS in divided societies138 described two 
predominant frameworks which focus on characterizing CSOs based on either 
bonding or bridging social capital and based on their degree of inclusiveness and 
civic character. ‘Ambiguous ethnicness’ as a form of legitimation has not previously 
been described in the academic literature. The argument for its relevance is that it is 
ambiguity which enables CSOs to manage contrasting expectations that citizens, the 
                                                          
138 See Section 1.2.2, page 19. 
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state, and donors have regarding the orientation of CSOs towards ethnic politics. 
Finally, there is also support for the wider applicability of the emergent literature on 
an approach focused on ‘straddler’ organizations with both CS and state 
characteristics (Read, 2009). Empirical research in the divided society of Indonesia 
found that ‘straddler’ CSOs ‘offer a way for NGOs to collaborate with the state in 
the achievement of development objectives’ and that there is ‘considerable promise 
in such arrangements’ (Yumasdaleni & Jakimow, 2017, p. 1015). There is thus a 
basis for the conclusion that CS actors also use strategies such as anti-politics, 
‘ambiguous ethnicness’ and fostering ‘straddler’ CSOs in order to legitimate 
themselves in other divided societies with CS strengthening programs. 
The final finding was that the combined effects of local and donor legitimacy 
explain the potential and limitations of the civic agency of CSOs and the outcomes 
that can be achieved. The literature of the ‘legitimacy critique’ (e.g., Bebbington et 
al., 2008; Howell & Pearce, 2001a; Pouligny, 2006) and the ‘neoliberal critique’ (e.g., 
Harriss, 2001) have made rather universal claims about the effects of donor CS 
strengthening programs. This dissertation has argued based on evidence from Bosnia 
that these conclusions do not apply in all cases of donor support and present evidence 
for the conditions under which they do and do not apply. This finding refers first of 
all to the unrecognized potential of CSOs that enjoy legitimacy with citizens and 
donors to serve as intermediaries between donors, citizens and the state. A more 
general relevance of this finding is supported by the presence and reported potential 
of NGOs that are engaged at the local level and that balance donor funding with 
funding by and engagement with the state in divided Indonesia (Yumasdaleni & 
Jakimow, 2017). The findings concerning the ‘donor darlings’ (low local, high 
donor), including that they have often withdrawn from advocacy, may also apply 
more generally because they do fit the conclusions of the ‘legitimacy critique’ 
regarding the connection between low local legitimacy and being weak advocates. 
Finally, the findings regarding the ‘representatives’ (high local, low donor) were that 
they engage participatory capacities more often but are often limited to ‘invited 
spaces’ with fewer outcomes. This finding may apply more generally based on the 
presence of neopatrimonialist governance cited earlier and the way that CS 
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strengthening programs similarly influence the expectations regarding advocacy on 
the part of political actors. 
This section on the scientific contributions of the dissertation can be 
summarized in four main points. First, that civic agency has utility for understanding 
CS in a divided society because its application shows that many CSOs use 
‘ambiguous ethnicness’ which illustrates the often blurry boundary between 
theorized mono-ethnic and multi-ethnic categories. Secondly, ‘ambiguous 
ethnicness’ is one of a group of strategies that includes ‘straddler CSOs’, and ‘local 
first’ approaches that indicate how some CSOs strive to legitimate themselves within 
the expectations established by donors, political actors, and citizens. The third 
contribution concerns the benefit of civic agency to theoretical debates regarding 
‘local agency’ and the ‘local turn’ within IR theory of liberal peace interventions. This 
section then concluded by presenting an argument for the relevance of the three 
findings for the broader category of divided societies with donor CS strengthening 
programs. 
6.7 Methodological reflection 
This section will address the contributions of the dissertation to methodology and 
its limitations. It will also discuss the questions that arose regarding methodology 
during the research process and what lessons were learned as a result. First, the 
dissertation developed a new methodology for assessing CSO legitimacy. Previous 
efforts have focused on qualitative approaches to CSOs as a group (Grødeland, 2006; 
Pickering, 2006), a few key informants (Hemmer, 2009) and population surveys of 
their opinions of selected CSOs (Seibert, 2010). In contrast, for this research, more 
people from different perspectives (donors, political actors, and diverse CS actors) 
were interviewed, and similar CSOs (in terms of focus area, urban context) were 
selected based on legitimacy categories, which were then compared. This 
methodology included a framework for coding the sources of CSO legitimacy (i.e., 
the reasons why a particular subject considers a given CSO to be legitimate). This 
framework, which was based on previous theory and empirical research, enabled 
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consistent coding of key informant interviews. In addition, a questionnaire was 
developed based on the same framework and administered to CSO constituents. The 
questionnaire provides a tool for comparison between individual CSOs and diverse 
contexts, enabling future quantitative research projects on CSO legitimacy in other 
contexts. 
Secondly, the methodology enabled selecting cases that most clearly 
represented the theoretical legitimacy categories (i.e., theoretical sampling). This 
approach was possible due to the systematic application of the mixed methods 
described above that combined qualitative (i.e., coding semi-structured interviews 
with key informants) and quantitative approaches (i.e., constituency survey, 
indicators) to CSO legitimacy. This methodology addresses the subjective and 
intersubjective character of legitimacy better than the alternatives described above. 
This is first because the methodology focuses on assessments of the legitimacy of a 
particular CSO. Second, this approach does so without presupposing what 
legitimacy means but rather also collecting data concerning why a given CSO was 
considered to be legitimate by each of the interlocutors. As important, by collecting 
information from individuals with different roles vis-à-vis a given CSO (e.g., CSO 
staff, partner organizations, political actors, and constituents), this approach 
addresses the intersubjective nature of legitimacy (i.e., that common assessments of 
legitimacy are  constructed and negotiated based on actors’ individual opinions 
regarding a given CSO). Potential bias resulting from the selection of key informants 
was addressed by contacting multiple key informants from a given role where 
possible and confirming the resulting assessments using objective indicators. An 
additional potential source of bias is the fact that having an opinion of a given CSO’s 
legitimacy depends on a key informant having sufficient information about that 
CSO. This bias was mitigated by the careful selection of key informants with 
extensive information and experience in working with CSOs. 
However, this approach was limited in that it did not attempt to measure the 
size of each category or the degree of legitimacy for each CSO. Such measurements 
were not possible because no comprehensive sources of legitimacy indicators (e.g., 
number of members and volunteers, voluntary contributions, state and donor 
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funding) were identified, nor could the sources that were identified be combined to 
create a comprehensive database of legitimacy indicators. Numerous CSOs were not 
selected as case studies because there were contradictory indications regarding their 
legitimacy for a given audience. While this decision was made to sharpen the 
theoretical insight resulting from the legitimacy categories, further systematic 
research may reveal that many CSOs can be found along scales between high and 
low legitimacy for citizens, political actors, and international donors.  
The research provides insight about whether the perspectives of political 
actors should be included within local legitimacy. Political actors were included with 
the key informants, and their views of CSO legitimacy were analyzed separately (See 
Appendix B). CSOs that are legitimate among political actors were observed to be 
more able to achieve desired outcomes, as discussed under sub-question #4. 
However, legitimacy with political actors cannot be observed independently of power 
relations. While obedient and accepted (podobne) CSOs may be reported as more 
legitimate by political actors, this dynamic could bias the results regarding civic 
agency and its outcomes. This is because such CSOs may to an observer appear to 
have achieved outcomes and demonstrated civic agency, but in fact such outcomes 
may represent the agency of the political actors and in this way conform to rather 
than challenge patrimonialism. For these reasons, Chapter Three focused more 
narrowly on legitimacy among citizens rather than local legitimacy. These questions 
were mitigated by selecting CSOs based on multiple reports and consistent 
indicators of legitimacy, based on an intersubjective understanding of legitimacy. In 
addition, CSOs were selected only if they had legitimacy with citizens. 
Civic agency was defined and operationalized for this research based on goals, 
capacities, and actions, which is more specific and reproducible than in previous 
research. The list of common advocacy actions (strategies) developed from this work 
and presented in Chapter Three provides more specificity to discussions of CSO 
advocacy by including how advocacy happens. The frequency of these advocacy 
strategies as used to address sub-question #3 provided a statistical method for 
drawing conclusions about the legitimacy categories. In this way, the methodology 
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regarding civic agency strengthened the inference necessary to answer the research 
question.  
In addition, the research furthered methodology regarding CSOs in divided 
societies by developing a tool for assessing CSO ethnicness (See Appendix C). This 
tool is based on the ethnic composition of members, beneficiaries, and staff, as well 
as perceptions regarding ethnic identification, inclusive/divisive ideological 
identifications and identification with monoethnic or multiethnic territories. This 
approach to ethnicness has more general relevance for CSOs in divided societies. 
Unexpectedly, this effort to operationalize the ethnic character of CSOs in divided 
societies led to the conclusion that many of the CSOs researched indicated 
‘ambiguous ethnicness.’ The tool for assessing ethnicness and the concept of 
‘ambiguous ethnicness’ is available for other researchers working on CSOs in divided 
societies.139  
The final topic for this methodological reflection is to consider the influence 
of the background of the researcher as a foreigner, who had, at the beginning of the 
research process, over a decade of experience living in Bosnia and the resulting 
linguistic and cultural knowledge. This background facilitated the research process 
because it enabled direct communication with and access to a wide range of 
interlocutors. This local knowledge was a factor in the methodology because 
legitimacy is socially desirable, while financial and personal interests that may 
mitigate or explain statements regarding legitimacy are often hidden. These two 
factors can motivate the bias of interlocutors and provide reasons for dissembling or 
ambiguity. Understanding these indirect cues strengthens the conclusions that were 
drawn but at times made it difficult to provide objective evidence for the conclusions. 
The methodology inevitably relied on assessments of the interlocutors’ credibility, 
which was aided by contextual knowledge but also subject to the researchers’ bias. 
This subjectivity was mitigated by seeking confirmation from multiple sources 
wherever possible during the research process. One additional potential source of 
bias was the fact that the researcher had engaged with CSOs in BiH in roles as a 
                                                          
139 See Section 6.6 Implications for the literature for relevant references. 
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practitioner and donor. This bias was limited by only selecting CSOs with which the 
researcher had not previously worked directly.  
This section has described how this research contributed to methodology in 
its approach and operationalization of the concepts of ethnicness, CSO legitimacy, 
and civic agency. A key innovation was developing a framing for coding varied 
reasons why a CSO may be considered legitimate and a questionnaire that is 
available as a tool for use in other contexts. In addition, the analysis of advocacy 
strategies provided a statistical method for comparing the civic agency of groups of 
CSOs based on legitimacy categories and making inferences based on those 
comparison. Recent policy documents, which will be discussed in the following 
section, indicate that the dynamics discussed are considered to be relevant to this 
broader category of divided societies, at least from the perspective of donors. The 
narrative will now examine how donor approaches are changing and address the 
policy implications of this research for both CSOs and donors. 
6.8 Policy implications 
This section will focus on the policy implications of the dissertation research for 
CSOs engaged in advocacy and for donors implementing CS strengthening 
programs. In the spirit of the ‘local turn,’ this section will first address the 
implications for CSOs and activists engaged in advocacy initiatives. The research 
benefited from the time and reflections that were generously provided by the CSO 
staff and activists. It is hoped that this discussion and the related recommendations 
may provide some benefit in exchange. CSOs emphasized the importance of 
legitimacy for their work and for achieving outcomes of advocacy initiatives. 
However, the CSOs also indicated that building legitimacy among citizens requires 
time and effort, which is made more difficult by project activities and donor 
reporting obligations. Nevertheless, the researched CSOs with high local legitimacy 
have been successful in this effort, and CSOs can benefit from learning about their 
approaches and actions. With respect to how to strengthen local legitimacy, the 
finding that citizens emphasize legitimacy due to ‘solving concrete problems’ 
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provides an opportunity. Thus, CSOs should emphasize the concrete benefits of 
their programs rather than more abstract goals. Micro scale spaces, such as youth 
and women’s centers, are also a practice that contribute to high local legitimacy. In 
addition, citizens are often skeptical and withhold legitimacy because they perceive 
that CSOs are motivated by narrow personal interests and lack integrity. One 
approach that some but only a very small minority of CSOs take is to increase 
financial transparency by publishing financial statements.  
The research findings also have implications for how to improve the ability 
of CSOs to achieve desired outcomes. CSOs’ outcomes can be strengthened by 
cooperative learning among CSOs about what strategies are successful. The findings 
emphasize contextual lessons learned about successful advocacy, particularly 
regarding the contributory role of developing and strengthening ties with state 
actors. Models of ‘straddler’ organizations, such as the municipal youth councils, 
which are made up of youth CSOs with a legal framework and state support, are 
innovative ways to strengthen these ties and are also supported by research from 
Indonesia (Yumasdaleni & Jakimow, 2017). However, such organizations are only 
successful at strengthening participation and leading to desired outcomes when they 
are strongly supported by the participating CSOs. Finally, a frequent lack of even 
formal outcomes for participatory actions does not mean that such actions should be 
abandoned. Citizen participation, both of the more cooperative and more 
confrontational varieties, is too integral to the norms of democratic governance. 
However, there is a benefit to acknowledging the experiences of both CSOs and 
citizens related to the futility of such actions. Much could be gained by more self-
reflection on the part of CSOs and more dialogue between CSOs and activists and 
among CSOs, particularly given the sharp critiques of those donor-supported 
organizations in 2014.  
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Some have argued that the dynamics regarding CS strengthening programs 
described here will not change until the programs are radically changed. Belloni 
concludes that ‘[s]o long as international engagement is framed around the notion 
that individuals, groups, and local associations are objects of international 
engagement, rather than being active agents with resources and assets, civil society’s 
contribution to both democratization and peace will be limited’ (2008, p. 184). The 
Bosnian anthropologist and activist Nebojša Šavija-Valha, whose writings are critical 
of the power relations of intervention, has proposed the even more radical idea that 
CS invigoration can only happen with a drastic withdrawal of foreign funds (2009, 
2012). The hope of such changes, and that their beneficial outcomes would outweigh 
negative and unforeseen consequences, remains unknown. 
Barring such changes, however, there is a benefit to discussing the current 
status of donor CS strengthening programs and making more incremental proposals 
for how such programs might be improved. At the end of the day, such programs 
are part of the political and economic context in which Bosnian CSOs find 
themselves and which they navigate to varying degrees of success. In fact, current 
donor programs demonstrate adaptation in response to the ‘legitimacy critique.’ In 
Summary of recommendations for CSOs engaged in advocacy 
 Stay focused on legitimacy as understood by citizens, even though building 
legitimacy with citizens is time-consuming and frequently not relevant for 
donor programs. 
 Emphasize ways to communicate goals and outcomes in terms of ‘solving 
concrete problems’ that citizens can understand. 
 Follow the lead of some CSOs and reduce citizens’ skepticism regarding 
donor programs via increased financial transparency. 
 Prioritize actions which strengthen local legitimacy among other CSOs 
due to its importance for coalition-building. 
 Engage in more effort to learn from the innovative advocacy strategies 
applied by CSOs and their outcomes; apply successful ones more 
frequently. 
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particular, current USAID and EU multiyear policy documents emphasize 
representation, credibility, and autonomy as necessary contributing factors for 
strengthening CS advocacy roles (EU DG Enlargement, 2013; USAID, 2013). In 
addition, these programs also reflect adaptation due to the gradual pace of change, 
in that they work on longer time frames. The recommendations will focus on the 
key areas of partner selection, collaboration within civil society, the implicit 
understanding of divided societies, and using lessons from advocacy initiatives for 
capacity building.  
Donor programs reflect awareness of the legitimacy critique (i.e., that donor 
programs frequently support CSOs with low local legitimacy, particularly legitimacy 
among citizens). Interviews with donor staff also show that they consider civil society 
to be largely ‘donor-driven’ and lacking in legitimacy (Ostojić & Fagan, 2014). In 
this perception, donor staff are similar to the literature, which primarily discusses 
donor-funded CSOs rather than the larger groups of CSOs that do not receive donor 
funds. Largely absent from this analysis is a discussion of those CSOs that receive 
public funds, which in fact are significantly more numerous than CSOs that receive 
donor funds.140  Donor programs can integrate better the understanding that CSOs 
exist with different forms of legitimacy (particularly the idea that there are CSOs 
with both donor and local legitimacy). This approach can be reflected by including 
legitimacy among citizens as one of the selection criteria for which CSOs receive 
support via donor programs. To implement this approach, donors need better 
information about the legitimacy of CSOs. As an example, one donor who was 
interviewed gathered this information by visiting affected communities and asking 
their opinion of applicant CSOs. In addition, the International Commission on 
Missing Persons (ICMP) expressed interest in applying the CSO legitimacy 
questionnaire that was developed during this dissertation to better understand the 
legitimacy of family associations that ICMP supports. 
                                                          
140 Grants for civil society and human rights in 2012 of 7.5 million euros (Donor Coordination Forum, 
2012) and grants to CSOs from all levels of government of 51.3 million euros (SIF in BiH and CSPC, 
2013).  
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The current donor programs emphasize cooperation among CSOs in the way 
they pose issue-based and sectoral coalitions as a means to improved governance 
outcomes. However, coalitions that formed in response to donor calls were observed 
to be based on the financial interests of dominant (large, professional) CSOs at the 
expense of their wider membership. This characteristic contributes to the short-term 
nature of the coalitions and shapes the outcomes that are possible. This dissertation 
finds that CSOs that enjoy legitimacy among both citizens and donors are strategic 
in the way that they foster partnership relationships with selected CSOs. Therefore, 
such CSOs represent unused potential for mobilizing broader support for desired 
common goods. 
Donor programs often reflect a dichotomous view of divided societies, 
marginalizing most ethnic and religious actors from receiving financial and political 
support, while supporting CSOs that apply inclusive liberal discourses. However, 
such programs reflect less sensitivity to the perceptions of citizens regarding ethnic 
identifications (for example, CSOs that only work in territories where one ethnic 
group is a majority). Such programs could benefit from an increased understanding 
of the ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ that was observed during the research and also 
avoiding the assumption that ‘ethnic’ CSOs are a priori opponents of donor-
supported goals. 
In broad strokes, donor legitimacy leads to donor resources, which strengthen 
transactional capacity and support more effective advocacy. Local legitimacy in the 
absence of donor legitimacy (i.e., the ‘representative’ CSOs) is more participatory 
out of necessity, but this comes at the expense of immediate results. This finding 
points to the literature on temporal dilemmas of post-war democratization (A. K. 
Jarstad & Sisk, 2008). Namely, while transactional strategies are often effective in 
terms of achieving outcomes, they can also reinforce neopatrimonialist governance. 
The ‘representative’ CSOs are the ones who engage in participatory actions and thus 
contribute more to strengthening participatory democratic roles, but such CSOs 
have less to show for their efforts. The findings provide empirical data and starting 
points for approaches that better integrate both kinds of capacities. 
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Finally, the concept of capacity building remains central to CS strengthening 
programs. This dissertation has argued that transactional capacities are more salient 
than participatory capacities for inclusive outcomes in a context like Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Many of the CSOs that were researched indicated lessons based on 
their advocacy initiatives. Donor programs could better reflect this accumulated 
knowledge among CSOs. Rather than existing models of individual participation 
and professional advocacy, donor programs should increase awareness of what forms 
of advocacy (both participatory and transactional) lead to outcomes. 
  
Summary of recommendations for donor policies 
 Improve methods for assessing the legitimacy of individual CSOs so that 
legitimacy among citizens can be considered as a criterion for selecting 
CSOs to support. 
 Actively support coalitions fostered by the ‘intermediary’ CSOs with 
legitimacy among both citizens and donors because this research suggests 
that such CSOs are more effective advocates. 
 Dedicate staff time and funds to respond to more organic civic agency, 
regardless of the area of focus and scope, rather than only top-down 
designs. 
 Improve awareness of the particular characteristics of civil society within 
divided societies (for example, how CSOs use ‘ambiguous ethnicness’). 
 Increase the broader use of lessons learned by CSOs with advocacy 
experience within capacity-building programs. 
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6.7 Konačno (Finally) 
This research started from the premise of the practical benefit of an in-depth study 
of cases of civic agency among CSOs and activists, and a hope remains at the end of 
this long process that the insights gained will be able to be translated into such 
practical benefits. For me, one of the benefits was challenging my assumptions (for 
example, that participation and protest would be more central for civic agency and 
that achieving outcomes is more common than it turned out to be). As a practitioner 
living in BiH, I learned a lot about how civil society actors go about advocacy and 
about the depth of the divide between the formal rules of governance and how they 
work in practice. As a researcher, I learned the importance of questioning and 
articulating my assumptions and the subtle ways that ethnicity is both out in the 
open and hidden in everyday interactions. The research process was personally 
enriching and surprising when it went in unexpected directions (for example, in 
terms of the central role of transactional capacities to explain the outcomes that were 
achieved). My hope is that these findings are a reflection of the many CSO staff, 
members, and partners who gave so generously of their time. In the end, both the 
potential (i.e., ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ and ‘local first’) and the limitations (i.e., ‘dead 
letters’ and ‘fighting against windmills’) of civic agency are reflections of the social 
and institutional reality, as played out on an everyday basis. The path has been 
discouraging at times, given that I, too, hope for a better future for my adopted 
home. In the end, I am struck by the creativity and innovation of those who I was 
able to research, and I finish with some new ideas and still more curiosity… 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Constituency survey 
Legitimacy and civic agency of CSO actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
You were recommended by the organization    because you have 
been involved in their work. Your answers to this questionnaire are confidential but 
a summary of the answers of all the people who answered will be shared with the 
organization. That means no-one will know what your answers were and I will not 
give your name and personal details to anyone, in particular they will not appear in 
the report. This survey is part of a PhD research project and contact information can 
be found at the end. Thank you! 
1. Age: 
2. Gender:  
3. Your involvement with this organization (you may select more than one) 
Member/Beneficiary/Staff person/unpaid volunteer/paid volunteer/Board 
member/CSO partner/government counterpart 
4. How many years have you involved with the organization 
5. How well do you know their work (not at all – not much – somewhat – 
quite well – very well) 
6. How often have you been involved in any way in the activities of the 
organization? (never – one to three times in the last 6 months – at least once 
per month - at least once per week – on most days) 
7. In your opinion, how credible and legitimate is the organization? 
In your opinion, how much do the following statements describe the organization 
________? 
8. has good results (strongly agree – strongly disagree) 
9. members or beneficiaries receive personal benefit because of their work  
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10. represents its members or beneficiaries 
11. provides important services 
12. follows a mission & vision that I support 
13. staff of the organization is representative of its members or beneficiaries 
14. works for the common good 
15. follows the right procedures 
16. confronts political and economic elites 
17. is against nationalism 
18. professional skills and capacity 
19. Fits into our society and cultural traditions 
20. Has a long history in the community 
21. Is legally registered 
22. Follows legal obligations 
23. The good reputation of the staff/volunteers 
24. Would you like to add any additional comments about why this 
organization is or isn’t legitimate and credible? 
In your opinion, how much does the legitimacy and credibility of ________ depend 
on the following factors? 
25. has good results (very much – not at all) 
26. members or beneficiaries receive personal benefit because of their work  
27. represents its members or beneficiaries 
28. provides important services 
29. follows a mission & vision that I support 
30. staff of the organization is representative of its members or beneficiaries 
31. works for the common good 
32. follows the right procedures 
33. confronts political and economic elites 
34. is against nationalism 
35. professional skills and capacity 
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36. Fits into our society and cultural traditions 
37. Has a long history in the community 
38. Is legally registered 
39. Follows legal obligations 
40. The good reputation of the staff/volunteers 
Contact information: Randall Puljek-Shank, PhD Candidate, r.puljek-
shank@fm.ru.nl, +387.61.488.978 
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Table 7-1. Salience of sources of legitimacy for CSO constituencies 
 Instrumental Normative Traditional Rational/ 
Legal 
Salient141  Performance 
(has good 
results, 
provides 
important 
services) 
 Representation 
of 
constituencies 
 Self-interest of 
constituencies 
 
 Mission & vision 
 ‘Doing the right 
things’ (works for 
the common good) 
 Reputation of key 
staff (founders, 
leaders) 
(professional skills 
and capacity) 
 ‘Doing things right’ 
 Positionality 
regarding dominant 
discourses (opposes 
nationalism) 
 Shared background 
and values  
 Taken-for 
-granted 
status 
(long 
history in 
our 
community
) 
 
Not 
salient 
  Moral voice 
(confronts political 
and economic elites) 
 Conformi-
ty to social 
structures 
or cultural 
traditions 
 Actions in 
accordance 
with legal 
obligations 
 Registra-
tion 
 
                                                          
141 Salience was determined based on spearman correlation coefficients between legitimacy scores and 
legitimacy sources. Legitimacy: ‘In your opinion, how credible and legitimate is the organization?’; 
sources: ‘In your opinion, to what degree do the following statements describe the organization.’ Salience 
was determined if ρ >0.22 based on one-tailed t-test at 0.005 level of significance with n=189 responses. 
  Appendices 
 
205 
Table 7-2. Salience of sources of legitimacy for CSO constituencies in rank order 
Source Type Salience 
Follows a mission & vision that I support Normative 0.59 
Provides important services Instrumental 0.51 
Has good results Instrumental 0.46 
Represents its members/beneficiaries Instrumental 0.45 
Has professional skills and capacity Instrumental 0.45 
Work for the common good Normative 0.44 
The good reputation of the staff/volunteers Normative 0.42 
Follows the right procedures Normative 0.40 
Opposes nationalism Normative 0.37 
Has a long history in the community Traditional 0.28 
Staff of the organization is representative of its 
members or beneficiaries 
Normative 0.28 
Members or beneficiaries receive personal benefit 
because of their work 
Instrumental 0.25 
Follows legal obligations Rational/Legal 0.22 
Is legally registered Rational/Legal 0.17 
Fits into our society and cultural traditions Traditional 0.16 
Confronts political and economic elites Normative 0.13 
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Appendix B: Construction of CSO legitimacy based on key informant 
interviews 
Table 7-3. Donor Perspectives on CSO legitimacy 
Frequency Instrumental Normative Traditional 
Most 
frequent 
 Performance 
(results, 
articulation of 
problems and 
solutions 
 Representation of 
constituencies 
(membership 
(disputed), ability 
to mobilize) 
 Mission & 
vision (political 
understanding 
of CS, local 
ownership, 
collaboration 
with other 
CSOs) 
 ‘Doing the right 
things’ (dealing 
with issues of 
the moment, 
advocate for 
accepted needs) 
 Reputation of 
key staff 
(founders, 
leaders) 
(professional 
legitimacy, 
personal 
commitment 
and integrity) 
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Less 
frequent 
  Positionality 
regarding 
dominant 
discourses (if 
include 
minorities) 
 
Not 
mentioned 
 Self-interest of 
constituencies 
 Shared 
background and 
values  
 ‘Doing things 
right’ (Internal 
democracy & 
accountability) 
 Moral voice 
 Conformity to 
social structures 
or cultural 
traditions 
 Taken-for -
granted status 
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Table 7-4. Political Actor Perspectives on CSO legitimacy 
Frequency Instrumental Normative Traditional 
Most 
frequent 
 Performance 
(Competence and 
capacity, provide 
services, results, have 
been tested) 
 Mission & vision 
(new model of 
citizenship, ideals, 
autonomous)  
 ‘Doing the right 
things’ 
(Articulation of 
everyday needs)  
 Conformity 
to social 
structures 
or cultural 
traditions 
Less 
frequent 
 Representation of 
constituencies 
 Reputation of key 
staff  (not elites) 
 Positionality 
regarding 
dominant 
discourses (able to 
overcome 
division) 
 ‘Doing things 
right’ (legal 
compliance, 
registration) 
 
Not 
mentioned 
 Self-interest of 
constituencies 
 Shared 
background and 
values  
 Moral voice 
 Taken-for- 
granted 
status 
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Appendix C: CSO ethnicness framework 
Dimension Indicators Example of low 
ethnicness 
Example of high 
ethnicness 
Ideological Mission 
statement, 
Website, CSO 
reports, Public 
statements 
‘CSO works for all, 
regardless of 
ethnicity’ 
Positive references to 
ethnic struggle 
Symbolic Mission 
statement, 
Website, CSO 
reports 
Refer to universal 
symbols 
Have ethic/religious 
identifier in the name 
Citizen 
perception 
Member survey, 
Public 
statements 
High values for 
‘confront ethnic 
elites’ 
Low values for 
‘confront ethnic elites’ 
Area of work Website, social 
media, CSO 
reports 
Work across the 
country 
Only work in 
communities with one 
ethnic majority 
Declared 
target 
population/me
mbers 
Member survey, 
CSO reports 
‘We seek out 
different ethnicities’ 
‘We work to support 
returnees in 
Srebrenica’142 
Actual target 
population/me
mbers, 
Member survey, 
CSO reports 
Work with 
different ethnicities 
Work exclusively with 
one ethnicity 
Composition 
of staff 
Website, CSO 
reports 
Very ethnically 
heterogeneous 
Staff all of one ethnicity 
 
                                                          
142 Commonly understood to be of Bošnjak ethnicity 
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Appendix D: Interviews and participant observation 
Date Position Organization 
Local Political 
 
30-Aug-12 Assistant Mayor Novo Sarajevo Municipality 
31-Aug-12 Advisor for Work with NGOs Stari Grad Municipality 
11-Sep-12 Assistant to the Minister, 
Sector for Civil Society 
Ministry of Justice, Sector for 
Civil Society 
26-Sep-12 Member of Parliament Federal Parliament 
Civil Society - Religious 
 
1-Aug-12 Director Small Steps 
16-Aug-12 Professor Emeritus Catholic School of Theology, 
Interreligious Council 
11-Sep-12 Activist Izvor Nade (Source of Hope) 
Civil Society - On Media and Business 
 
4-Sep-12 Director Association of Employers 
8-Apr-12 Journalist Buka 
14-Sep-12 Director BH Journalists 
Civil Society – General 
 
7-Apr-12 Program Manager Helsinki Citizens Assembly 
26-Jun-12 Chief of Party Catholic Relief Services 
6-Sep-12 Director Tuzla Citizen's Forum 
4-Oct-12 Director Our Children Sarajevo 
Civil Society – Activists 
 
12-Nov-12 Activist UNSA Geto 
17-Nov-12 Activists Dobro.ba 
21-Feb-13 Activist Others’ Citizens Front 
12-Apr-13 Program Manager Helsinki Citizens Assembly 
12-Apr-13 Activist UNSA Geto 
Civil Society Building 
 
3-Sep-12 Director Kronauer Consulting 
11-Sep-12 Resident Advisor TACSO 
3-Oct-12 Project Manager Center for the Promotion of 
Civil Society 
4-Oct-12 Consultant CIDI 
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Date Position Organization 
International Civil Society 
 
16-May-12 Chief of Party Public International Law & 
Policy Group 
15-Jun-12 Senior Associate Democratization Policy Council 
Donors 
  
19-Sep-12 First Secretary, Development 
Cooperation 
Embassy of Sweden 
 
20-Sep-12 Programme Manager - Civil 
Society Development 
EU Delegation 
2-Oct-12 Country Representative, 
Programme Officer 
Kvinna till Kvinna 
11-Oct-12 Project Management Specialist USAID 
22-May-13 First Secretary, Development 
Cooperation 
Embassy of Sweden 
28-May-13 First Secretary Germany Embassy 
4-Jun-13 Regional Director - 
CEE/Russia 
CS Mott Foundation 
7-Jun-13 Deputy Head of Mission Embassy of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands 
7-Jun-13 Director Open Society Fund 
10-Jun-13 Senior Program Officer National Endowment for 
Democracy 
10-Jun-13 Director of Cooperation Swiss Development 
Cooperation 
International Political Actors 
 
30-Aug-12 Head of Office Council of Europe 
4-Sep-12 Senior Advisor Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) 
Potential CSO interviews 
 
24-Oct-12 Director VESTA 
25-Oct-12 Director Youth Resource Center 
12-Nov-12 Secretary MeNeRaLi 
12-Nov-12 Program Manager United Women 
13-Nov-12 Program Manager Hi Neighbor 
16-Nov-12 President, Activist Democratic Youth Movement 
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Date Position Organization 
21-Feb-13 Director Abrašević 
22-Feb-13 Director Women to Women 
24-Feb-13 Director TPO 
26-Feb-13 Director, Activist Renesansa 
4-Mar-13 Public Relations KULT 
6-Mar-13 Director, Journalist Kewser 
7-Mar-13 Program Manager Foundation for Local 
Democracy Sarajevo 
12-Mar-13 Director B&H Woman 
2-Apr-13 Director Nahla 
4-Apr-13 Program Manager Open Network 
20-Sep-13 Program Manager Center for Civil Cooperation 
21-Oct-13 Executive Director Youth Information Agency 
Case study interviews 
 
21-Feb-13 Volunteer Abrašević 
 
12-Mar-13 Activist Abrašević, Street Air Festival, 
Youth Council 
12-Mar-13 Independent Officer for 
Relations with NGOs and 
Religious Communities 
City of Mostar 
11-Apr-13 Secretary MeNeRaLi 
11-Apr-13 Program Manager United Women 
11-Apr-13 Program Manager Hi Neighbor 
17-Apr-13 Director, Journalist Open Network 
22-May-13 President Democratic Youth Movement 
1-Oct-13 Assistant Mayor Novo Sarajevo Municipality 
16-Oct-13 Director Association of Dialysis, 
Transplant Recipients, and 
Chronic Kidney Patients for 
Doboj Region 
23-Oct-13 Legal Advisor and Head of 
Education Department 
 
Nahla 
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Date Position Organization 
24-Oct-13 Director Abrašević 
24-Oct-13 President Mostar Youth Council 
25-Oct-13 Director B&H Woman 
11-Nov-13 Head of Department for Social 
Activities 
City of Banja Luka 
12-Nov-13 Officer for Youth City of Banja Luka 
12-Nov-13 Assistant Minister Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare, RS 
12-Nov-13 Program Manager Udružene Žene 
12-Nov-13 Secretary MeNeRaLi 
13-Nov-13 Intervention Team 
Coordinator 
Banja Luka Center for Social 
Work 
13-Nov-13 Program Manager United Women 
13-Nov-13 Officer Department for Social 
Activities, City of Banja Luka 
13-Nov-13 President Association for Assistance to 
Developmentally Disabled 
Banja Luka 
13-Nov-13 Member of Parliament National Assembly of RS 
26-Nov-13 Program Manager Caritas 
28-Nov-13 Legal Advisor Viva Žene, Safe Network 
13-Dec-13 President Democratic Youth Movement 
27-Dec-13 Program Manager Open Network 
8-Jan-14 Executive Director Youth Information Agency 
9-Jan-14 Director, Program  Manager Women to Women 
13-Jan-14 Assistant Minister Ministry of Health, Federation 
2-Jun-14 Activist Democratic Youth Movement 
8-Jul-14 President, Activist Democratic Youth Movement 
16-Oct-14 Director B&H Woman 
7-Nov-14 Member of Parliament Federal Parliament 
10-Nov-14 Executive Director Abrašević 
11-Nov-14 Officer MUP Mostar 
11-Nov-14 
 
Program Manager Caritas 
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Date Position Organization 
11-Nov-14 Independent Officer for 
Relations with NGOs and 
Religious Communities 
Mostar city government 
17-Nov-16 Youth Center Manager Spajalica/KULT 
17-Nov-16 Executive Director KULT 
Participant Observation  
24-May-13 POINT Conference Why Not 
28-Jun-12 Monthly Meeting NGO Council 
14-Feb-13 Public Event 'Billion Rising' Multiple 
3-Apr-13 Bidder's Conference USAID 
9-Apr-13 Position and Perspectives for 
Youth in BiH 
KULT 
22-Apr-13 Conference on Youth Councils KULT 
22-Sep-14 Peace, Justice, and the fight 
against corruption: the role of 
NGOs 
Multiple 
30-Dec-13 Presentation of book "ženski 
pokret" 
Sarajevo Open Center 
25-Oct-13 Conference on Federation 
Constitutional Reform 
Conrad Adenauer Foundation 
9-Dec-13 Presentation of book "sjaj 
ljudskosti" 
TPO 
10,11-Nov-
14 
Observation of café and public 
events 
Abrašević 
30-Oct-15 Panel about Domestic Violence Women to Women 
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Summary 
This research emerged from a decade of experience supporting local organizations 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia or BiH) to overcome ethnic divides. Two practical 
questions emerged from this experience. The first question was, how do 
organizations become change agents towards the state, rejecting the common 
understanding in BiH that politics is a dirty and immoral affair that is best avoided 
all together (i.e., anti-politics)? The second question was, how do such organizations 
develop legitimacy among those in their surroundings? Bringing these two questions 
together, I hypothesized that organizations with local legitimacy might be more 
likely to have a broad sense of agency and a stronger ability to influence policies than 
organizations lacking local legitimacy. 
This dissertation uses Bosnia as a case of a divided society in which civil 
society (CS) strengthening programs by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, 
mainly from Western countries, have played a significant role. Divided societies are 
ethnically diverse societies in which ethnicity is politically salient as a basis for 
organizing politics. Drawing on Western CS theories, donors came to consider ‘CS 
strengthening’ a means to promote democratization and peacebuilding in divided 
societies. As a result, CS strengthening became an international policy aim. CS 
strengthening policies were conceived as a method of reforming state-society 
relations and fostering responsive and legitimate institutions that can effectively deal 
with conflict. 
This dissertation applies the concept of civic agency, defined as the perception 
of capacity and action vis-à-vis the state to create change for a common good, in order to 
approach the issue of change agents towards the state. Given the limited and de-
politicized way that CS has been applied in the policies of donors, civic agency is a 
way to ‘bring the politics back in’. Focusing on the political effects of CS, it 
conceptualizes the ‘spark’ that motivates and shapes civil society’s struggle towards 
the state in divided societies. This dissertation provides in-depth research on the 
civic agency of both formal and non-formal CS actors - civil society organizations 
(CSOs) and activists, respectively – analyzing the types of actions that they 
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undertake and the outcomes of engagement with the state. The focus on civic agency 
follows a shift in the peace literature away from studying liberal peace interventions 
(founded on democracy, civil society, and a market economy) and their (lack of) 
results and towards a ‘local turn’. The ‘local turn’ means a shift in epistemology from 
interventionism to the ideational constructions of local actors and the processes, 
practices, and interrelationships that shape those constructions. 
This dissertation thus aims to answer the following research question: How 
do the local and donor legitimacy of civil society actors influence their civic agency and their 
outcomes in the presence of donor CS strengthening programs in a divided society?   
The analytical framework brings together rather separate literatures on CS 
strengthening programs, divided societies, and civic agency. The causal links 
between legitimacy and civic agency are explored by selecting and comparing similar 
CSOs with different kinds of legitimacy. Legitimacy is considered from the 
perspectives of citizens, political actors, and donors. The perceptions of legitimacy 
with these groups can be linked in theory and empirical research to the outcomes of 
civic agency. In addition, the civic agency of activists is also compared to that of 
CSOs in a similar context. The focus is on theory-building based on the case of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
Chapter One first establishes the context of CS and governance in the 
Bosnian case. Next, it offers a theoretical framework for the research, presenting 
each of the key concepts (CS, civic agency, participatory and transactional capacities, 
and legitimacy) and explaining how those concepts are used in relation to theory and 
empirical research. The links between legitimacy and civic agency are analyzed in 
relation to two academic debates. The first debate focuses on the ‘legitimacy critique’ 
of donor CS strengthening programs and how they reduce local support for CSOs 
and activists, while the second debate focuses on the difficulties of mobilizing cross-
cutting identities in divided societies. This second debate concerns the potential and 
limitations of CS vis-à-vis ethnic division in a divided society. As is explained in this 
chapter, the dissertation examines the potential and limitations of civic agency in 
terms of influencing cross-cutting identities by investigating the advocacy of selected 
women’s, youth, and social welfare CSOs, as well as activism framed around a 
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‘citizen’ identity. Bosnia provides fertile ground for exploring this interaction in a 
more general sense because donor programs have been long-lasting and more has 
been invested per capita than in almost any other country. 
The remainder of Chapter One focuses on laying out the foundations of the 
research. First, the research question is broken down into four sub-questions in order 
to tease out the causal links between legitimacy and civic agency. Each of the sub-
questions is addressed in a chapter, which have been published as separate peer-
reviewed journal articles. Next, a methodology section presents the design of the 
research and describes how the data was collected and analyzed. Finally, the societal 
relevance of the dissertation is discussed in light of current donor policies and 
discourse among CS actors in Bosnia. 
Chapter Two focuses on understanding the legitimacy of Bosnian CSOs. It 
is particularly interested in two questions: first, what is the relationship between local 
and donor legitimacy? And second, what is the relationship between CSO legitimacy 
and ethnicness (their ethnic character)? Regarding the first, although the findings 
support previous research which concludes that donor and local legitimacy rarely go 
together, the combination does occur. One of the novel explanations offered for their 
scarcity is that local and donor actors apply different norms when assessing 
legitimacy. There is local mistrust of international normative frameworks and their 
perceived lack of tangible results. Organizations enjoying both local and donor 
support form an interesting category. These organizations tend to focus on solving 
concrete problems and to play intermediary roles between local and donor discourses 
and actors.  
Secondly, the ethnic character of CSOs was found to be more ambiguous 
than implied by theories that characterize CSOs as either bonding or bridging social 
capital and as either inclusive or divisive. As a result, the relationship between 
ethnicness and legitimacy was also found to be much more ambiguous than expected. 
The majority of high local legitimacy organizations, in addition to some with both 
local and donor legitimacy, demonstrate ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ – meaning that they 
act as multi-ethnic and mono-ethnic organizations depending on the audience and 
context. Legitimate organizations then are often those best able to maneuver in 
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ethnically-divided societies and political systems, and this adaptive use of ‘ambiguous 
ethnicness’ enables them to do so. ‘Ambiguous ethnicness’ offers benefits to CSOs 
in terms of their positionality in relation to the dominant ideas of ethnonationalism 
and the liberal peace, as it enables them to fit themselves into different and even 
competing discourses where beneficial.  
Chapter Three focuses on ways that different categories of legitimacy with 
the key constituencies of citizens and donors influence the kinds of actions in which 
CSOs engage vis-à-vis the state. Three categories were researched: ‘donor darlings’ 
(legitimate with donors but not citizens), ‘representatives’ (legitimate with citizens 
but not donors) and ‘intermediaries’ (legitimate with both groups).  There are salient 
differences between the categories in how they attempt to influence the state, 
particularly whether they focus on mobilization of citizens (participatory capacities) 
or on developing ties to political actors (transactional capacities). This chapter 
analyses how these different capacities influence outcomes and what role donor 
resources play in this.  
The findings in this chapter support the link made in the critique of CS 
strengthening programs that low legitimacy with citizens is a contributing factor to 
the adoption of apolitical approaches by supported CSOs. Indeed, the ‘donor 
darling’ CSOs tend to follow apolitical approaches. However, the findings also 
question the critique of CS strengthening programs which argues that technocratic 
and professional approaches inhibit civic agency. In this light, it is surprising that 
the ‘representative’ CSOs use expertise the most as an advocacy strategy. The chapter 
argues that this is due to differences regarding the nature of expertise. The expertise 
applied by these ‘representatives’ is related to their ability to engage in formal state 
processes via understanding of legal and administrative systems, which is 
strengthened by traditional professional qualifications. Expertise can be a resource 
by which CSOs gain influence if it is sought by the state. Yet the expertise sought is 
rarely provided by the ‘donor darling’ CSOs. Rather, it is the ‘representative’ CSOs, 
which are the least involved in donor programs, which most often provide expertise 
to the state.  
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Chapter Four turns to the question of how activists outside of formal CSOs 
expressed civic agency in 2014 protests (with larger and more sustained participation 
than any since Dayton) and plenums, a new form of participatory democracy open 
to all citizens on an equal footing. It uses interviews with key activists and plenum 
statements to argue that the protests were positioned against both dominant patterns 
of ethnic politics and the politics of CS strengthening programs. In order to explain 
this it turns to Antonio Gramsci’s conceptualization of CS as part of the way that 
hegemony functions by manufacturing consent via the ‘rules of the game’. Even 
though governance within the liberal peace is often described as a hybrid of 
international and local practices, the chapter puts forth the idea that the hybrid state 
is not dominated under one hybrid hegemony, but rather denoted by two vastly 
different visions of statehood competing for support from and influence over the 
populace—a situation referred to as dual hegemony. 
The chapter argues that this dual hegemony helps to explain the emergence 
of ‘local first’ approaches to activism since 2014. ‘Local first’ means a strategy of 
pursuing geographically local action with explicitly political strategies, for example 
to support the re-opening of the Dita factory in Tuzla and the national museum in 
Sarajevo. Each of these acts, while being local in scope, also carried symbolic 
meaning that resonated with the wider demands of 2014 for increased social justice. 
‘Local first’ provides a means to become political by building popular legitimacy in 
opposition to ‘dual hegemony’. Although the activists carried with them some of the 
contradictions and tensions of anti-politics, ‘local first’ has potential as an 
intermediate step towards building broader, cross-ethnic political coalitions. 
Chapter Five focuses on the group of locally legitimate CSOs and analyses 
whether they are able to achieve outcomes as a result of their efforts. On the one 
hand, there is strong evidence that such CSOs are able to achieve outcomes. At the 
same time, the outcomes are often only formal, and much more effort is required to 
achieve substantive outcomes that are implemented in practice. These experiences of 
bounded and ambiguous substantive outcomes from engagement in governance 
processes encourage CSOs to become incrementalists and limit their perceptions of 
their own capacity. Secondly, the chapter argues based on the case studies that it is 
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often transactional capacity rather than participation which reaps results. This point 
will return again in the conclusion. 
Chapter Six revisits the answers to each of the four sub-questions and then 
uses these as the basis for three key findings. This discussion is followed by a section 
on the contributions of the dissertation for theoretical debates and a methodological 
reflection which discusses key choices that were made during the research process. 
A final section discusses the policy implications of the research: what are ways in 
which activists, CSOs, and donors can do better?  
The first finding focuses on the civic agency of the three categories: ‘donor 
darlings’ (legitimate with donors but not citizens), ‘representatives’ (legitimate with 
citizens but not donors) and ‘intermediaries’ (legitimate with both groups). By 
comparing CSOs with variations in levels of both local and donor legitimacy, the 
combined effects of these two forms of legitimacy become clearer. These categories 
of CSOs vary in the capacities that they bring to interactions with the state and the 
outcomes that they are able to achieve. The finding is that the combined effects of 
local and donor legitimacy explain the potential and limitations of civic agency and 
the outcomes that can be achieved.  
The second finding addresses how civic agency influences processes of 
legitimation, i.e., how CSOs present themselves as legitimate for different groups 
and which of these claims are accepted. A finding from Chapter Two is that 
‘ambiguous ethnicness’ is often a successful technique of legitimation given different 
expectations on the part of citizens, donors, and the state. ‘Ambiguous ethnicness’ 
supports the second finding, that civil society actors exhibit civic agency through the 
innovative and strategic ways in which they legitimate themselves towards both 
ethnic divides and CS strengthening programs. It is also shown in the adoption of 
‘local first’ strategies by activists following the 2014 protests and plenums. This 
approach is a legitimation strategy due to the way that it builds on citizens’ concerns 
and strengthens legitimacy by solving concrete problems. It is strategic in its focus 
on local-level problems in contrast to activism that is focused on challenging ethnic-
based division directly.   
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The third finding is that transactional capacities with political actors are 
more salient than participatory capacities with citizens in explaining the link 
between civic agency and outcomes. The limited potential of participatory capacities 
was demonstrated by the ‘representative’ CSOs described in Chapter Three. Given 
their legitimacy among citizens but not donors, it is not surprising that these CSOs 
use participatory actions more often. These actions include using protest as a means 
of power and a substantive threat, but also as a means that they view as having mixed 
efficacy at best. This research provides ample evidence that the lessons learned from 
participation is often not that this approach works but that it does not work, echoing 
the public discourse following the activist mobilizations of 2014. Despite the 
differences in advocacy actions, there was strong support across all of the legitimacy 
categories for the idea that what makes a difference in influencing the state is direct 
engagement. 
Chapter Six next discusses the contributions of the dissertation to theoretical 
debates regarding the intersection between CS and divided societies theories, 
particularly the benefit of civic agency in this regard. Instead of analyzing CS in 
divided societies via binary categories regarding their orientation towards ethnic 
cleavages (i.e., bonding/bridging, inclusive/exclusive), civic agency is relevant in the 
way that many CSOs engage in ‘ambiguous ethnicness’. A contribution is also made 
to the literature on activism in divided societies by the framing and description of 
‘dual hegemony’ and how it helps to explain the strategies adopted and their potential 
to challenge the status quo. In addition, this work adds analytical substance to the 
civic agency concept and tests its utility by applying it to both CSOs and non-formal 
activism. The final contribution concerns the benefit of the findings regarding civic 
agency for theoretical debates regarding ‘local agency’ and the ‘local turn’ within 
International Relations theory of liberal peace interventions. This section concludes 
by making the case for the generalizability of the findings to other divided societies 
with CS strengthening programs. 
This dissertation develops a new methodology for assessing CSO legitimacy. 
Previous efforts have focused on qualitative approaches to CSOs as a group, a few 
key informants, and population surveys of their opinions of selected CSOs. In 
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contrast, for this research, more people from different perspectives (donors, political 
actors, and diverse CS actors) were interviewed, and similar CSOs (in terms of focus 
area, urban context) were selected based on legitimacy categories, which were then 
compared. This methodology includes a framework based on previous theory and 
empirical research for coding the sources of CSO legitimacy (i.e., the reasons why a 
particular subject considers a given CSO to be legitimate). In addition, a 
questionnaire was developed based on the same framework and administered to 
CSO constituents. The questionnaire provides a tool for comparison between 
individual CSOs and diverse contexts, enabling future quantitative research projects 
on CSO legitimacy in other contexts. 
Chapter Six concludes by elaborating on the policy implications of the 
dissertation research for CSOs engaged in advocacy and for donors implementing 
CS strengthening programs. With respect to how to strengthen local legitimacy, the 
finding that citizens emphasize legitimacy due to ‘solving concrete problems’ 
provides an opportunity. Thus, CSOs should emphasize the concrete benefits of 
their programs rather than more abstract goals. Micro scale spaces, such as youth 
and women’s centers, are also a practice that contribute to high local legitimacy. 
The findings emphasize contextual lessons learned about successful advocacy, 
particularly regarding the contributory role of developing and strengthening ties with 
state actors. Models of ‘straddler’ organizations, such as the municipal youth 
councils, which are made up of youth CSOs within a legal framework and with state 
support, represent innovative ways to strengthen these ties. However, such 
organizations are only successful at strengthening participation and leading to 
desired outcomes when they are strongly supported by the participating CSOs. 
Barring more radical changes to donor programs, there is a benefit to 
discussing the current status of donor CS strengthening programs and making more 
incremental proposals for how such programs might be improved. At the end of the 
day, such programs are part of the political and economic context in which Bosnian 
CSOs find themselves and which they navigate to varying degrees of success. In fact, 
current donor programs demonstrate adaptation in response to the ‘legitimacy 
critique.’ The recommendations focus on the key areas of partner selection, 
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collaboration within CS, the implicit understanding of divided societies, and using 
lessons from advocacy initiatives for capacity building. First, donor programs can 
better integrate the understanding that CSOs exist with different forms of legitimacy 
and include legitimacy among citizens as one of the selection criteria for which CSOs 
receive support via donor programs. Next, current donor programs emphasize 
cooperation among CSOs as a means to improve governance outcomes. CSOs that 
enjoy legitimacy with both citizens and donors may be better able to form more 
sustainable coalitions rather than the frequent short-term ones based on the financial 
interests of dominant (large, professional) CSOs at the expense of their wider 
membership. Finally, donor programs often reflect a dichotomous view of divided 
societies, marginalizing most ethnic and religious actors from receiving financial and 
political support, while supporting CSOs that apply inclusive liberal discourses. Such 
programs can benefit from an increased understanding of the ‘ambiguous ethnicness’ 
that was observed during the research and also avoiding the assumption that ‘ethnic’ 
CSOs are a priori opponents of donor-supported goals. 
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
Dit onderzoek wortelt in een decennium aan ervaring in het ondersteunen van lokale 
organisaties in Bosnië en Herzegovina (Bosnië of BiH) met als doel de etnische 
verdeeldheid te overbruggen. Uit deze ervaring kwamen twee praktische vragen 
voort. De eerste vraag was: hoe ontwikkelen organisaties zich tot change agents ten 
opzichte van de staat, waarbij ze ingaan tegen de algemene opvatting in BiH dat 
politiek een bedrieglijke en immorele aangelegenheid is die het beste geheel 
vermeden kan worden (de zogeheten anti-politiek)? De tweede vraag die opkwam 
was: hoe verwerven dergelijke organisaties legitimiteit binnen hun eigen omgeving? 
De beantwoording van deze vragen in dit proefschrift gaat uit van de veronderstelling 
dat organisaties met lokale legitimiteit een grotere kans hebben op het uitoefenen 
van agency en een beter vermogen hebben om beleid te beïnvloeden, dan organisaties 
met een gebrek aan lokale legitimiteit.  
Bosnië geldt in dit proefschrift als een voorbeeld van een verdeelde 
samenleving waarin beleidsprogramma’s, gericht op het versterken van civil society 
(CS) en gefinancierd door zowel bilaterale als multilaterale donoren uit voornamelijk 
Westerse landen, een aanzienlijke rol hebben gespeeld. Verdeelde samenlevingen 
zijn samenlevingen met een etnisch diverse samenstelling waarin etniciteit politiek 
gezien sterk van belang is en een basis vormt voor politieke organisatie. Op basis van 
Westerse CS theorieën hebben donoren CS versterkende programma’s ontplooid als 
een manier om democratisering en wederopbouw in verdeelde samenlevingen te 
bevorderen. Deze CS versterkende programma’s worden gezien als een instrument 
om de relaties tussen de staat en de maatschappij te hervormen. Daarnaast willen 
deze programma’s responsieve en legitieme instituties bevorderen die op een 
effectieve manier met conflict om kunnen gaan.  
Dit proefschrift maakt gebruik van het concept civic agency, gedefinieerd als: 
de perceptie van capaciteit en actie tegenover de staat om verandering voor het 
gemeenschappelijke goed te bewerkstelligen. Dit concept wordt toegepast om de rol van 
change agents richting de staat te begrijpen. Omdat donoren CS veelal op een 
gedepolitiseerde benaderen, kan civic agency een manier zijn om de politiek terug in 
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dit proces te brengen door te focussen op de politieke effecten van CS. Op deze 
manier kunnen ook de beweegredenen worden blootgelegd van CS actoren die in 
verdeelde samenlevingen invloed proberen uit te oefenen op de staat . Dit 
proefschrift betreft een onderzoek  naar de civic agency van zowel formele als 
informele CS actoren – civil society organisaties (CSOs) en activisten – door de 
verschillende soorten acties die ze ondernemen en de betrokkenheid met de staat die 
daaruit volgt te analyseren. Deze focus volgt de stroming binnen de literatuur op het 
gebied van vrede en wederopbouw, die afstand neemt van de nadruk op de studie 
van de liberal peace interventies (gefundeerd op democratie, CS, en de 
markteconomie) vanwege  de (beperkte) resultaten die daarmee zijn behaald, en die 
het accent heeft verlegd  naar een ‘local turn’. Deze ‘local turn’ omvat een 
verschuiving in de epistemologie van interventionisme naar de ideologische 
constructies van lokale actoren en de processen, praktijken en onderlinge relaties die 
hiervan onderdeel zijn.  
Dit proefschrift probeert dus een antwoord te vinden op de volgende 
onderzoeksvraag:  
Hoe beïnvloedtn de lokale- en donor-legitimiteit van civil society actoren hun civic 
agency en hun behaalde resultaten in een verdeelde samenleving waar civil society 
versterkende beleidsprogramma’s zijn ingezet?  
Het analytische kader brengt de relatief gescheiden literatuur op het gebied 
van CS versterkende programma’s (verdeelde samenlevingen en civic agency) samen. 
Door vergelijkbare CSOs met verschillende mate aan legitimiteit te selecteren en te 
vergelijken wordt de causale link tussen legitimiteit en civic agency bestudeerd. 
Legitimiteit wordt hierin vanuit de perspectieven van burgers, politieke actoren en 
donoren benaderd. De percepties van legitimiteit binnen deze groepen wordt door 
middel van theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek gekoppeld aan de uitkomsten van 
civic agency. Daarnaast wordt de civic agency van activisten vergeleken met dat van 
CSOs in een soortgelijke context. Dit onderzoek richt zich op theorie-ontwikkeling 
gebaseerd op de casus van Bosnië en Herzegovina.  
Hoofdstuk 1 begint met het omschrijven van de context van CS en 
beleidsvorming in de Bosnische casus. Vervolgens wordt een theoretisch kader 
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gepresenteerd waarin de fundamentele concepten (CS, civic agency, participatieve en 
transactionele capaciteiten en legitimiteit) uiteen worden gezet en waarin wordt 
uitgelegd hoe deze concepten worden gebruikt in relatie tot theorie en empirisch 
onderzoek. Het verband tussen legitimiteit en civic agency wordt geanalyseerd door 
het te betrekken op twee academische debatten. Het eerste debat focust op de 
legitimiteitskritiek van de CS versterkende programma’s van donoren en hoe deze 
lokale steun voor CSOs en activisten verminderen. Het tweede debat focust op de 
moeilijkheden die ontstaan bij het mobiliseren van overlappende identiteiten in een 
verdeelde samenleving. Dit tweede debat gaat over de potenties en beperkingen van 
een CS ten aanzien van etnische scheidingen in een verdeelde samenleving., Door 
de belangenbehartiging van CSOs te bestuderen, onderzoekt deze dissertatie de 
mogelijkheden en de beperkingen van civic agency wat betreft het beïnvloeden van 
overlappende identiteiten. Met name wordt gekeken naar CSOs die zich richten op 
vrouwen, jongeren en maatschappelijk welzijn, en naar activisme rondom het frame 
van burgerschap. Bosnië is een geschikte casus voor het bestuderen van deze 
problematiek omdat de programma’s van donoren langdurig van aard zijn en omdat 
er bijna nergens anders zoveel per hoofd van de bevolking  is geïnvesteerd in deze 
beleidsprogramma’s. 
De rest van hoofdstuk één richt zich op het neerzetten van de fundamenten 
van het onderzoek. Eerst wordt de onderzoeksvraag in vier sub-vragen verdeeld om 
de causale link tussen legitimiteit en civic agency bloot te leggen. Elk van deze sub-
vragen zal worden behandeld in hoofdstukken die ook elk afzonderlijk van elkaar als 
artikelen gepubliceerd zijn. Vervolgens wordt de methodologische opzet van de 
studie gepresenteerd en wordt er uitgelegd hoe de data is verzameld en geanalyseerd. 
Tot slot wordt de maatschappelijke relevantie van dit proefschrift met betrekking tot 
het huidige donorbeleid en het discours van CS actoren in Bosnië besproken.   
Hoofdstuk 2 richt zich op de legitimiteit van Bosnische CSOs. Twee vragen 
staan centraal: ten eerste, wat is de relatie tussen lokale legitimiteit en donor-
legitimiteit? Ten tweede, wat is de relatie tussen de legitimiteit van CSOs en hun 
ethnicness (hun etnische karakter)? Hoewel en aanzien van de eerste vraag veel 
voorgaand onderzoek, aantoont dat donorlegitimiteit en lokale legitimiteit zelden 
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samen gaan, komt deze combinatie in dit onderzoek toch voor. Het onderzoek biedt 
een nieuwe verklaring voor  de zeldzaamheid  van deze combinatie, namelijk dat 
lokale en donor actoren verschillende normen toepassen wanneer ze hun legitimiteit 
beoordelen. Er bestaat een gebrek aan lokaal vertrouwen in de internationale 
normatieve kaders vanwege hun verondersteld gebrek aan tastbare resultaten. 
Organisaties die zowel lokale steun als steun van donoren genieten vormen een 
interessante categorie. Deze organisaties neigen naar het oplossen van concrete 
problemen. Daarmee spelen ze vaak een intermediaire rol tussen de lokale en donor 
discoursen en de actoren.  
In relatie tot de tweede vraag bleek het etnische karakter van CSOs meer 
ambigu te zijn dan wordt verondersteld door theorieën die CSOs enkel opdelen in 
categorieën als verbindend of overbruggend, en inclusief of verdelend. Als gevolg van 
dit meerduidige etnische karakter, werd de relatie tussen ethnicness en legitimiteit 
ook als meer ambigu waargenomen dan aanvankelijk werd verwacht. De 
meerderheid van de organisaties met een hoge lokale legitimiteit, samen met een 
aantal organisatie met zowel lokale- als donor-legitimiteit, laten een ambigue 
ethnicness zien. Dit houdt in dat ze zich soms voordoen als multi-etnisch en soms als 
mono-etnisch, afhankelijk van hun publiek en context. De organisaties met lokale 
legitimiteit zijn dus vaak het beste in staat om te maneuvreren in etnisch verdeelde 
maatschappijen en politieke systemen. Het gebruik van ambigue ethnicness stelt ze 
hiertoe in staat. Ambigue ethnicness biedt voordelen aan de positie van CSOs in 
relatie tot de dominante ideeën over ethno-nationalisme en de liberal peace. Dit komt 
doordat het hen in staat stelt om aan te sluiten bij verschillende, zelfs competitieve 
discoursen, afhankelijk van wat hen uitkomt.  
Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op de invloed van legitimiteit in de ogen van burgers 
en donoren op de acties van CSOs ten aanzien van de staat. De drie categorieën die 
onderzocht zijn: ‘donor darlings’ (legitiem bij donoren maar niet bij burgers), 
representatives’ (legitiem bij burgers maar niet bij donoren) en ‘intermediaries’ 
(legitiem bij beide groepen). Er zijn aanzienlijke verschillen tussen de categorieën in 
hoe zij de staat proberen te beïnvloeden. Dit geldt met name de keuze of ze  focussen 
op het mobiliseren van burgers (participatie capaciteiten) of op het ontwikkelen van 
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banden met politieke actoren (transactionele capaciteiten). Dit hoofdstuk analyseert 
hoe deze verschillende capaciteiten uitkomsten kunnen beïnvloeden en welke rol 
door donor verstrekte middelen hierin spelen.  
De bevindingen in dit hoofdstuk sluiten zich aan bij die kritiek op CS 
versterkende programma’s die betoogt dat lage legitimiteit bij burgers bijdraagt aan 
de het ontplooien van apolitieke benaderingen door CSOs. Het blijkt inderdaad dat 
‘donor darling’ CSOs de neiging hebben om apolitieke benaderingen na te streven. 
Daarentegen trekken de bevindingen een ander onderdeel de kritiek op de CS-
versterkende programma’s in twijfel. Critici stellen namelijk dat de technocratische 
benadering van deze programma’s civic agency inperkt. In dit opzicht is het 
opmerkelijk dat niet de ‘donor darlings’, maar juist de ‘representative’ CSOs het vaakst 
hun expertise inzetten als een belangenbehartigings-strategie. Het hoofdstuk 
beargumenteert dat er sprake is van verschillende soorten expertise. De expertise die 
de ‘representatives toepassen is gerelateerd aan hun vermogen om deel te nemen in 
formele statelijke processen door hun begrip van legale en administratieve systemen. 
Deze expertise kan een middel zijn waarmee CSOs invloed kunnen uitoefenen op 
het moment dat de staat naar deze expertise zoekt. De gezochte expertise wordt 
echter zelden verschaft door de ‘donor darling’ CSOs. Het zijn eerder de 
‘representative’ CSOs, die het minst betrokken zijn in de donor programma’s, die 
meestal die expertise aan de staat verschaffen.  
 Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de vraag hoe activisten hun civic agency, buiten de 
formele CSOs om, uitten in de protesten van 2014 (welke een grotere en langduriger 
participatie kenden dan elk ander protest sinds Dayton) en hoe een nieuwe vorm van 
democratie werd gecreëerd die open stond voor iedereen en burgers op gelijke voet 
plaatste. Interviews met de belangrijkste activisten en vergaderstukken worden 
gebruikt om aan te tonen dat de protesten zich positioneerden tegenover zowel de 
dominante etnische politiek als de CS versterkende programma’s. Om dit uit te 
kunnen leggen wordt Antonio Gramsci’s conceptualisering van CS gebruikt. Hij 
definieert CS als een deel van de manier waarop hegemonie functioneert door 
consensus voort te brengen via het opstellen van spelregels. Hoewel bestuur binnen 
de liberal peace vaak omschreven wordt als een mix van internationale en lokale 
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praktijken, komt dit hoofdstuk met het idee dat de hybride staat niet gedomineerd 
wordt door één hybride hegemonie. Daarentegen zien we twee zeer verschillende 
visies op de staat die in competitie zijn voor steun van en invloed over de populatie- 
een situatie waarnaar gerefereerd wordt als een duale hegemonie.  
Het hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat deze duale hegemonie helpt bij het 
uitleggen van de sinds 2014 opgekomen ‘local first’ benadering tot activisme. ‘Local 
first’ betekent het nastreven van lokale activiteiten met expliciete politieke 
strategieën. Een voorbeeld hiervan is het steunen van de heropening van de Dita 
fabriek in Tuzla en het nationale museum in Sarajevo. Elk van deze acties, ook al 
zijn ze lokaal van aard, dragen ook een symbolische waarde die doorklinkt in de 
bredere eisen uit 2014 ter verbetering van de sociale rechtvaardigheid. Het grote 
verschil was dat deze acties deze keer geen verandering opeisten, maar het zelf 
produceerden.‘Local first’ biedt een manier om politiek te worden door legitimiteit 
binnen de populatie op te bouwen die tegenover de duale hegemonie staat. Ondanks 
dat deze activisten sommige contradicties en spanningen van de antipolitiek met zich 
meedroegen, heeft ‘local first’ de potentie om een intermediaire stap te vormen naar 
het bouwen van bredere, cross-etnische politieke coalities.  
Hoofdstuk 5 focust op de groep CSOs die lokale legitimiteit genieten en 
analyseert de vraag of ze dit behaalden als een resultaat van hun eigen inspanningen. 
Enerzijds is er sterk bewijs dat dergelijke CSOs in staat zijn om uitkomsten te 
bewerkstelligen. Anderzijds zijn de uitkomsten vaak enkel formeel, en is veel meer 
inspanning nodig om de substantiële uitkomsten te behalen die worden 
geïmplementeerd in de praktijk. Deze ervaringen van gebonden en dubbelzinnige 
uitkomsten van de betrokkenheid bij beleidsprocessen, moedigen CSOs aan om het 
incrementalisme te omarmen en zo het zicht op hun eigen capaciteit te belemmeren. 
Daarnaast, beargumenteert dit hoofdstuk, op basis van case studies, dat het vaak de 
transactionale capaciteit en niet participatie betreft, waar resultaat wordt geboekt. 
Dit punt komt terug in de conclusie. 
Hoofdstuk 6  combineert de antwoorden van de vier sub-vragen tot een basis 
voor drie algemene bevindingen. Deze discussie wordt gevolgd door een paragraaf 
over de toevoegingen van de dissertatie op de theoretische debatten en een 
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methodologische reflectie op de belangrijkste keuzes die zijn gemaakt tijdens het 
onderzoeksproces. Het laatste deel bespreekt de beleidsimplicaties van het 
onderzoek en behandelt manieren waarop activisten, CSOs en donoren effectiever 
op kunnen treden.  
De eerste bevinding focust  op de civic agency van drie categorieën: ‘donor 
darlings’ (legitiem bij donors maar niet bij burgers), ‘representatives’ (legitiem bij 
burgers maar niet bij donoren) en ‘intermediaries’ (legitiem bij beide groepen). Door 
CSOs met een variërende mate van zowel lokale als donor legitimiteit met elkaar te 
vergelijken, worden de gecombineerde effecten van deze twee vormen van 
legitimiteit duidelijker. Deze categorieën van CSOs variëren in de capaciteiten die 
ze door de interacties met de staat hebben verworven, alsmede in de uitkomsten die 
zij daarmee kunnen bereiken. De bevinding is dat de gecombineerde effecten van 
lokale en donorlegitimiteit de mogelijkheden en belemmeringen van civic agency en 
de uitkomsten die kunnen worden behaald, kunnen verklaren.  
De tweede bevinding benoemt hoe civic agency processen van legitimiteit 
beïnvloedt dat wil zeggen, hoe CSOs zichzelf als legitiem representeren voor 
verschillende groepen en welke van deze claims door deze groepen geaccepteerd 
worden. Een bevinding van hoofdstuk twee is dat een ambigue mate van ethnicness 
vaak een succesvolle techniek is om legitimiteit te verkrijgen gezien de verschillende 
verwachtingen die burgers, donoren en de staat hebben. Deze ambigue ethnicness 
ondersteunt de tweede bevinding, namelijk dat civil society actoren civic agency  tonen 
door de innovatieve en strategische manieren waarop zij zichzelf legitimeren 
richting zowel etnische verdeling als CS versterkende programma’s. Dit wordt ook 
aangetoond door de toepassing van de ‘local first’ strategieën bij activisten in 
navolging van de protesten in 2014. Deze benadering is een strategie om legitimiteit 
te verkrijgen door de manier waarop het inspeelt op de zorgen van burgers en door 
dit te versterken met het oplossen van concrete problemen. De strategische focus op 
lokale problemen staat in tegenstelling tot het activisme dat focust op het direct 
tegengaan van de etnische verdeeldheid. 
 De derde bevinding is dat zogeheten transactional capacities in relatie tot 
politieke actoren relevanter zijn dan zogeheten participative capacities in relatie tot  
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burgers voor een begrip van de relatie tussen civic agency en het succes van hun 
inspanningen. Het beperkte gewicht van participative capacities werd aangetoond in 
de analyse van de ‘representative’ CSOs in hoofdstuk 3. Gezien de legitimiteit die zij 
wel onder burgers maar niet onder donoren genieten, is het niet verrassend dat deze 
CSOs vaker gebruik maken van acties gericht op participatie. Het gebruik van 
protest is daarbij een machtsmiddel en vormt een significante dreiging, maar heeft 
ook slechts  een beperkte werkzaamheid. Dit proefschrift laat zien   dat de 
participatie-benadering meestal niet werkt. Dit correspondeert met het publieke 
debat hierover na de mobilisatie van activisten in 2014. Ondanks de verschillen in 
belangenbehartigingsacties, was er een sterke steun binnen alle categorieën van 
legitimiteit voor het idee dat directe betrokkenheid daadwerkelijk  het verschil maakt 
in het beïnvloeden van de staat. 
Hoofstuk 6 bespreekt vervolgens de bijdrage van de dissertatie op de 
theoretische debatten. Er wordt een bijdrage geleverd aan de theorievorming 
betreffende de intersectie tussen CS en verdeelde samenlevingen, in het bijzonder de 
voordelen van civic agency in dit opzicht. In plaats CS in verdeelde samenlevingen te 
analyseren als een binaire categorie wat betreft hun oriëntatie op etnische 
scheidslijnen (bindend/overbruggend; inclusief/exclusief), is juist civic agency 
relevant gebleken omdat het de wijze waarop waarop CSOs ambigue etnicness 
centraal stellen. Het proefschrift voegt ook toe aan de literatuur op het gebied van 
activisme in verdeelde samenlevingen. Dit wordt gedaan door de toepassing van het 
begrip duale hegemonie, waardoor een beter inzicht mogelijk wordt in de gekozen 
strategieën en hun kans om de status quo uit te dagen. Daarnaast levert dit 
proefschrift een conceptuele bijdrage aan het begrip civic agency. Bovendien 
onderzoekt het  de bruikbaarheid van dit begrip door het toe te passen op zowel 
heterogene CSOs als op vormen van non-formeel activisme. De laatste toevoeging 
betreft de waarde van de bevindingen op het gebied van civic agency voor de 
theoretische debatten aangaande ‘local agency’ en de ‘local turn’ binnen de 
Internationale Betrekkingen theorieën over liberal peace interventies. Hoofdstuk 6  
eindigt met een discussie over  de generaliseerbaarheid van het onderzoek naar 
andere verdeelde samenlevingen met CS versterkende programma’s.  
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Deze dissertatie ontwikkelt een nieuwe methodologie om CSO legitimiteit 
te benaderen. Voorgaande pogingen richtten zich voornamelijk op een kwalitatieve 
benadering van CSOs als één groep, waarin een aantal belangrijke informanten, en 
enquêtes over de meningen van de samenleving over een aantal geselecteerde CSOs 
leidend waren. Daarentegen zijn voor dit onderzoek meer mensen geïnterviewd die 
verschillende perspectieven vertegenwoordigen (van donoren, politieke actoren, en 
diverse CS actoren), en zijn vergelijkbare CSOs (op het gebied van hun focus en 
geografische context) geselecteerd op basis van de mate van legitimiteit, en met 
elkaar vergeleken. Deze methodologie voorziet in wezen in een codering van de mate 
van legitimiteit (dat wil zeggen, de reden waarom een bepaald subject een CSO als 
legitiem beschouwt) en bevat een kader dat is gebaseerd op voorgaande theorie en 
empirisch onderzoek. Daarbij is er een vragenlijst opgesteld gebaseerd op ditzelfde 
kader en dat werd verspreid onder de CSO actoren. De vragenlijst verschaft een 
mogelijkheid om individuele CSOs in verschillende contexten met elkaar te 
vergelijken. Dit maakt toekomstige kwantitatieve onderzoeksprojecten naar CSO 
legitimiteit in een andere setting mogelijk.   
Hoofdstuk 6 eindigt met een uiteenzetting van de beleidsimplicaties van het 
onderzoek voor CSOs die betrokken zijn bij belangenbehartiging, en voor donoren 
die CS versterkende beleidsprogramma’s implementeren. Als het gaat om het 
versterken van lokale legitimiteit, biedt de bevinding dat burgers legitimiteit vooral 
toekennen als gevolg van het oplossen van concrete problemen, een kans om 
legitimiteit op dit gebied te versterken. CSOs zouden dan de concrete voordelen van 
hun programma’s moeten benadrukken in plaats van de meer abstracte doelen. 
Ruimtes op een microniveau, zoals centra voor jongeren en vrouwen, zijn ook 
concrete voorbeelden van beleid dat bijdraagt aan een hoge lokale legitimiteit.  
De bevindingen benadrukken de contextuele les over succesvolle 
belangenbehartiging, met name gezien de  rol van het ontwikkelen en versterken van 
de banden met statelijke actoren. Modellen van overbruggende organisaties zoals de 
gemeentelijke jeugdraden, die bestaan uit jeugd CSOs binnen een juridisch kader 
met steun van de staat, zijn voorbeelden van  innovatieve manieren om de banden te 
versterken. Zulke organisaties zijn echter enkel succesvol in het versterken van 
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participatie en het voortbrengen van de gewenste uitkomsten als ze nadrukkelijk 
worden gesteund door de deelnemende CSOs.  
Naast meer radicale veranderingen aan donorprogramma’s, is het raadzaam 
om de huidige status van donor CS versterkende beleidsprogramma’s te bespreken 
en meer stapsgewijze voorstellen op te stellen voor de verdere verbetering van zulke 
programma’s. Uiteindelijk zijn zulke programma’s onderdeel van de politieke en 
economische omgeving waarbinnen Bosnische CSOs zich bevinden en waarbinnen 
ze in verschillende mate successen boeken. In de praktijk laten huidige 
donorprogramma’s al in bepaalde mate aanpassingen zien als antwoord op de 
legitimiteitskritiek. De aanbevelingen benadrukken de belangrijkste gebieden van 
partnerselectie, samenwerking binnen CS, kennis over verdeelde samenlevingen, en 
het gebruik van de lessen van belangenbehartigingsinitiatieven voor het opbouwen 
van capaciteit. Allereerst kunnen donor programma’s verbeteren door de kennis te 
verspreiden dat dat CSOs bestaan uit verschillende vormen van legitimiteit. Het is 
daarom belangrijk dat  het genieten van legitimiteit onder de bevolking aangenomen 
wordt als één van de selectiecriteria op basis waarvan CSOs steun ontvangen via 
donor programma’s. Verder benadrukken huidige donorprogramma’s de 
samenwerking tussen CSOs als een manier om beleidsuitkomsten te verbeteren. 
CSOs die legitimiteit genieten onder zowel burgers als donoren zijn mogelijk beter 
in staat om meer substantiële coalities te vormen. De huidige coalities zijn nog te  
vaak gericht op korte-termijneffecten en  zijn voornamelijk gebaseerd op de 
financiële belangen van de grote CSOs. Dit gaat ten koste van hun bredere 
lidmaatschap. Ten slotte hebben donorprogramma’s vaak een dichotome kijk op 
verdeelde samenlevingen, waarin ze de meeste etnische en religieuze actoren 
marginaliseren bij het verkrijgen van financiële en politieke steun terwijl de CSOs 
die de inclusieve liberale discoursen toepassen wel steun krijgen. Zulke programma’s 
kunnen profiteren van een beter begrip over de ambigue ethnicness, dat zo centraal 
staat in dit onderzoek. Dit kan ook de misvatting corrigeren dat etnische CSOs per 
definitie tegenstanders zouden zijn van de door donoren ondersteunde doelen.  
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